Narrative:

Let me start this report by saying that there were three pilots in the cockpit during this event; and each of us saw something a little different. It may very well be that some of the things we think we remember might not be exactly how it happened. For instance; I think that we were only cleared to FL160 and that we were level when the event began. At least one of the other pilots thinks that we were climbing to FL240. I think that clearance came after the event. So; keep that in mind as I relate what I remember about how the event unfolded. The fact that we had to take evasive action; and the action we took to avoid the other aircraft; that; we all agree on. We took off from limc and were proceeding normally. We were initially cleared to FL50; then sent to departure control and cleared to FL100; direct to dogub; I think it was. We changed frequencies again and were cleared to FL160; direct to tor. Prior to tor; we were cleared direct to ronop; I believe was the fix. Ronop is the last fix before marseille control's airspace. We were level at FL160; I think; when our TCAS gave us a; 'traffic; traffic' warning. I reached up and reduced the range so as to see the TCAS threat. I saw a threat at 12 o'clock; level with us and 6 miles; then 5 miles. The first officer (first officer) said; 'we are going to have to do something about this.' out of my peripheral vision; I saw him put his hand on the yoke in preparation to disconnect the autopilot and comply with the RA that I felt would come at any second. About this time; I heard a garbled transmission from ATC. I did not understand the call sign; but I did hear; 'turn south immediately.' I reached for the microphone button when the relief pilot said; 'that was for us.' I was about to transmit to the controller when he repeated that we should turn south immediately. The first officer; who was flying; disconnected the autopilot and rolled into a hard left turn toward a heading of 180. The traffic was at -100 feet and at 4 miles closing fast (800 knots closure). We were all expecting to get an RA. However; we got a bank angle warning instead as we were rolled over at about 35-40 degrees in a left turn. I was looking for the traffic; we were in the clouds at the time; when the over bank warning came; I glanced down at the navigation display. The traffic was still at our level; but now at about 3 miles out and slightly to our left. I thought at the time that the turn to the south from the controller was a mistake. The controller called and said; I think; 'flight X; traffic 12 o'clock 3 miles.' I keyed the mic and replied; 'looking for the traffic; traffic in sight;' at that exact moment; I caught sight of the traffic as we seemed to be in a void within the clouds. The traffic was in a right turn and at our altitude or slightly below us; it was some sort of regional jet [and] it appeared to be descending. I could see instantly that the controller's assigned turn to the south was going to make things much; much worse and that we needed to reverse the turn. The mic was still keyed and I told the first officer to 'turn right; turn right now'. I know that at least the first 'turn right' was said with the mic keyed and so went out over the radio. I think that I un-keyed the mic for the second 'turn right; now'. The first officer quickly reversed our turn and the intruder disappeared under the nose as we banked away. We might have also been climbing slightly at this point; or as the first officer thinks; we might have already been cleared to a higher altitude. He also told me later that when I told him to 'turn right; turn right now;' he looked up and caught sight of the aircraft as well and steepened his turn away. I think that this was when the controller issued a climb to FL240 and re-cleared us direct to ronop. Just before he switched us to marseille control he asked if we had gotten an RA. I do not know why we did not get one; as we certainly needed it; but I had the impression that he was asking because he would havesome reporting to do; but that is just my supposition. I answered that we did not get an RA; but that his turn to the south had made things worse. I estimate that at closest approach we were less than a mile from the traffic and that he might have been 300 feet or so below us; but it might have been more by that time. I was not looking at the TCAS at the point of closest approach; but had my eyes on the intruder who was turning to the south and; I believe; diving; until he disappeared under the nose as we banked away. The reason I think that we were level and not climbing was because the intruder went from 6 to 5 to 4 miles while showing 0 feet relative to us. If we had been climbing; his altitude relative to us would have changed. I do not know why the controller did not issue traffic to us prior to our getting the traffic warning from TCAS; nor why he issued the turn to the south instead of turning us north and away. I do remember thinking that his heading was not the right way to go based on what I was seeing on the TCAS. However; we are trained to follow the lateral instructions from ATC and the vertical instructions from TCAS. I have no idea why the TCAS did not issue us a climb or maintain vertical speed RA. I do not know whether there was miscommunication between the marseille sector and milan or what the reason for the other aircraft to be at our altitude and heading right for us. The other odd thing about this event is that I do not recall there being any radio transmissions to or from the intruder aircraft. The only radio transmissions pertinent to the event were between ATC and us. No one in the back of the aircraft seemed to think that we were in anything other than some turbulence. There were no injuries on board our aircraft whatsoever.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Flight crew of a large passenger jet reported a NMAC while at cruise altitude requiring evasive action.

