Narrative:

We were trying to overcome delays caused by significant error on the part of the ramp crew. The flight crew became distracted and made many of their own mistakes as a result.the APU was MEL'd so we were on ground power and required an air start. Prior to starting the engine; rampers disconnected the gpu and the aircraft lost all power except battery power. Due to the interruption of power; EICAS showed numerous error messages that did not clear out on their own system logic. Maintenance was called and they ordered a 10-minute shutdown with gpu disconnected. When we looked to tell ramp to disconnect the gpu; all ramp crew had disappeared! We called operations to have them sent back to the aircraft. This added several more minutes to the delay. One consequence of the 10 minute shut down was that the out; off; on and in times cleared out of ACARS.after power was re-established; we started engines with assistance from an air start and a cross bleed start. We pushed and configured to de-ice the aircraft. At the same time; the flight attendant requested clearance to begin water service. Water service was authorized considering that we still needed to de-ice.just prior to de-ice; captain sent an ACARS message with the actual out time of xa:33. Dispatcher sent ACARS message requesting our status and indicated that we were approaching one hour since door closing. Captain responded that water service was underway. Dispatch requested 'times please' via ACARS. Captain responded with time of water service and out time.during taxi; dispatch requested off time.after rotation; captain sent the wheels up time of xa:47 via ACARS. Captain neglected to call 'positive rate' due to this distraction; so pilot flying overlooked calling 'gear up'.pilot monitoring selected the heading of 190. Pilot flying called for heading and autopilot. Pilot monitoring engaged both buttons. Captain usually confirms that autopilot is engaged when requested; but this time captain was observing that the FMS speed was at 201 knots and not increasing for the climb. Just as pilot monitoring noticed that the aircraft was not following the flight director; the audio 'sink rate' warning was heard.captain took controls and guided the aircraft into the flight director. Gear was retracted. Speed selector knob was switched to manual. Autopilot button was firmly pushed again and its engagement was confirmed.pilot flying indicated that he was looking at the flight plan page; thinking that the aircraft was on autopilot.1. Respect the sterile cockpit environment and monitor all indications while in sterile or above.2. Do not use ACARS below 10;000 feet.3. Avoid complacency at all times; but especially between wheels up and 10;000 feet.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB 175 flight crew reported distraction led to a lapse in standard operating procedures after takeoff; resulting in a GPWS 'sink rate' warning.

Narrative: We were trying to overcome delays caused by significant error on the part of the ramp crew. The flight crew became distracted and made many of their own mistakes as a result.The APU was MEL'd so we were on ground power and required an air start. Prior to starting the engine; rampers disconnected the GPU and the aircraft lost all power except battery power. Due to the interruption of power; EICAS showed numerous error messages that did not clear out on their own system logic. Maintenance was called and they ordered a 10-minute shutdown with GPU disconnected. When we looked to tell ramp to disconnect the GPU; all ramp crew had disappeared! We called operations to have them sent back to the aircraft. This added several more minutes to the delay. One consequence of the 10 minute shut down was that the out; off; on and in times cleared out of ACARS.After power was re-established; we started engines with assistance from an air start and a cross bleed start. We pushed and configured to de-ice the aircraft. At the same time; the flight attendant requested clearance to begin water service. Water service was authorized considering that we still needed to de-ice.Just prior to de-ice; Captain sent an ACARS message with the actual out time of XA:33. Dispatcher sent ACARS message requesting our status and indicated that we were approaching one hour since door closing. Captain responded that water service was underway. Dispatch requested 'times please' via ACARS. Captain responded with time of water service and out time.During taxi; Dispatch requested off time.After rotation; Captain sent the wheels up time of XA:47 via ACARS. Captain neglected to call 'positive rate' due to this distraction; so pilot flying overlooked calling 'gear up'.Pilot monitoring selected the heading of 190. Pilot flying called for heading and autopilot. Pilot monitoring engaged both buttons. Captain usually confirms that autopilot is engaged when requested; but this time Captain was observing that the FMS speed was at 201 knots and not increasing for the climb. Just as pilot monitoring noticed that the aircraft was not following the flight director; the audio 'sink rate' warning was heard.Captain took controls and guided the aircraft into the flight director. Gear was retracted. Speed selector knob was switched to manual. Autopilot button was firmly pushed again and its engagement was confirmed.Pilot flying indicated that he was looking at the flight plan page; thinking that the aircraft was on autopilot.1. Respect the Sterile cockpit environment and monitor all indications while in sterile or above.2. Do not use ACARS below 10;000 feet.3. Avoid complacency at all times; but especially between wheels up and 10;000 feet.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.