Narrative:

Arrived at aircraft one hour and 10 minutes before departure with plenty time to set up; it was routine pre-departure. Got a release 2 for payload increase. When plane arrived from hangar; it had 42.4 pounds of fuel; 6;000 more pounds than release. Called dispatch and got release 3. Briefed via the safety-briefing card; completed checklists; and pushed a few minutes early. Had long taxi to the runway. We were cleared to line up and wait; and as we aligned with centerline; we were cleared for takeoff. Normal call outs; autothrottles; check thrust; thrust set. At 100 knots; I looked down at my airspeed indicator and saw '0' and red flags. I called abort as I looked over to first officer (first officer) airspeed indicator and saw 110 knots. I felt the auto brakes activate but I did not want the aggressive max braking of rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff).since we had 12;000 feet of runway; I elected to kick off autobrakes and decelerate aircraft smoothly so not to alarm flight attendants and passengers. We exited the runway [and] first officer made the call to tower and then the 'remain seated' public address. We ran the rejected takeoff checklist; which took us to the brake cooling considerations page. We had high brake temperatures of 7; 8; and 9 and 'brake temp' light on. We called for firefighting equipment per checklist. We waited for a few minutes and heard over the frequency 'there's fire on the bogey!' I asked if that was for us because I could not see any trucks (they approached from rear blind side). They repeated 'fire on the bogey' I asked where the fire was and they said left gear. We ran evacuation checklist down to the evacuation command step and fire command said; 'do not evacuate; the fire is out; it's smoking'. We did not evacuate. There was confusion outside as to which side; left or right side. We had to wait an hour per brake cooling procedure and notified maintenance of that fact. Once we got the approval from maintenance and fire command; we were able to start APU and provide comfortable air in the back for passengers and flight attendants. The station; maintenance and airport authority were going back and forth as to what to do with passengers; to bring out super tug or bring stairs and deplane to bus to terminal. Maintenance wanted to change tires there instead of towing back as it was. In the meantime; we contacted dispatch; maintenance control; local maintenance; and chief pilot.there was excellent communication between ATC; fire command and cockpit on aircraft status updates throughout the whole ordeal. There was also excellent communication between the cabin and cockpit. Purser did a phenomenal job as liaison with cockpit as well as with the passengers. She and her crew kept the passengers calm and comfortable. We kept passengers abreast of situation with frequent updates as much situation allowed. Finally; the buses and stairs came to aircraft and the fire team came to cockpit to check status. They praised us on keeping everyone safe and we thanked them for their help. Station manager - also came on board to check our status. As we disembarked passengers through doors 1L and 1R; I went back to check on passengers and flight attendants. Once everyone deplaned; we got a ride to station's operation and were reassigned to fly to the original destination. This successful outcome to this situation would not have been possible without the incredible teamwork of this crew. First officer - ran the checklists thoroughly and concisely. He did an outstanding job communicating with all the parties involved and was extremely proficient with duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 flight crew reported executing a high-speed abort due to Captain's airspeed indicator failure on takeoff roll.

Narrative: Arrived at aircraft one hour and 10 minutes before departure with plenty time to set up; it was routine pre-departure. Got a Release 2 for payload increase. When plane arrived from hangar; it had 42.4 pounds of fuel; 6;000 more pounds than release. Called dispatch and got Release 3. Briefed via the safety-briefing card; completed checklists; and pushed a few minutes early. Had long taxi to the Runway. We were cleared to line up and wait; and as we aligned with centerline; we were cleared for takeoff. Normal call outs; autothrottles; check thrust; thrust set. At 100 knots; I looked down at my airspeed indicator and saw '0' and red flags. I called abort as I looked over to First Officer (FO) airspeed indicator and saw 110 knots. I felt the auto brakes activate but I did not want the aggressive max braking of rejected takeoff (RTO).Since we had 12;000 feet of runway; I elected to kick off autobrakes and decelerate aircraft smoothly so not to alarm flight attendants and passengers. We exited the Runway [and] FO made the call to tower and then the 'Remain Seated' Public Address. We ran the Rejected takeoff checklist; which took us to the Brake Cooling considerations page. We had high brake temperatures of 7; 8; and 9 and 'Brake Temp' light on. We called for firefighting equipment per checklist. We waited for a few minutes and heard over the frequency 'There's fire on the bogey!' I asked if that was for us because I could not see any trucks (they approached from rear blind side). They repeated 'fire on the bogey' I asked where the fire was and they said left gear. We ran Evacuation checklist down to the Evacuation Command step and Fire command said; 'Do not evacuate; the fire is out; it's smoking'. We did not evacuate. There was confusion outside as to which side; left or right side. We had to wait an hour per brake cooling procedure and notified maintenance of that fact. Once we got the approval from maintenance and fire command; we were able to start APU and provide comfortable air in the back for passengers and flight attendants. The station; maintenance and airport authority were going back and forth as to what to do with passengers; to bring out super tug or bring stairs and deplane to bus to terminal. Maintenance wanted to change tires there instead of towing back as it was. In the meantime; we contacted Dispatch; Maintenance Control; Local Maintenance; and Chief Pilot.There was excellent communication between ATC; Fire command and cockpit on aircraft status updates throughout the whole ordeal. There was also excellent communication between the cabin and cockpit. Purser did a phenomenal job as liaison with cockpit as well as with the passengers. She and her crew kept the passengers calm and comfortable. We kept passengers abreast of situation with frequent updates as much situation allowed. Finally; the buses and stairs came to aircraft and the fire team came to cockpit to check status. They praised us on keeping everyone safe and we thanked them for their help. Station Manager - also came on board to check our status. As we disembarked passengers through doors 1L and 1R; I went back to check on passengers and flight attendants. Once everyone deplaned; we got a ride to station's operation and were reassigned to fly to the original destination. This successful outcome to this situation would not have been possible without the incredible teamwork of this crew. FO - ran the checklists thoroughly and concisely. He did an outstanding job communicating with all the parties involved and was extremely proficient with duties.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.