Narrative:

Shortly after takeoff; at a few hundred feet we had a single chime; master caution; and two ECAM messages. Looking at the ecams quickly; I saw that they were brake issues and elected to delay running the ecams until we were safely away from terrain. The ecams were brakes automatic brk fault brakes released and brakes system 2 fault. The first ECAM was brakes automatic brk fault brakes released and there were no blue action steps to accomplish. The status page included lnd dist procedure...apply and listed the inoperative system as CAT 3 dual; automatic brk; brk system 2. At that point we proceeded to the QRH to calculate the landing distance which was around 4;000 feet. We then went to the brakes system 2 fault checklist and saw there was an in-flight reset that could not be accomplished because of the 'caution: do not reset the bscu in flight if the brakes automatic brk fault is also displayed.' there were no action steps associated with brakes system 2 fault.I sent an ACARS message to [maintenance control] informing of the ecams and asked if we would have normal brakes and anti-skid on landing. [They] sent back that according [to] the QRH we would not have normal brakes; as this is listed as an inoperative system under deferred items in the QRH. [They] said alternate braking will be normal. I tried to communicate that our inoperative system page did not show norm brk and that I thought we would be on the normal brake system. [Maintenance control] also sent a note that said 'FYI I'm showing a fault with #4 brake normal servo vlv.' the ECAM on the airplane is more accurate than the checklist. I decided to have dispatch call me with [maintenance control] to make sure that regardless of which braking system we were on we would have anti-skid and that it would be a more or less normal landing.having satisfied myself that we would have anti-skid; that the required landing distance was 4;000 feet; the weather was good; that the runway was clear and dry; we decided not to [advise ATC] as all we were expecting was 'pilots should be prepared to counter a possible slight lateral drift at landing by using the rudder' as indicated in QRH. First officer and I reviewed braking procedures if we lost anti-skid and loss of all brakes immediate action items and how we would accomplish those tasks. First officer flew a stable approach to a smooth touchdown and we experienced a quick; short-lived (less than half a second) yawing moment as she applied the brakes. It was an otherwise completely normal landing and taxi back to the gate. No yellow brake pressure was indicated on the brakes pressure indicator. We watched as the number three brake temperature rose more quickly than the number 4 brake temperature; which is exactly what we expected. Not wanting to heat up #3 wheel anymore; I used idle thrust all the way to the gate.while we were sitting in the cockpit a ramp agent informed us that we had a flat tire. We were both surprised; as there was nothing in the landing or taxi to the gate that would have indicated that we had a flat tire. There was no pulling either to the left or right and no feeling of dragging a flat tire. More importantly; neither ECAM; QRH; nor [maintenance control] showed that a locked or flat tire was a possibility.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Airbus A320 flight crew reported two Brake EICAS messages annunciated on departure and a flat tire discovered after landing.

Narrative: Shortly after takeoff; at a few hundred feet we had a single chime; master caution; and two ECAM messages. Looking at the ECAMs quickly; I saw that they were brake issues and elected to delay running the ECAMs until we were safely away from terrain. The ECAMs were BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT BRAKES RELEASED and BRAKES SYS 2 FAULT. The first ECAM was BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT BRAKES RELEASED and there were no blue action steps to accomplish. The status page included LND DIST PROCEDURE...APPLY and listed the INOP SYS as CAT 3 DUAL; AUTO BRK; BRK SYS 2. At that point we proceeded to the QRH to calculate the landing distance which was around 4;000 feet. We then went to the BRAKES SYS 2 FAULT checklist and saw there was an in-flight reset that could not be accomplished because of the 'CAUTION: Do not reset the BSCU in flight if the BRAKES AUTO BRK FAULT is also displayed.' There were no action steps associated with BRAKES SYS 2 FAULT.I sent an ACARS message to [Maintenance Control] informing of the ECAMs and asked if we would have Normal Brakes and Anti-Skid on landing. [They] sent back that according [to] the QRH we would not have normal brakes; as this is listed as an INOP SYS under deferred items in the QRH. [They] said Alternate Braking will be normal. I tried to communicate that our INOP SYS page did not show NORM BRK and that I thought we would be on the Normal Brake system. [Maintenance Control] also sent a note that said 'FYI I'm showing a fault with #4 Brake Normal Servo VLV.' The ECAM on the airplane is more accurate than the checklist. I decided to have Dispatch call me with [Maintenance Control] to make sure that regardless of which braking system we were on we would have Anti-Skid and that it would be a more or less normal landing.Having satisfied myself that we would have Anti-Skid; that the required landing distance was 4;000 feet; the weather was good; that the runway was clear and dry; we decided not to [advise ATC] as all we were expecting was 'Pilots should be prepared to counter a possible slight lateral drift at landing by using the rudder' as indicated in QRH. First Officer and I reviewed braking procedures if we lost Anti-Skid and loss of all brakes Immediate Action items and how we would accomplish those tasks. First Officer flew a stable approach to a smooth touchdown and we experienced a quick; short-lived (less than half a second) yawing moment as she applied the brakes. It was an otherwise completely normal landing and taxi back to the gate. No yellow brake pressure was indicated on the Brakes Pressure Indicator. We watched as the number three brake temperature rose more quickly than the number 4 brake temperature; which is exactly what we expected. Not wanting to heat up #3 wheel anymore; I used idle thrust all the way to the gate.While we were sitting in the cockpit a ramp agent informed us that we had a flat tire. We were both surprised; as there was nothing in the landing or taxi to the gate that would have indicated that we had a flat tire. There was no pulling either to the left or right and no feeling of dragging a flat tire. More importantly; neither ECAM; QRH; nor [Maintenance Control] showed that a locked or flat tire was a possibility.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.