Narrative:

We rejected a takeoff after receiving a 'configuration flaps' takeoff warning message because we failed to ensure the flaps were set for takeoff. I let my attention be taken up by secondary issues such as air traffic; wheels up time; and single engine taxi metrics.I arrived in ZZZ ahead of my report time to find out my departure was delayed due to a late arriving aircraft. We needed extra time prior to boarding because lav service and catering were slow to perform their functions. This added another 15-20 minutes to our already delayed flight; and we ended up departing a full 2+ hours behind schedule. I flew the leg out with no abnormalities.we had full flight leaving and performed a 29 min turn; arriving in the gate at XA21 and departing at XA50. At about XA35; in the middle of boarding; we called ground control for our clearance and estimated a XA55 departure. I estimated with the usual 5-10 min delay beyond the requested time; we would have plenty of leeway if we got a wheels up time just after the top of the hour. I thought that would be an expeditious but reasonable wheels up time.we pushed back at XA50 and I elected to start the right engine and set; as I almost always do unless limited by weather or safety concerns. I called parking brake released; sterile cockpit' as I always do and we taxied out; I decided to hold off on the taxi checklist because runway xy/zz was directly behind us and I wanted to focus on safely crossing the runway first. After crossing golf; when I would ordinarily perform the taxi checklist; my focus again went to time management as I began contemplating it wheels up time. I had the first officer (first officer) start the left engine; and as we approached the end of the runway and I incorrectly called for the before takeoff checklist; the flight attendants (flight attendant) called us up 'secured for takeoff'. I asked the first officer to hold the before takeoff checklist to answer them. Ordinarily; I wouldn't do that because focusing on the checklist is the more pressing item. This event is exactly the reason why I won't hold checklists anymore except in rare; safety-related circumstances.when he returned from the call; we incorrectly performed the before takeoff checklist. I don't recall if he inadvertently skipped the 'takeoff configuration verified checked' or we both incorrectly responded to it because we saw what we wanted to see; and not what was actually there; but we missed it. The last factor that caught my attention was a comment the first officer made as we were approaching the end of the runway about aircraft Y. The pattern for runway 20 who was turning a very high base-to-final leg; I remember the first officer remarking that aircraft Y was very high; as if performing a 'power off 180' commercial training maneuver. Additionally; there was a company aircraft Z on final for [adjacent] runway; and I was again so preoccupied with our wheels up time that I inquired with tower if we were going to make our window; and he replied that he'd called and pushed our time a minute or two. My attention was completely outside the aircraft on external threats and I failed to eliminate the internal threat.we took the runway; I transferred the controls; and the last clue and I should have caught on to was when the first officer hit the toga switches and the FMA had to/to [and] red with lines through them. I starting saying 'something's not right' but by that point he'd pushed up the thrust levers. We got the 'configuration flaps' warning and immediately reverted to our training and rejected the takeoff; advised tower; pulled off the runway; made a PA for the passengers to remain seated; and performed the rejected takeoff QRH procedure. After 15 mins of brake cooling; we departed.[causes] too much of a focus on departing quickly and 'making up time'. Too much of a focus on set parameters when it was in inappropriate occasion. Holding a checklist that if performed correctly; is designed explicitly to avoid this error. Lost situational awarenessby not identifying the most pressing threat.I can't overstate how grave and serious an error this was. While we reacted correctly by rejecting the takeoff and performing the QRH; not departing until we were sure the aircraft and the passengers were taken care of; I could not believe the error I made. I'm responsible for the entire operation and I can't believe I made that egregious an error. I know this is especially a focus at [the company] because of past events and it's even more so inexcusable to make this error.[suggestion] we have the option to perform the taxi checklist after engine start or on the roll; as we taxi out if the conditions permit (e.g.; a busy ramp environment when we want to expedite leaving the gate for other departures and arrivals) but from here on out I will always perform the taxi checklist immediately after engine start. I like that we have the option; I don't feel like everything has to be dumbed down; trained to the 'lowest common denominator' but I have to acknowledge I didn't help that cause.I will also double down on my efforts to never be rushed. It's a big focus of mine always; and something I brief with my crews every trip but I failed to heed my own personal stance.I can't acknowledge; apologize for; and appreciate my mistake any more. It was an inexcusable error I will never again make; or anything like it.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported rejecting takeoff due to an incorrect flap setting.