Narrative: Let me start this report by saying that there were three pilots in the cockpit during this event; and each of us saw something a little different. It may very well be that some of the things we think we remember might not be exactly how it happened. For instance; I think that we were only cleared to FL160 and that we were level when the event began. At least one of the other pilots thinks that we were climbing to FL240. I think that clearance came after the event. So; keep that in mind as I relate what I remember about how the event unfolded. The fact that we had to take evasive action; and the action we took to avoid the other aircraft; that; we all agree on. We took off from LIMC and were proceeding normally. We were initially cleared to FL50; then sent to Departure Control and cleared to FL100; direct to DOGUB; I think it was. We changed frequencies again and were cleared to FL160; direct to TOR. Prior to TOR; we were cleared direct to RONOP; I believe was the fix. RONOP is the last fix before Marseille Control's airspace. We were level at FL160; I think; when our TCAS gave us a; 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC' warning. I reached up and reduced the range so as to see the TCAS threat. I saw a threat at 12 o'clock; level with us and 6 miles; then 5 miles. The FO (First Officer) said; 'We are going to have to do something about this.' Out of my peripheral vision; I saw him put his hand on the yoke in preparation to disconnect the autopilot and comply with the RA that I felt would come at any second. About this time; I heard a garbled transmission from ATC. I did not understand the call sign; but I did hear; 'turn south immediately.' I reached for the microphone button when the relief pilot said; 'That was for us.' I was about to transmit to the controller when he repeated that we should turn south immediately. The FO; who was flying; disconnected the autopilot and rolled into a hard left turn toward a heading of 180. The traffic was at -100 feet and at 4 miles closing fast (800 knots closure). We were all expecting to get an RA. However; we got a bank angle warning instead as we were rolled over at about 35-40 degrees in a left turn. I was looking for the traffic; we were in the clouds at the time; when the over bank warning came; I glanced down at the NAV Display. The traffic was still at our level; but now at about 3 miles out and slightly to our left. I thought at the time that the turn to the south from the controller was a mistake. The controller called and said; I think; 'Flight X; traffic 12 o'clock 3 miles.' I keyed the mic and replied; 'Looking for the traffic; TRAFFIC IN SIGHT;' at that exact moment; I caught sight of the traffic as we seemed to be in a void within the clouds. The traffic was in a right turn and at our altitude or slightly below us; it was some sort of regional jet [and] it appeared to be descending. I could see instantly that the controller's assigned turn to the south was going to make things much; much worse and that we needed to reverse the turn. The mic was still keyed and I told the First Officer to 'TURN RIGHT; TURN RIGHT NOW'. I know that at least the first 'turn right' was said with the mic keyed and so went out over the radio. I think that I un-keyed the mic for the second 'turn right; NOW'. The First Officer quickly reversed our turn and the intruder disappeared under the nose as we banked away. We might have also been climbing slightly at this point; or as the FO thinks; we might have already been cleared to a higher altitude. He also told me later that when I told him to 'turn right; turn right NOW;' he looked up and caught sight of the aircraft as well and steepened his turn away. I think that this was when the controller issued a climb to FL240 and re-cleared us direct to RONOP. Just before he switched us to Marseille Control he asked if we had gotten an RA. I do not know why we did not get one; as we certainly needed it; but I had the impression that he was asking because he would havesome reporting to do; but that is just my supposition. I answered that we did not get an RA; but that his turn to the south had made things worse. I estimate that at closest approach we were less than a mile from the traffic and that he might have been 300 feet or so below us; but it might have been more by that time. I was not looking at the TCAS at the point of closest approach; but had my eyes on the intruder who was turning to the south and; I believe; diving; until he disappeared under the nose as we banked away. The reason I think that we were level and not climbing was because the intruder went from 6 to 5 to 4 miles while showing 0 feet relative to us. If we had been climbing; his altitude relative to us would have changed. I do not know why the controller did not issue traffic to us prior to our getting the traffic warning from TCAS; nor why he issued the turn to the south instead of turning us north and away. I do remember thinking that his heading was not the right way to go based on what I was seeing on the TCAS. However; we are trained to follow the lateral instructions from ATC and the vertical instructions from TCAS. I have no idea why the TCAS did not issue us a climb or maintain vertical speed RA. I do not know whether there was miscommunication between the Marseille Sector and Milan or what the reason for the other aircraft to be at our altitude and heading right for us. The other odd thing about this event is that I do not recall there being any radio transmissions to or from the intruder aircraft. The only radio transmissions pertinent to the event were between ATC and us. No one in the back of the aircraft seemed to think that we were in anything other than some turbulence. There were no injuries on board our aircraft whatsoever.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.