Narrative:

Once we became airborne after takeoff; we received two master caution EICAS messages: lg air/ground fail and engine 1 - 2 rev disagree. The first officer (first officer) was pilot flying. We continued our climb normally. After the after takeoff checklist was complete; I went to the QRH and completed the engine 1 - 2 rev disagree and lg air/ground fail checklists. The procedure for engine 1 - 2 rev disagree instructed us to disregard the message. The lg air/ground fail QRH checklist instructed us to exit/aviod icing conditions.the weather at destination at the time of our arrival reported a broken layer of clouds at 2;500 ft; which indicated to me that we were likely to encounter icing conditions if we were to continue to our destination. Based on the possibility of encountering icing conditions I decided that the best course of actions would be to return back to phl. We were currently over max landing weight and needed to burn approximately 30 minutes of fuel so we could land under weight. I informed ATC that we intended to return to phl but we needed to hold in order to burn enough fueling for landing. I contacted dispatch via ACARS; informed them of our situation; and plan to return to the field. I then notified the flight attendant and passengers of our situation. We did not identify as an emergency at any time; but we did ask to have emergency vehicles standing by. I requested the emergency vehicles because of the note in the lg air/ground fail QRH; which stated that: 'thrust reversers; steering; and ground spoiler may not be available. Depending on the failed conditions; ground idle may not be selectable. If the message is presented on the ground; a loss of the main brake capacity may occur (below 10 knots ground speed) and steering may not be available...' however; moc informed us via ACARS that the loss of steering and brakes was unlikely. Based on the QRH procedure we required a flap 45 landing with a factored landing distance of 1.70. We determined that runway 35 was the most suitable runway for our situation based on available landing distances and the current winds at the field.after we burned enough fuel to make a safe landing under max structural landing weight we informed ATC that we wanted to proceed to phl. The first officer remained pilot flying up until we returned to phl then I became pilot flying for the landing. Once we landed; both EICAS messages went away; I stopped the aircraft on the runway in order to determine whether or not I would have breaks and steering authority based on the note above. Once I determined that I did have brakes and steering ability; I notified tower control that we would be able to taxi to our gate on our own. Once at the gate I called dispatch and maintenance control and entered a write-up in the logbook. I believe we made the right decision to return to phl based on all of the information we had at the time. All parties were in agreement of the decision to return to the departure airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 flight crew reported an air return to departure airport due to multiple EICAS messages shortly after takeoff.

Narrative: Once we became airborne after takeoff; we received two master caution EICAS messages: LG AIR/GND FAIL and ENG 1 - 2 REV DISAGREE. The First Officer (FO) was pilot flying. We continued our climb normally. After the after takeoff checklist was complete; I went to the QRH and completed the ENG 1 - 2 REV DISAGREE and LG AIR/GND FAIL checklists. The procedure for ENG 1 - 2 REV DISAGREE instructed us to disregard the message. The LG AIR/GND FAIL QRH checklist instructed us to EXIT/AVIOD icing conditions.The weather at destination at the time of our arrival reported a broken layer of clouds at 2;500 ft; which indicated to me that we were likely to encounter icing conditions if we were to continue to our destination. Based on the possibility of encountering icing conditions I decided that the best course of actions would be to return back to PHL. We were currently over max landing weight and needed to burn approximately 30 minutes of fuel so we could land under weight. I informed ATC that we intended to return to PHL but we needed to hold in order to burn enough fueling for landing. I contacted dispatch via ACARS; informed them of our situation; and plan to return to the field. I then notified the flight attendant and passengers of our situation. We did not identify as an emergency at any time; but we did ask to have emergency vehicles standing by. I requested the emergency vehicles because of the note in the LG AIR/GND FAIL QRH; which stated that: 'Thrust Reversers; Steering; and Ground Spoiler may not be available. Depending on the failed conditions; Ground Idle may not be selectable. If the message is presented on the ground; a loss of the main brake capacity may occur (below 10 knots ground speed) and steering may not be available...' However; MOC informed us via ACARS that the loss of steering and brakes was unlikely. Based on the QRH procedure we required a flap 45 landing with a factored landing distance of 1.70. We determined that runway 35 was the most suitable runway for our situation based on available landing distances and the current winds at the field.After we burned enough fuel to make a safe landing under max structural landing weight we informed ATC that we wanted to proceed to PHL. The FO remained Pilot Flying up until we returned to PHL then I became Pilot Flying for the landing. Once we landed; both EICAS messages went away; I stopped the aircraft on the runway in order to determine whether or not I would have breaks and steering authority based on the note above. Once I determined that I did have brakes and steering ability; I notified tower control that we would be able to taxi to our gate on our own. Once at the gate I called dispatch and maintenance control and entered a write-up in the logbook. I believe we made the right decision to return to PHL based on all of the information we had at the time. All parties were in agreement of the decision to return to the departure airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.