Narrative:

I was in a hover during my part 135 check ride. The check airman was in the right seat and I was flying left seat. We were occupying the mowed grass approximately 100 feet off of runway 29/11. There were multiple aircraft in the pattern for runway 34 and during our flight and did not observe any traffic for 29/11. The 'chatter' at the airport was heavy so the check airman and I both felt that our location would best fit the needs of the check ride and safely separate us from the other traffic.I finished preforming my hovering maneuvers (slopes; hover auto-rotations) and received directions to where the next maneuver would be. In order to complete the next assignment I would be crossing runway 29/11. Our aircraft had a heading of 110 so in order to clear myself of any traffic I would have to perform a right pedal turn. As the right turn was completed we quickly noticed a small experimental fixed wing landing runway 11 directly in front of us. The aircraft unexpectedly rocked its wings and in doing so slightly 'scuffed' his left wing. The experimental proceeded to takeoff again and during his next pattern made a number of unprofessional radio calls in regards to our operation on the runway. During his calls there were multiple radio calls made by other traffic at the airport 'mocking' the experimental for using a runway opposite of what the winds and traffic favored. My check airman and I remained off the radio until the fixed wing was on the ground and asked were we would like to park and talk.the check airman decided to talk with the experimental pilot and try to understand what events led to his situation. I noticed the check airman was being very professional in making sure the experimental pilot calmed down and that they were able to have a positive discussion.the experimental pilot confessed that he did not see us hovering until he was approximately a quarter mile from landing. He admitted that it would have been a better idea to just do a go around. The pilot was not sure what our intentions were and having preformed his landing in the closest relation to us not the best procedure.in the end the helicopters location was in a safe location and I was preforming the necessary 'clearing' turn before crossing a runway. It's unknown if the experimental pilot over corrected from not fully knowing what the nature of our operation was or if there was any possible rotor wash that had extended its way to the runway.I feel the lesson learned was the experimental pilot having seen the helicopter should have extended his landing or aborted his landing until the proper radio communication could be established. As for the helicopter operation; myself and my employer will work to find the ideal training area that completely removes us from any airport traffic.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Helicopter pilot and Check Airman reported a NMAC with fixed wing traffic operating on an unannounced approach.

Narrative: I was in a hover during my Part 135 check ride. The Check Airman was in the right seat and I was flying left seat. We were occupying the mowed grass approximately 100 feet off of runway 29/11. There were multiple aircraft in the pattern for runway 34 and during our flight and did not observe any traffic for 29/11. The 'chatter' at the airport was heavy so the Check Airman and I both felt that our location would best fit the needs of the check ride and safely separate us from the other traffic.I finished preforming my hovering maneuvers (slopes; hover auto-rotations) and received directions to where the next maneuver would be. In order to complete the next assignment I would be crossing runway 29/11. Our aircraft had a heading of 110 so in order to clear myself of any traffic I would have to perform a right pedal turn. As the right turn was completed we quickly noticed a small experimental fixed wing landing runway 11 directly in front of us. The aircraft unexpectedly rocked its wings and in doing so slightly 'scuffed' his left wing. The experimental proceeded to takeoff again and during his next pattern made a number of unprofessional radio calls in regards to our operation on the runway. During his calls there were multiple radio calls made by other traffic at the airport 'mocking' the experimental for using a runway opposite of what the winds and traffic favored. My Check Airman and I remained off the radio until the fixed wing was on the ground and asked were we would like to park and talk.The Check Airman decided to talk with the experimental pilot and try to understand what events led to his situation. I noticed the Check Airman was being very professional in making sure the experimental pilot calmed down and that they were able to have a positive discussion.The experimental pilot confessed that he did not see us hovering until he was approximately a quarter mile from landing. He admitted that it would have been a better idea to just do a go around. The pilot was not sure what our intentions were and having preformed his landing in the closest relation to us not the best procedure.In the end the helicopters location was in a safe location and I was preforming the necessary 'clearing' turn before crossing a runway. It's unknown if the experimental pilot over corrected from not fully knowing what the nature of our operation was or if there was any possible rotor wash that had extended its way to the runway.I feel the lesson learned was the experimental pilot having seen the helicopter should have extended his landing or aborted his landing until the proper radio communication could be established. As for the helicopter operation; myself and my employer will work to find the ideal training area that completely removes us from any airport traffic.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.