Narrative:

Arrived at airport and spoke with the inbound crew. Captain reported that APU was inoperative for both electric and air and that station personnel were aware of the situation and would provide an air cart for start. All pre-flight preparations proceeded normally. When the first officer did walk around; ground air cart was not at the aircraft. When ground personnel checked in on the headset; I ask if the ground cart was available as we could not see it from the flight deck. First officer and I assumed it was tucked in close to the right side of the airplane; out of view. Ground personnel responded that air cart was in place and ready. We completed ground pneumatic start checklist as well as before push checklist. I informed ground crew over the headset that we were ready for air and after air was supplied; I told ground personnel 'turning number one; left; engine' and got a reply of 'roger'.30 to 45 seconds into the engine start; unintelligible communication came over the headset; I asked for clarification; another unintelligible communication over the headset; I asked for clarification again. I'm not sure exactly what was said but I became aware that there was confusion surrounding which engine was being started and where the ground cart was located. I immediately commanded the first officer to shut down the left engine which was at or close to stabilized thrust. After the engine was secured; I spoke with ground personnel over the headset; they confirmed that ground cart had been on the left side; in front of the engine. I told them we needed to move it to the right side. This was done; the checklist completed; and the left engine was again started. At this point; I was very specific that ground personnel should disconnect air only but both air and electrics were disconnected. The remainder of pushback and engine start was completed normally.I do not know how close air cart and ground personnel were to the left; running; engine as the jetway blocked my view. I do believe that a near 'disaster' was avoided simply by 'luck'! Two words I strenuously avoid coming into the same sentence in describing my aircraft operations. As we pushed back; the gentleman who had been on the headset; and had been replaced by other ground crew; could be seen visibly shaken by the experience standing below the jetway. In looking back at this incident; trying to glean 'lessons learned' I look at things that I could've done differently. I am confident that all checklists and procedures were followed to the letter on the flight deck. Ground personnel at [this station] are contracted and evidently were not familiar with [our specific] procedures. I do not know if some of the aircraft they deal with require air carts on the left side of aircraft to start. The person on the headset was evidently not listening very closely; or could not understand my commands from the flight deck.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Captain reported deviations from SOP during engine start endangered the contract ground personnel.

Narrative: Arrived at airport and spoke with the inbound crew. Captain reported that APU was inoperative for both electric and air and that station personnel were aware of the situation and would provide an air cart for start. All pre-flight preparations proceeded normally. When the first officer did walk around; ground air cart was not at the aircraft. When ground personnel checked in on the headset; I ask if the ground cart was available as we could not see it from the flight deck. First Officer and I assumed it was tucked in close to the right side of the airplane; out of view. Ground personnel responded that air cart was in place and ready. We completed ground pneumatic start checklist as well as before push checklist. I informed ground crew over the headset that we were ready for air and after air was supplied; I told ground personnel 'turning number one; left; engine' and got a reply of 'Roger'.30 to 45 seconds into the engine start; unintelligible communication came over the headset; I asked for clarification; another unintelligible communication over the headset; I asked for clarification again. I'm not sure exactly what was said but I became aware that there was confusion surrounding which engine was being started and where the ground cart was located. I immediately commanded the first officer to shut down the left engine which was at or close to stabilized thrust. After the engine was secured; I spoke with ground personnel over the headset; they confirmed that ground cart had been on the left side; in front of the engine. I told them we needed to move it to the right side. This was done; the checklist completed; and the left engine was again started. At this point; I was very specific that ground personnel should disconnect air only but both air and electrics were disconnected. The remainder of pushback and engine start was completed normally.I do not know how close air cart and ground personnel were to the left; running; engine as the jetway blocked my view. I do believe that a near 'disaster' was avoided simply by 'luck'! Two words I strenuously avoid coming into the same sentence in describing my aircraft operations. As we pushed back; the gentleman who had been on the headset; and had been replaced by other ground crew; could be seen visibly shaken by the experience standing below the jetway. In looking back at this incident; trying to glean 'lessons learned' I look at things that I could've done differently. I am confident that all checklists and procedures were followed to the letter on the flight deck. Ground personnel at [this station] are contracted and evidently were not familiar with [our specific] procedures. I do not know if some of the aircraft they deal with require air carts on the left side of aircraft to start. The person on the headset was evidently not listening very closely; or could not understand my commands from the flight deck.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.