Narrative:

Conducted all preflight through engine start procedures and checklists per company SOP. During the departure brief; I reviewed rejected takeoff (rejected take off) and evac procedures with the first officer since it was the first flight of the trip. (We did note that the airplane came from the hangar and several switches on the overhead panel were out of their normal positions.)after pushing back and starting the engines; the first officer conducted a recall on the master caution system. I noted that the engine light remained illuminated. After checking the overhead panel; I observed both amber engine reverser lights illuminated. Both the first officer and I checked the circuit breaker panels but did not see any tripped cbs.we contacted hub maintenance on the VHF radio. After explaining our issue; I was informed by the technician that I could probably clear the problem by 'cycling the reversers about five times.' I told him that I believed that was a maintenance procedure and the technician told me to contact [maintenance control]. I spoke with [maintenance control] who told me the problem could be cleared by cycling the reversers. I told him I was not comfortable performing that procedure. I told him I was going to make an elb (electronic logbook) entry and asked him how he would like me to proceed. He told me to return to the gate. After coordinating with ramp control; we taxied back to the gate where we were met by local maintenance technicians. A technician came onboard and after coordinating with his partner; cycled both engine reverse levers two times each. This cleared the problem. While awaiting a new (maintenance release) to print out; the first officer and I conducted the preflight and before pushback checklists for a second time.engine start was normal and we conducted the after start through before takeoff procedures per company SOP including the before takeoff checklist. I distinctly remember pressing the take-off warn test button twice on the way to the runway and did not receive an aural warning horn.after we were cleared for takeoff on by the tower; I taxied the aircraft into position and transferred controls to the first officer. She pushed the throttles up for takeoff and we began our takeoff roll. Through 100 knots; all was normal. V1 was calculated at 143 knots. At approximately 130 (based on my best estimation) I heard a momentary 'chirp' that sounded like the takeoff warning horn. As I was processing this info; the intermittent takeoff warning horn began to sound continuously. Being in the high-speed regime; I did not have time to analyze the situation. Thinking the airplane may be in an unsafe configuration; I opted to reject the takeoff. I announced to the first officer that 'I have the airplane' and initiated the rejected takeoff procedure.the first officer advised the tower that we were rejecting the takeoff and asked for 'trucks' (or something to that effect). Tower seemed confused. As we were slowing to a stop; the first officer (first officer) was still busy talking to the tower and had not gotten to the 'remain seated' P.a. So I picked up the hand mic and made the announcement. I stopped the airplane straight ahead on the runway just prior to the taxiway intersection.I directed the first officer to tell the tower we were stopping on the runway and to request firefighting equipment. I believe I also asked ATC to 'roll the trucks' (or something similar). The point is that arff never responded.I asked tower if he observed any smoke or fire. He said he did not see any and asked another aircraft in the vicinity who replied in the negative. Feeling that an evacuation was not necessary; I called for the rejected takeoff QRH which we completed on the runway. After checking with flight attendants; I taxied clear of the runway after being requested to do so by the tower. After exiting the runway; I did not set the parking brake. We had calculated a brake cooling time of about 57 minutes based on conditions at the time of the reject. We coordinated with dispatch; operations; and maintenance. The plan was to stay put because we were very near the caution zone in the brake cooling chart. We shut down the engines and I was able to release the brakes and keep the aircraft from moving by cocking the nose wheel.the seatbelt sign was turned off and the flight attendants conducted a water service while we were waiting.at this time the first officer and I reviewed the configuration of the airplane and what may have caused the configuration warning. We verified the trailing edge flaps were set to 5 degrees; the leading edge devices appeared to be in the appropriate position; and the stab trim was in the take-off green band around 5 units. I had raised the speed brakes during the rejected takeoff but I remember physically checking the lever was in the down detent during the preflight checklist. I am still unsure as to what caused the warning horn to sound.a tug showed up to tow us to the gate about 45 minutes after the reject. Out of an abundance of caution; I directed them to not approach the main gear tires. I did ask them to give me a visual assessment of the tires and they said they looked normal with the exception of the left inboard which 'may be a little under-inflated.' after waiting about another 12 minutes to comply with the brake cooling table; I directed the crew to connect the aircraft to the tug.we were towed to [the gate] where the customers disembarked normally via the loading bridge.after the passengers were off the aircraft. I conducted a debriefing with the first officer and flight attendants. The F/as reported that overall communications were good (cockpit to F/a's and cockpit to pax).I feel that one issue that needs to be addressed is the lack of an arff response after being requested (I believe three times; twice by the first officer and once by myself). I perhaps should take some blame for not communicating this more clearly to tower. I believe I said something to the effect of 'roll the trucks' when I should have chosen my words more clearly and asked that firefighting equipment check our brakes. I did drop this request after being reassured by the tower and another close by airplane that there was no smoke or flames coming from our wheels.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported a high speed aborted takeoff due to the Take-off Configuration Warning light illuminated and the Take-off Warning horn sounded.