Narrative: We rejected a takeoff after receiving a 'Configuration Flaps' Takeoff Warning Message because we failed to ensure the flaps were set for takeoff. I let my attention be taken up by secondary issues such as air traffic; wheels up time; and single engine taxi metrics.I arrived in ZZZ ahead of my report time to find out my departure was delayed due to a late arriving aircraft. We needed extra time prior to boarding because Lav Service and Catering were slow to perform their functions. This added another 15-20 minutes to our already delayed flight; and we ended up departing a full 2+ hours behind schedule. I flew the leg out with no abnormalities.We had full flight leaving and performed a 29 min turn; arriving in the gate at XA21 and departing at XA50. At about XA35; in the middle of boarding; we called ground Control for our Clearance and estimated a XA55 departure. I estimated with the usual 5-10 min delay beyond the requested time; we would have plenty of leeway if we got a wheels up time just after the top of the hour. I thought that would be an expeditious but reasonable wheels up time.We pushed back at XA50 and I elected to start the right engine and SET; as I almost always do unless limited by weather or safety concerns. I called parking brake released; sterile cockpit' as I always do and we taxied out; I decided to hold off on the taxi checklist because runway XY/ZZ was directly behind us and I wanted to focus on safely crossing the runway first. After crossing Golf; when I would ordinarily perform the taxi checklist; my focus again went to time management as I began contemplating it wheels up time. I had the First Officer (FO) start the left engine; and as we approached the end of the runway and I incorrectly called for the before takeoff checklist; the Flight Attendants (FA) called us up 'secured for takeoff'. I asked the FO to hold the before takeoff checklist to answer them. Ordinarily; I wouldn't do that because focusing on the checklist is the more pressing item. This event is exactly the reason why I won't hold checklists anymore except in rare; safety-related circumstances.When he returned from the call; we incorrectly performed the before takeoff checklist. I don't recall if he inadvertently skipped the 'Takeoff Configuration verified checked' or we both incorrectly responded to it because we saw what we wanted to see; and not what was actually there; but we missed it. The last factor that caught my attention was a comment the FO made as we were approaching the end of the runway about Aircraft Y. The pattern for runway 20 who was turning a very high base-to-final leg; I remember the FO remarking that Aircraft Y was very high; as if performing a 'power off 180' commercial training maneuver. Additionally; there was a company Aircraft Z on final for [adjacent] runway; and I was again so preoccupied with our wheels up time that I inquired with tower if we were going to make our window; and he replied that he'd called and pushed our time a minute or two. My attention was completely outside the aircraft on external threats and I failed to eliminate the internal threat.We took the runway; I transferred the controls; and the last clue and I should have caught on to was when the FO hit the TOGA switches and the FMA had TO/TO [and] Red with lines through them. I starting saying 'something's not right' but by that point he'd pushed up the thrust levers. We got the 'Configuration Flaps' warning and immediately reverted to our training and rejected the takeoff; advised tower; pulled off the runway; made a PA for the passengers to remain seated; and performed the rejected takeoff QRH procedure. After 15 mins of brake cooling; we departed.[Causes] Too much of a focus on departing quickly and 'making up time'. Too much of a focus on SET parameters when it was in inappropriate occasion. Holding a checklist that if performed correctly; is designed explicitly to avoid this error. Lost situational awarenessby not identifying the most pressing threat.I can't overstate how grave and serious an error this was. While we reacted correctly by rejecting the takeoff and performing the QRH; not departing until we were sure the aircraft and the passengers were taken care of; I could not believe the error I made. I'm responsible for the entire operation and I can't believe I made that egregious an error. I know this is especially a focus at [the company] because of past events and it's even more so inexcusable to make this error.[Suggestion] we have the option to perform the taxi checklist after engine start or on the roll; as we taxi out if the conditions permit (e.g.; a busy ramp environment when we want to expedite leaving the gate for other departures and arrivals) but from here on out I will always perform the taxi checklist immediately after engine start. I like that we have the option; I don't feel like everything has to be dumbed down; trained to the 'lowest common denominator' but I have to acknowledge I didn't help that cause.I will also double down on my efforts to never be rushed. It's a big focus of mine always; and something I brief with my crews every trip but I failed to heed my own personal stance.I can't acknowledge; apologize for; and appreciate my mistake any more. It was an inexcusable error I will never again make; or anything like it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.