Narrative:

We were conducting a ferry flight of a company aircraft from smx to psp. Prior to departure I asked the captain if he wanted me to file an IFR flight plan. He said no, we'd go VFR since we would be operating under part 91 (no passenger or cargo). The WX was not a factor for VFR flight. We departed. En route I asked if he wished for me to contact center for radar advisories. He said no. (The captain was the PF.) we cruised at 11500' MSL from smx direct pmd then V137 to psp. Our altitude put us above the MEA for the first part of the arwy, but below for the latter half. I pointed this out. The captain responded that it would not be a problem that we'd go around the larger peaks. I was under the impression that he meant to circumnav the area by turning to the south. It soon became apparent that he was going to continue for the most part along the arwy. In my opinion flight along the path would have provided more than adequate terrain sep. However, the captain then began to descend toward the terrain. I reminded him that we needed adequate sep from the terrain according to far 91.195 (rewritten 91.515). He responded, 'I see 1000',' and continued. I expressed my discomfort in his buzzing the mountain/hilltops, but did not feel that there was any jeopardy to the aircraft or anything nearby. Our airspeed was adequate along with our location (valley off to the right side of the aircraft) that in the event of an engine failure, I felt there would be no undue hazard presented (far 91.79 rewritten as 91.119). My discomfort was in respect to being closer to the terrain than (in my estimation) 1000' as required by far 91.195 (rewritten 91.515) and also taking place within (or at least close proximity to) a special conservation area. My policy as a F/a is to state or point out errors that I notice, be that with respect to far's or flying mistakes. I have decided that the time for time action is when I feel the situation is no longer safe. At that time it will be necessary to insist on a change or possibly take control of the aircraft. It is a difficult position (in my opinion) to know how much and when or what to do, since good relations are extremely important in the cockpit and can easily be hampered by such action (even if meant in good intent). Any suggestion on how to respond to such possible situations in the future would be appreciated. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: analyst suggested that reporter could discuss with captain at the time of occurrence. Reporter realizes would have been the best thing. Has gotten to know captain better and finds that his experience was flying river rafters into the wilderness, so not the least bit disturbing to fly so low over mountainous terrain. Reporter still in probationary period so is walking on egg shells to keep his record clean. Does not feel flight was dangerous, just uncomfortable at the time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR ON FERRY FLT DOES NOT MAINTAIN PROPER TERRAIN CLRNC IN MOUNTAINOUS AND WILDERNESS AREA.

Narrative: WE WERE CONDUCTING A FERRY FLT OF A COMPANY ACFT FROM SMX TO PSP. PRIOR TO DEP I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WANTED ME TO FILE AN IFR FLT PLAN. HE SAID NO, WE'D GO VFR SINCE WE WOULD BE OPERATING UNDER PART 91 (NO PAX OR CARGO). THE WX WAS NOT A FACTOR FOR VFR FLT. WE DEPARTED. ENRTE I ASKED IF HE WISHED FOR ME TO CONTACT CENTER FOR RADAR ADVISORIES. HE SAID NO. (THE CAPT WAS THE PF.) WE CRUISED AT 11500' MSL FROM SMX DIRECT PMD THEN V137 TO PSP. OUR ALT PUT US ABOVE THE MEA FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE ARWY, BUT BELOW FOR THE LATTER HALF. I POINTED THIS OUT. THE CAPT RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A PROB THAT WE'D GO AROUND THE LARGER PEAKS. I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE MEANT TO CIRCUMNAV THE AREA BY TURNING TO THE S. IT SOON BECAME APPARENT THAT HE WAS GOING TO CONTINUE FOR THE MOST PART ALONG THE ARWY. IN MY OPINION FLT ALONG THE PATH WOULD HAVE PROVIDED MORE THAN ADEQUATE TERRAIN SEP. HOWEVER, THE CAPT THEN BEGAN TO DSND TOWARD THE TERRAIN. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE NEEDED ADEQUATE SEP FROM THE TERRAIN ACCORDING TO FAR 91.195 (REWRITTEN 91.515). HE RESPONDED, 'I SEE 1000',' AND CONTINUED. I EXPRESSED MY DISCOMFORT IN HIS BUZZING THE MOUNTAIN/HILLTOPS, BUT DID NOT FEEL THAT THERE WAS ANY JEOPARDY TO THE ACFT OR ANYTHING NEARBY. OUR AIRSPD WAS ADEQUATE ALONG WITH OUR LOCATION (VALLEY OFF TO THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE ACFT) THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN ENG FAILURE, I FELT THERE WOULD BE NO UNDUE HAZARD PRESENTED (FAR 91.79 REWRITTEN AS 91.119). MY DISCOMFORT WAS IN RESPECT TO BEING CLOSER TO THE TERRAIN THAN (IN MY ESTIMATION) 1000' AS REQUIRED BY FAR 91.195 (REWRITTEN 91.515) AND ALSO TAKING PLACE WITHIN (OR AT LEAST CLOSE PROX TO) A SPECIAL CONSERVATION AREA. MY POLICY AS A F/A IS TO STATE OR POINT OUT ERRORS THAT I NOTICE, BE THAT WITH RESPECT TO FAR'S OR FLYING MISTAKES. I HAVE DECIDED THAT THE TIME FOR TIME ACTION IS WHEN I FEEL THE SITUATION IS NO LONGER SAFE. AT THAT TIME IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO INSIST ON A CHANGE OR POSSIBLY TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT. IT IS A DIFFICULT POS (IN MY OPINION) TO KNOW HOW MUCH AND WHEN OR WHAT TO DO, SINCE GOOD RELATIONS ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN THE COCKPIT AND CAN EASILY BE HAMPERED BY SUCH ACTION (EVEN IF MEANT IN GOOD INTENT). ANY SUGGESTION ON HOW TO RESPOND TO SUCH POSSIBLE SITUATIONS IN THE FUTURE WOULD BE APPRECIATED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: ANALYST SUGGESTED THAT RPTR COULD DISCUSS WITH CAPT AT THE TIME OF OCCURRENCE. RPTR REALIZES WOULD HAVE BEEN THE BEST THING. HAS GOTTEN TO KNOW CAPT BETTER AND FINDS THAT HIS EXPERIENCE WAS FLYING RIVER RAFTERS INTO THE WILDERNESS, SO NOT THE LEAST BIT DISTURBING TO FLY SO LOW OVER MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. RPTR STILL IN PROBATIONARY PERIOD SO IS WALKING ON EGG SHELLS TO KEEP HIS RECORD CLEAN. DOES NOT FEEL FLT WAS DANGEROUS, JUST UNCOMFORTABLE AT THE TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.