Narrative:

We were tasked to fly aircraft X back from ZZZZ; this aircraft had extensive previous history on it. After performing a gate return for an engine valve issue and subsequent MEL we had a normal take off. Climbing through 6;000 feet we heard a very loud air noise; which we initially thought was rain/weather. No weather was present so I was tasked to check the cabin in case we had a door come open or something similar but the noise was present mainly in the cockpit. This was later determined to possibly be a blown duct. After the noise occurred we checked the status page and we had a landing gear monitor message. At the same time; the maintenance person that [the company] had tasked to ride with us had a specific piece of equipment to monitor the O2 content in the aircraft. As we leveled at 13;000 feet his monitor started making an audible alarm and noticeable flash and when I saw the screen I could see that the O2 content was not normal. We now had three issues occurring at the same time that we felt necessitated an air return which also was going to include an overweight landing in ZZZZ. As the relief officer (international relief officer) I looked up the overweight landing checklist and attempted to run it but there was some confusion among the three of us as to exactly how to run that checklist. It kept referring me to the performance section for the correct chart and for some reason I found that chart exceptionally difficult to understand. That checklist is somewhat confusing I think in the heat of battle. What was great was the ability of the ipad to remember what page I was on in the checklist and also to be able to 'hotlink' me to the correct sections and move back and forth - that feature is fabulous. I had to prompt the crew several times that we needed to run this overweight landing checklist which also contains the approach descent and landing checklists. The captain had his hands full flying the heavy aircraft and getting it properly slowed down and configured. The margins were very narrow on the speed tape. There was also some discussion of trying to 'document' what was happening which I eventually had to express very forcefully that the focus should be on flying the aircraft first. That was a definite threat which in a different scenario could have been very dangerous. With a heavy; slow plane like that; one person should have been totally focused on flying and at times that focus appeared to be wandering slightly. After we were able to get all the checklists ran we made a normal VFR approach and landing the slightly longer runway. ZZZZ had to suspend takeoffs for us I believe for us to land.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 flight crew reported returning to land due to several indications of malfunctions on the aircraft.

Narrative: We were tasked to fly Aircraft X back from ZZZZ; this aircraft had extensive previous history on it. After performing a gate return for an engine valve issue and subsequent MEL we had a normal take off. Climbing through 6;000 feet we heard a very loud air noise; which we initially thought was rain/weather. No weather was present so I was tasked to check the cabin in case we had a door come open or something similar but the noise was present mainly in the cockpit. This was later determined to possibly be a blown duct. After the noise occurred we checked the status page and we had a landing gear monitor message. At the same time; the Maintenance person that [the Company] had tasked to ride with us had a specific piece of equipment to monitor the O2 content in the aircraft. As we leveled at 13;000 feet his monitor started making an audible alarm and noticeable flash and when I saw the screen I could see that the O2 content was not normal. We now had three issues occurring at the same time that we felt necessitated an air return which also was going to include an overweight landing in ZZZZ. As the Relief Officer (IRO) I looked up the overweight landing checklist and attempted to run it but there was some confusion among the three of us as to exactly how to run that checklist. It kept referring me to the performance section for the correct chart and for some reason I found that chart exceptionally difficult to understand. That checklist is somewhat confusing I think in the heat of battle. What was great was the ability of the iPad to remember what page I was on in the checklist and also to be able to 'hotlink' me to the correct sections and move back and forth - that feature is fabulous. I had to prompt the crew several times that we needed to run this overweight landing checklist which also contains the approach descent and landing checklists. The captain had his hands full flying the heavy aircraft and getting it properly slowed down and configured. The margins were very narrow on the speed tape. There was also some discussion of trying to 'document' what was happening which I eventually had to express very forcefully that the focus should be on flying the aircraft first. That was a definite threat which in a different scenario could have been very dangerous. With a heavy; slow plane like that; one person should have been totally focused on flying and at times that focus appeared to be wandering slightly. After we were able to get all the checklists ran we made a normal VFR approach and landing the slightly longer runway. ZZZZ had to suspend takeoffs for us I believe for us to land.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.