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Computer problem at center causes loss of all flight plans and data blocs resulting in an aircraft entering another controller's airspace.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 153219 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199007 |
| Day | Tue |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : zla |
| State Reference | CA |
| Altitude | msl bound lower : 24000 msl bound upper : 24000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | artcc : zla |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
| Flight Phase | cruise other |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : radar |
| Qualification | controller : radar |
| Experience | controller non radar : 1 controller radar : 7 |
| ASRS Report | 153219 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : non radar |
| Qualification | controller : developmental |
| Experience | controller non radar : 1 |
| ASRS Report | 154344 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other other anomaly other |
| Independent Detector | other controllera |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
| Consequence | Other |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Operational Deviation other |
Narrative:
On 7/X/90 at XA20, ZLA main computer was shut down. This was done to reload the old program since the new program (software) was not functioning properly. I was working riz at this time. At XA30Z, the fdp was shut down, which caused the darc system to lose all flight plans in ZLA airspace. When fdp was brought back, all aircraft flying at the time and proposed departures had to have their flight plans put back into the machine. This caused numerous problems with starting new tracks on aircraft departing. At sector 12, we had at least 5-10 aircraft that flew our airspace west/O being tracked by the darc system. This occurred for at least 20 mins. At XB06 the NAS computer system was reinstated. At this time I had just completed a handoff on air carrier X to sector 40 in the darc system. When we converted to NAS the data block was not there. Instead the NAS computer was showing the aircraft to be air carrier Y. This was an unsatisfactory condition and was very unsafe. Supplemental information from acn 154344: we began transition from darc to NAS and I was performing manual coordination and entering flight plans. The coordination was heavy. The traffic in the sector was moderate. During this period I was unable to make a manual heading on a certain aircraft. The flight plan was in the computer and we had a data block on this aircraft. The next sector did not accept the handoff. When my r-side went to talk to the aircraft, there was no response. The aircraft penetrated the other sector's boundary. Because of the confusion and the lack of help we received from other sectors, the situation was very dangerous. With a computer flop of this sort, it was evident that very few if any are totally proficient in the darc system. But with the loss of data processing, this was the worst that could happen. I feel the situation was one I did everything I could. With the computer failure there was just too much room for error--a very unsafe situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: COMPUTER PROBLEM AT CENTER CAUSES LOSS OF ALL FLT PLANS AND DATA BLOCS RESULTING IN AN ACFT ENTERING ANOTHER CTLR'S AIRSPACE.
Narrative: ON 7/X/90 AT XA20, ZLA MAIN COMPUTER WAS SHUT DOWN. THIS WAS DONE TO RELOAD THE OLD PROGRAM SINCE THE NEW PROGRAM (SOFTWARE) WAS NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. I WAS WORKING RIZ AT THIS TIME. AT XA30Z, THE FDP WAS SHUT DOWN, WHICH CAUSED THE DARC SYS TO LOSE ALL FLT PLANS IN ZLA AIRSPACE. WHEN FDP WAS BROUGHT BACK, ALL ACFT FLYING AT THE TIME AND PROPOSED DEPS HAD TO HAVE THEIR FLT PLANS PUT BACK INTO THE MACHINE. THIS CAUSED NUMEROUS PROBS WITH STARTING NEW TRACKS ON ACFT DEPARTING. AT SECTOR 12, WE HAD AT LEAST 5-10 ACFT THAT FLEW OUR AIRSPACE W/O BEING TRACKED BY THE DARC SYS. THIS OCCURRED FOR AT LEAST 20 MINS. AT XB06 THE NAS COMPUTER SYS WAS REINSTATED. AT THIS TIME I HAD JUST COMPLETED A HDOF ON ACR X TO SECTOR 40 IN THE DARC SYS. WHEN WE CONVERTED TO NAS THE DATA BLOCK WAS NOT THERE. INSTEAD THE NAS COMPUTER WAS SHOWING THE ACFT TO BE ACR Y. THIS WAS AN UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION AND WAS VERY UNSAFE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 154344: WE BEGAN TRANSITION FROM DARC TO NAS AND I WAS PERFORMING MANUAL COORD AND ENTERING FLT PLANS. THE COORD WAS HEAVY. THE TFC IN THE SECTOR WAS MODERATE. DURING THIS PERIOD I WAS UNABLE TO MAKE A MANUAL HDG ON A CERTAIN ACFT. THE FLT PLAN WAS IN THE COMPUTER AND WE HAD A DATA BLOCK ON THIS ACFT. THE NEXT SECTOR DID NOT ACCEPT THE HDOF. WHEN MY R-SIDE WENT TO TALK TO THE ACFT, THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. THE ACFT PENETRATED THE OTHER SECTOR'S BOUNDARY. BECAUSE OF THE CONFUSION AND THE LACK OF HELP WE RECEIVED FROM OTHER SECTORS, THE SITUATION WAS VERY DANGEROUS. WITH A COMPUTER FLOP OF THIS SORT, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT VERY FEW IF ANY ARE TOTALLY PROFICIENT IN THE DARC SYS. BUT WITH THE LOSS OF DATA PROCESSING, THIS WAS THE WORST THAT COULD HAPPEN. I FEEL THE SITUATION WAS ONE I DID EVERYTHING I COULD. WITH THE COMPUTER FAILURE THERE WAS JUST TOO MUCH ROOM FOR ERROR--A VERY UNSAFE SITUATION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.