Narrative:

Passing 15;000 feet loud bang heard and hard 'thump' felt in floor under the cockpit. Both pilots reviewed all synoptic pages with no abnormalities noted. Discussed with the 2 jump seaters. Shortly thereafter 'hydraulic 3 fail' alert displayed; verified quantity zero.requested FL250 until we understood problem.capt as PF; first officer as pm; [and company jump seater] as support for pm as he is an MD11 cap; both to work checklist and [jump seat pilot from another airline] as safety monitor. Once checklist was underway; contacted [ops] notified them of issue and he contacted freight recovery person. They suggested [an alternate]; if we felt it was safe; that was their preference. Discussed with all 4 and agreed for many reasons to return to [departure airport].notified ATC; turn back and discussed options and sequence and consequences of the hydraulic 3 fail. All agreed on [a runway] and with equipment standing by for safety reasons. Leveled and slowed somewhere between 6-8;000 feet; called for slats extend and slowed to 180 KIAS. Since an alternate gear extension was required we agreed to manually extend while descending on downwind.when manual extend lever pulled the main gear extended normally; but the nose gear fell out with a violence and sound I have never heard; combined with a violent shake of the airframe. The nose gear indication showed red/unsafe. After more discussion we all felt that the nose gear assembly had left the plane or at a minimum was damaged and compromised. We all reviewed the checklist to include the the off line jump seater to see if there were any other options.requested a fly past the tower to confirm there was a nose gear attached. Confirmation of a nose gear and after briefing of all options and briefing the tower that we may have a collapse of the nose gear; we configured to flaps 35 and landed uneventfully. Stopped on runway; coordinated with tower; operations; fire and rescue and eventually maintenance. Stuff happens; things break; procedures and training developed prior assured a safe outcome of unforeseen events. All performed above and beyond expected.it felt like a simulator ride as the pace; flow; communication and cooperative effort was text book in my opinion. I couldn't feel more honored to have worked with all involved and been afforded their professionalism in making their job look easy.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after loss of the Number 3 hydraulic system.

Narrative: Passing 15;000 feet loud bang heard and hard 'thump' felt in floor under the cockpit. Both pilots reviewed all synoptic pages with no abnormalities noted. Discussed with the 2 jump seaters. Shortly thereafter 'HYD 3 Fail' alert displayed; verified quantity zero.Requested FL250 until we understood problem.Capt as PF; FO as PM; [and company jump seater] as support for PM as he is an MD11 CAP; both to work checklist and [jump seat pilot from another airline] as safety monitor. Once checklist was underway; contacted [Ops] notified them of issue and he contacted freight recovery person. They suggested [an alternate]; IF WE FELT IT WAS SAFE; that was their preference. Discussed with all 4 and agreed for many reasons to return to [departure airport].Notified ATC; turn back and discussed options and sequence and consequences of the HYD 3 FAIL. All agreed on [a runway] and with equipment standing by for safety reasons. Leveled and slowed somewhere between 6-8;000 feet; called for slats extend and slowed to 180 KIAS. Since an alternate gear extension was required we agreed to manually extend while descending on downwind.When manual extend lever pulled the main gear extended normally; but the nose gear fell out with a violence and sound I have never heard; combined with a violent shake of the airframe. The nose gear indication showed RED/UNSAFE. After more discussion we all felt that the nose gear assembly had left the plane or at a minimum was damaged and compromised. We all reviewed the checklist to include the the off line jump seater to see if there were any other options.Requested a fly past the Tower to confirm there was a nose gear attached. Confirmation of a nose gear and after briefing of all options and briefing the Tower that we may have a collapse of the nose gear; we configured to flaps 35 and landed uneventfully. Stopped on runway; coordinated with Tower; Operations; Fire and Rescue and eventually Maintenance. Stuff happens; things break; procedures and training developed prior assured a safe outcome of unforeseen events. All performed above and beyond expected.It felt like a simulator ride as the pace; flow; communication and cooperative effort was text book in my opinion. I couldn't feel more honored to have worked with all involved and been afforded their professionalism in making their job look easy.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.