Narrative:

I was working 4 combined sectors. Aircraft X was traveling through my airspace VFR at 9500 ft. The pilot informed me that he was seeing a few clouds and asked to descend to a lower altitude to maintain VFR. The aircraft slowly descended to 4500 ft. After a few minutes the pilot reported low visibility because of clouds and requested an IFR clearance. I informed the pilot the he was currently below IFR minimums and asked if he could climb to 6000 ft to maintain minimums. I then issued a clearance to maintain 6000 ft and proceed IFR. After a few minutes the pilot reported light icing and requested a lower altitude to get out of the icing. I informed the pilot that I couldn't descend him below because of IFR minimums. The pilot then asked if there were any airports close to him and I replied that there was one about 10 miles away. He then asked for vectors for that airport.he asked if there were any larger airports around; I told him one was further south; however the closer airport had a 7000 ft hard surface. He then wanted to proceed to that airport. I realized at some point the the visibility was low and informed the pilot of the weather and that I would try and set him up for an ILS approach. I kept the pilot on a heading towards the airport to hopefully get him in the airspace where IFR minimums were only 5000 ft. At this point I was coordinating with my supervisor and with tower. I asked the pilot how he was doing and if he could maintain altitude and he said yes and that he was fine. As soon as he was in the airspace with IFR minimums of 5000 ft; I descended him to 5000 ft.I then turned the aircraft to a heading of 240 to to set him up for the ILS approach. I figured that I had a minute to take care of my other aircraft; so I did. This is where the mistake happened. Either I accidentally said heading 140 instead of 240; or possibly the pilot misheard me. Either way; the pilot made a hard left turn to the southeast heading toward the airspace with IFR minimums of 6000 ft. When my scan came back I realized the direction the pilot was flying and instructed him to fly a heading of 270 I think. I just wanted him back into the airspace with minimums of 5000 ft as soon as possible. I realized that he had ventured a few miles into a 6000 ft minimum vectoring altitude area; however I felt it was unsafe to climb him back up into potentially icy conditions at 6000 ft. After a few minutes he was back in 5000 ft minimums airspace. There is a small area of airspace that has minimums of 5100 ft so I climbed him above. I asked the pilot again how his aircraft was handling and he said fine however he wanted to remain as priority handling. My supervisor decided to split off one of the sectors from me so I could concentrate on my other aircraft. A few minutes after the sector split I was informed that the pilot was safely on the ground.I'm not sure if I really have any recommendations but I know that I will take a lot away from this event. I know that I had a lot going on around me; trying to coordinate with my supervisor; the tower; and scanning my other aircraft. I will definitely be paying more attention to hearback/readbacks from now on. I realize that many minutes were wasted in a potentially dangerous situation that could've easily been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDC Center Controller reported inadvertently vectoring a priority aircraft into an area with a lower MVA.

Narrative: I was working 4 combined sectors. Aircraft X was traveling through my airspace VFR at 9500 ft. The pilot informed me that he was seeing a few clouds and asked to descend to a lower altitude to maintain VFR. The aircraft slowly descended to 4500 ft. After a few minutes the pilot reported low visibility because of clouds and requested an IFR clearance. I informed the pilot the he was currently below IFR minimums and asked if he could climb to 6000 ft to maintain minimums. I then issued a clearance to maintain 6000 ft and proceed IFR. After a few minutes the pilot reported light icing and requested a lower altitude to get out of the icing. I informed the pilot that I couldn't descend him below because of IFR minimums. The pilot then asked if there were any airports close to him and I replied that there was one about 10 miles away. He then asked for vectors for that airport.He asked if there were any larger airports around; I told him one was further south; however the closer airport had a 7000 ft hard surface. He then wanted to proceed to that airport. I realized at some point the the visibility was low and informed the pilot of the weather and that I would try and set him up for an ILS approach. I kept the pilot on a heading towards the airport to hopefully get him in the airspace where IFR minimums were only 5000 ft. At this point I was coordinating with my supervisor and with tower. I asked the pilot how he was doing and if he could maintain altitude and he said yes and that he was fine. As soon as he was in the airspace with IFR minimums of 5000 ft; I descended him to 5000 ft.I then turned the aircraft to a heading of 240 to to set him up for the ILS approach. I figured that I had a minute to take care of my other aircraft; so I did. This is where the mistake happened. Either I accidentally said heading 140 instead of 240; or possibly the pilot misheard me. Either way; the pilot made a hard left turn to the southeast heading toward the airspace with IFR minimums of 6000 ft. When my scan came back I realized the direction the pilot was flying and instructed him to fly a heading of 270 I think. I just wanted him back into the airspace with minimums of 5000 ft as soon as possible. I realized that he had ventured a few miles into a 6000 ft Minimum Vectoring Altitude area; however I felt it was unsafe to climb him back up into potentially icy conditions at 6000 ft. After a few minutes he was back in 5000 ft minimums airspace. There is a small area of airspace that has minimums of 5100 ft so I climbed him above. I asked the pilot again how his aircraft was handling and he said fine however he wanted to remain as priority handling. My supervisor decided to split off one of the sectors from me so I could concentrate on my other aircraft. A few minutes after the sector split I was informed that the pilot was safely on the ground.I'm not sure if I really have any recommendations but I know that I will take a lot away from this event. I know that I had a lot going on around me; trying to coordinate with my supervisor; the tower; and scanning my other aircraft. I will definitely be paying more attention to hearback/readbacks from now on. I realize that many minutes were wasted in a potentially dangerous situation that could've easily been avoided.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.