Narrative:

We landed runway 1; and shortly after touchdown; we were told 'exit november; juliet; short of 33; confirm.' this was what we expected as 33 had been used multiple times for departure since we checked on. The first officer acknowledged we could do as tower asked; and the controller then cleared an airplane for takeoff on 33. As we approached the november turnoff at taxi speed; I was surprised to see the runway 15-33 hold position sign on the west side of runway 1 in the island south of taxiway november. (There is no runway boundary line for 15-33 painted across runway 1.) I expected it to be on the north side of the runway exit at november.knowing tower had already cleared an aircraft for takeoff on 33 and that we had 'confirmed' we would be 'short of 33' (which we both interpreted as a hold short clearance) I stopped on runway 1; short of the 15-33 hold position signs on either side of the runway. Tower asked us to 'expedite' off of the runway via 'november and juliet.' at this point; for clarification; I transmitted and asked if clearing on november as he intended was clear of 33 (my thought at the time; was that this might be a local geographic signage anomaly; because the sign on the west side of the runway is quite far back from where you might think it should be; most likely because of the location of taxiway november).the tower replied affirmatively; and I proceeded as instructed. The departing 33 traffic had already passed; and had done so well before I began moving again. There were no conflicts and we proceeded uneventfully to the gate.I believe this confusion arose from a misunderstanding of intent. That said; I believe I took the most conservative course of action with the information available and acted reasonably. With time to reflect; the following points stand out to me.1) it is impossible to simultaneously clear 1 at november and hold short of 15-33 based on current markings and signage. To operate as the controller initially directed; the markings and/or signs need to change.2) when I got involved by making a transmission; I tried to lead the controller into my way of thinking by asking if I'd be clear of 33 if we made the turn. The dynamics of the situation did not allow me enough time in the moment to formulate a more appropriate transmission and; in retrospect; I should have been more definitive in expressing my exact concerns. In fact; removed from the situation; I clearly see flaws in my reasoning in the moment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported the DCA airport signage on Runway 1-19 was confusing and difficult to understand where to hold short of Runway 15-33.

Narrative: We landed Runway 1; and shortly after touchdown; we were told 'exit November; Juliet; short of 33; confirm.' This was what we expected as 33 had been used multiple times for departure since we checked on. The First Officer acknowledged we could do as Tower asked; and the Controller then cleared an airplane for takeoff on 33. As we approached the November turnoff at taxi speed; I was surprised to see the Runway 15-33 hold position sign on the west side of Runway 1 in the island south of taxiway November. (There is no runway boundary line for 15-33 painted across Runway 1.) I expected it to be on the north side of the runway exit at November.Knowing Tower had already cleared an aircraft for takeoff on 33 and that we had 'confirmed' we would be 'short of 33' (which we both interpreted as a hold short clearance) I stopped on Runway 1; short of the 15-33 hold position signs on either side of the runway. Tower asked us to 'expedite' off of the runway via 'November and Juliet.' At this point; for clarification; I transmitted and asked if clearing on November as he intended was clear of 33 (my thought at the time; was that this might be a local geographic signage anomaly; because the sign on the west side of the runway is quite far back from where you might think it should be; most likely because of the location of taxiway November).The Tower replied affirmatively; and I proceeded as instructed. The departing 33 traffic had already passed; and had done so well before I began moving again. There were no conflicts and we proceeded uneventfully to the gate.I believe this confusion arose from a misunderstanding of intent. That said; I believe I took the most conservative course of action with the information available and acted reasonably. With time to reflect; the following points stand out to me.1) It is impossible to simultaneously clear 1 at November and hold short of 15-33 based on current markings and signage. To operate as the Controller initially directed; the markings and/or signs need to change.2) When I got involved by making a transmission; I tried to lead the Controller into my way of thinking by asking if I'd be clear of 33 if we made the turn. The dynamics of the situation did not allow me enough time in the moment to formulate a more appropriate transmission and; in retrospect; I should have been more definitive in expressing my exact concerns. In fact; removed from the situation; I clearly see flaws in my reasoning in the moment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.