Narrative: Conducted all Preflight through Engine Start procedures and checklists per company SOP. During the Departure Brief; I reviewed RTO (Rejected Take Off) and Evac procedures with the first officer since it was the first flight of the trip. (We did note that the airplane came from the hangar and several switches on the overhead panel were out of their normal positions.)After pushing back and starting the engines; the first officer conducted a recall on the master caution system. I noted that the ENG light remained illuminated. After checking the overhead panel; I observed both amber engine REVERSER lights illuminated. Both the first officer and I checked the circuit breaker panels but did not see any tripped CBs.We contacted Hub Maintenance on the VHF radio. After explaining our issue; I was informed by the technician that I could probably clear the problem by 'cycling the reversers about five times.' I told him that I believed that was a maintenance procedure and the technician told me to contact [maintenance control]. I spoke with [maintenance control] who told me the problem could be cleared by cycling the reversers. I told him I was not comfortable performing that procedure. I told him I was going to make an ELB (Electronic Logbook) entry and asked him how he would like me to proceed. He told me to return to the gate. After coordinating with ramp control; we taxied back to the gate where we were met by local maintenance technicians. A technician came onboard and after coordinating with his partner; cycled both engine reverse levers two times each. This cleared the problem. While awaiting a new (Maintenance Release) to print out; the first officer and I conducted the preflight and before pushback checklists for a second time.Engine start was normal and we conducted the After Start through Before Takeoff procedures per company SOP including the Before Takeoff checklist. I distinctly remember pressing the TAKE-OFF WARN TEST button twice on the way to the runway and DID NOT receive an aural warning horn.After we were cleared for takeoff on by the Tower; I taxied the aircraft into position and transferred controls to the first officer. She pushed the throttles up for takeoff and we began our takeoff roll. Through 100 knots; all was normal. V1 was calculated at 143 knots. At approximately 130 (based on my best estimation) I heard a momentary 'chirp' that sounded like the takeoff warning horn. As I was processing this info; the intermittent takeoff warning horn began to sound continuously. Being in the high-speed regime; I did not have time to analyze the situation. Thinking the airplane may be in an unsafe configuration; I opted to reject the takeoff. I announced to the first officer that 'I have the airplane' and initiated the rejected takeoff procedure.The first officer advised the tower that we were rejecting the takeoff and asked for 'trucks' (or something to that effect). Tower seemed confused. As we were slowing to a stop; the F/O (First Officer) was still busy talking to the tower and had not gotten to the 'remain seated' P.A. so I picked up the hand mic and made the announcement. I stopped the airplane straight ahead on the runway just prior to the taxiway intersection.I directed the first officer to tell the tower we were stopping on the runway and to request firefighting equipment. I believe I also asked ATC to 'roll the trucks' (or something similar). The point is that ARFF never responded.I asked tower if he observed any smoke or fire. He said he did not see any and asked another aircraft in the vicinity who replied in the negative. Feeling that an evacuation was not necessary; I called for the Rejected Takeoff QRH which we completed on the runway. After checking with flight attendants; I taxied clear of the runway after being requested to do so by the Tower. After exiting the runway; I did not set the parking brake. We had calculated a brake cooling time of about 57 minutes based on conditions at the time of the reject. We coordinated with dispatch; operations; and maintenance. The plan was to stay put because we were very near the caution zone in the brake cooling chart. We shut down the engines and I was able to release the brakes and keep the aircraft from moving by cocking the nose wheel.The seatbelt sign was turned off and the flight attendants conducted a water service while we were waiting.At this time the first officer and I reviewed the configuration of the airplane and what may have caused the configuration warning. We verified the trailing edge flaps were set to 5 degrees; the leading edge devices appeared to be in the appropriate position; and the stab trim was in the take-off green band around 5 units. I had raised the speed brakes during the rejected takeoff but I remember physically checking the lever was in the down detent during the Preflight checklist. I am still unsure as to what caused the warning horn to sound.A tug showed up to tow us to the gate about 45 minutes after the reject. Out of an abundance of caution; I directed them to not approach the main gear tires. I did ask them to give me a visual assessment of the tires and they said they looked normal with the exception of the left inboard which 'may be a little under-inflated.' After waiting about another 12 minutes to comply with the brake cooling table; I directed the crew to connect the aircraft to the tug.We were towed to [the gate] where the customers disembarked normally via the loading bridge.After the passengers were off the aircraft. I conducted a debriefing with the first officer and flight attendants. The F/As reported that overall communications were good (cockpit to F/A's and cockpit to Pax).I feel that one issue that needs to be addressed is the lack of an ARFF response after being requested (I believe three times; twice by the F/O and once by myself). I perhaps should take some blame for not communicating this more clearly to tower. I believe I said something to the effect of 'roll the trucks' when I should have chosen my words more clearly and asked that firefighting equipment check our brakes. I did drop this request after being reassured by the tower and another close by airplane that there was no smoke or flames coming from our wheels.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.