Narrative:

I was assigned to fly in the right seat on this pairing. The pairing started off with a deadhead to ZZZ; and a schedule 9:49 overnight. I called scheduling when I got to my hotel room to adjust my show time. The go time for the flight was not adjusted. I informed the ca that I would be taking a later van time then them to accommodate my adjusted show time.once I got to the plane the ca had done the walk around and several other items so we would still be out on time. Sitting in the right seat for the first time in over four months and only one other time the entire year of 2017; it took a few minutes for me to adjust. I informed the ca that I have not sat in this seat in quite some time. So we agreed to take things slow.once we called for taxi; tower asked which runway we were requesting; we had planned; briefed and ran the performance checks for runway 2. Ground advised us that there would be slight delay for runway xx due to an aircraft that had a wheels up time. We both agreed to switch to runway yy. Luckily I had put runway yy in the conditions page so we already had the data. I quickly switched over to runway yy which involved changing from e-to to altitude-to; changing the runway in the FMS for the RNAV departure; verify all the fixes with the flight plan; resetting all the speeds and redoing the performance checklist. It was a high workload situation to say the least. In hindsight it might have been easier to wait for runway xx.after departure; at 1000 AGL; I called fra (flaps retract altitude); and the ca called for flight crew; flaps 0; after takeoff checklist. I asked if he wanted speed 200 due to ZZZ airspace; he replied that's fine. It was here that my muscle memory from using my right hand to raise the flaps caused the issue. This accompanied by ATC radio changes. At around 3000 the ca called for flight crew. Coming through 10;000 the ca called for the autopilot and he lowered the nose to accelerate the aircraft. Around 16;000 feet and 280 KIAS; I noticed that the flaps were still set at 9. We slowed the aircraft and raised the flaps.after discussing it; we had realized that I had not called out flaps indicating zero. I then ran the after takeoff checklist. It's amazing how 3 feet of perspective can completely and totally throw you off from such a simple task of raising the flaps. I feel that if I had more experience in sitting in the right seat this incident would not have happened.threats: lack of experience in sitting in the right seat; flight crew vs speed hold.errors: failing to raise the flaps with my left hand; failing to run the after takeoff checklist; failing to make the appropriate call outs; (flaps zero)uas: flaps 9 at 280 kiastypically when I am the ca; I do make the call out 'flaps; speed; sterile' at 10;000 feet. I did not do this on this leg; in the future I will make sure that I do regardless of which seat I am sitting in.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 Captain acting as the First Officer on this flight reported failing to raise flaps and run the after takeoff checklist. The pilot identified these due to lack of experience operating from the right seat.

Narrative: I was assigned to fly in the right seat on this pairing. The pairing started off with a deadhead to ZZZ; and a schedule 9:49 overnight. I called scheduling when I got to my hotel room to adjust my show time. The go time for the flight was not adjusted. I informed the CA that I would be taking a later van time then them to accommodate my adjusted show time.Once I got to the plane the CA had done the walk around and several other items so we would still be out on time. Sitting in the right seat for the first time in over four months and only one other time the entire year of 2017; it took a few minutes for me to adjust. I informed the CA that I have not sat in this seat in quite some time. So we agreed to take things slow.Once we called for taxi; tower asked which runway we were requesting; we had planned; briefed and ran the performance checks for runway 2. Ground advised us that there would be slight delay for runway XX due to an aircraft that had a wheels up time. We both agreed to switch to runway YY. Luckily I had put runway YY in the conditions page so we already had the data. I quickly switched over to runway YY which involved changing from E-TO to ALT-TO; changing the runway in the FMS for the RNAV departure; verify all the fixes with the flight plan; resetting all the speeds and redoing the performance checklist. It was a high workload situation to say the least. In hindsight it might have been easier to wait for runway XX.After departure; at 1000 AGL; I called FRA (Flaps Retract Altitude); and the CA called for FLC; Flaps 0; After Takeoff Checklist. I asked if he wanted speed 200 due to ZZZ airspace; he replied that's fine. It was here that my muscle memory from using my right hand to raise the flaps caused the issue. This accompanied by ATC radio changes. At around 3000 the CA called for FLC. Coming through 10;000 the CA called for the autopilot and he lowered the nose to accelerate the aircraft. Around 16;000 feet and 280 KIAS; I noticed that the flaps were still set at 9. We slowed the aircraft and raised the flaps.After discussing it; we had realized that I had not called out flaps indicating zero. I then ran the after takeoff checklist. It's amazing how 3 feet of perspective can completely and totally throw you off from such a simple task of raising the flaps. I feel that if I had more experience in sitting in the right seat this incident would not have happened.Threats: Lack of experience in sitting in the right seat; FLC vs SPD hold.Errors: Failing to raise the flaps with my left hand; failing to run the after takeoff checklist; failing to make the appropriate call outs; (flaps zero)UAS: Flaps 9 at 280 KIASTypically when I am the CA; I do make the call out 'flaps; speed; sterile' at 10;000 feet. I did not do this on this leg; in the future I will make sure that I do regardless of which seat I am sitting in.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.