Narrative:

I was plugged in with a radar associate trainee providing a skill check. The first radar controller had done some work to space aircraft X in the arrival sequence with speeds and a turn after departure. While the first radar controller was giving a briefing to get relieved; there was a 30 knot overtake with just under 6 miles separation. The first radar controller asked if the new radar controller was comfortable with the situation and if there was anything he wanted done to resolve the situation. The second radar controller said no.after taking over the position the situation was looking worse and my trainee asked the radar controller if there was anything he could do to help resolve the situation. The radar controller said no. The radar controller climbed aircraft X to 13;000 feet to comply with a restriction on the RNAV arrival. At this point there was a bare 5 miles and about 1200 feet. The aircraft were bumping the 5 mile display ring as aircraft Y continued the descent on the descend via and separation was lost. I asked the radar controller after he had shipped both aircraft to TRACON if he was aware he had lost separation and he said he was aware. I asked him why he had not taken more action to keep separation and he replied that if traffic management unit (tmu) is going to release an aircraft in a sequence then he is not going to crank the aircraft all over to keep separation.my recommendation would be to have the radar controller be proactive and make sure separation is maintained. The radar controller was very nonchalant about the loss of separation and placed the blame on tmu rather than taking responsibility. The radar controller is also resistant to taking suggestions from others. I could have had my developmental call TRACON to request aircraft X at 12000 feet or aircraft Y at 14000 feet and not descending via. I don't think that by the time we had coordinated either of those options and got back to the sector that it would have saved the loss or that the radar controller would have followed through with the control instruction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAB Center Supervisor reported he observed a Controller intentionally allow two in trail aircraft to fly with less than required standard separation.

Narrative: I was plugged in with a radar associate trainee providing a skill check. The first Radar Controller had done some work to space Aircraft X in the arrival sequence with speeds and a turn after departure. While the first Radar Controller was giving a briefing to get relieved; there was a 30 knot overtake with just under 6 miles separation. The first Radar Controller asked if the new Radar Controller was comfortable with the situation and if there was anything he wanted done to resolve the situation. The second Radar Controller said no.After taking over the position the situation was looking worse and my trainee asked the Radar Controller if there was anything he could do to help resolve the situation. The Radar Controller said no. The Radar Controller climbed Aircraft X to 13;000 feet to comply with a restriction on the RNAV arrival. At this point there was a bare 5 miles and about 1200 feet. The aircraft were bumping the 5 mile display ring as Aircraft Y continued the descent on the descend via and separation was lost. I asked the Radar Controller after he had shipped both aircraft to TRACON if he was aware he had lost separation and he said he was aware. I asked him why he had not taken more action to keep separation and he replied that if Traffic Management Unit (TMU) is going to release an aircraft in a sequence then he is not going to crank the aircraft all over to keep separation.My recommendation would be to have the Radar Controller be proactive and make sure separation is maintained. The Radar Controller was very nonchalant about the loss of separation and placed the blame on TMU rather than taking responsibility. The Radar Controller is also resistant to taking suggestions from others. I could have had my developmental call TRACON to request Aircraft X at 12000 feet or Aircraft Y at 14000 feet and not descending via. I don't think that by the time we had coordinated either of those options and got back to the sector that it would have saved the loss or that the Radar Controller would have followed through with the control instruction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.