Narrative:

We were scheduled to depart sfo for ZZZ. We had received the sntna 2 RNAV departure with the tipre transition. At approximately xa:55; we received a right engine ovht caution message. At that point; I grabbed the QRH to look up the issue. Initially; I went to the 70 engines; APU section and couldn't find it. Captain (ca) decided to transfer the controls to me. So I assumed both pilot flying (PF) and pilot monitoring (pm) duties while he conducted the checklist which he eventually found in 80 fire protection section using the search function in content locker. Prior to the start of the engine ovht - left(right) 80.11 checklist; the left engine egt was 704; the right engine egt indicated 744. ATC assigned us a higher altitude of FL270; we read back the assignment and initiated the climb. As ca was doing the checklist; we began to realize that there may be a more serious issue due to the fact that the caution message persisted. Prior to the manual shutdown of the right engine; ATC assigned us FL330. I advised them of the need to stop at FL270. The aircraft eventually ceased climbing around FL266. I requested lower altitudes; initially FL200 and subsequently lower verified by the engine out prompt on the VNAV page which indicated FL185. After we completed the checklist; we advised ATC of our problem. We advised them that we would be returning to sfo. The ca spoke with dispatch and technical support maintenance control about the issue and the fact that we would be diverting back to sfo. Afterwards; the ca advised the flight attendants of the issue and eventually the passengers as well. After we got vectored back in the direction of sfo; we were given cedes for the dyamd 3 RNAV arrival and the FMS bridge visual 28R. ATC asked us if we wanted emergency equipment and we elected for aircraft rescue and fire fighting (arff) only as a precaution. They also let us know that both runways were available; however; we stayed with runway 28R. The ca also ran checklist non-normal configuration landing distance to determine the landing distance required. It was followed by a detailed approach briefing. Afterward; the deferred items descent checklist was performed and; after cleared for the approach the appropriate landing checklist was performed. We landed without incident.however; due to the higher V speeds; the right brake temperatures reached as high as 8 as we were taxiing to the gate. Taxiing in; we advised flight operations to let ramp know that we could not set the parking brake due to the high brake temperatures. As we parked; we could see arff trucks behind the aircraft. Flight operations gave us frequency 128.65 to speak with arff. What was frustrating was the fact that it took several minutes before they responded to the ca. Also; the ramp personnel didn't connect a headset to the aircraft for approximately 4 to 5 minutes as the ca wanted to speak with them as well about the hot brake temps. We made the request with flight operations for the ground personnel to attach a headset to speak to us. Flight ops also let us know that there was smoke emanating from the brakes. Arff also advised us as well. As the temps were coming down (5-6 range); they indicated them temps were 250 degrees and decreasing. After a further decrease in temps; we let them know that no further assistance was needed. Soon; maintenance personnel came to the flight deck for a debrief on the issue and whether or not it was an overweight landing. We landed around 9;000 lbs overweight. Based upon the facts provided to the maintenance supervisor; he indicated that there was a bleed air duct leak.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported an engine overheat during climbout.

Narrative: We were scheduled to depart SFO for ZZZ. We had received the SNTNA 2 RNAV departure with the TIPRE transition. At approximately XA:55; we received a R ENG OVHT caution message. At that point; I grabbed the QRH to look up the issue. Initially; I went to the 70 ENGINES; APU section and couldn't find it. Captain (CA) decided to transfer the controls to me. So I assumed both Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties while he conducted the checklist which he eventually found in 80 FIRE PROTECTION section using the search function in Content Locker. Prior to the start of the ENG OVHT - L(R) 80.11 checklist; the left engine EGT was 704; the right engine EGT indicated 744. ATC assigned us a higher altitude of FL270; we read back the assignment and initiated the climb. As CA was doing the checklist; we began to realize that there may be a more serious issue due to the fact that the caution message persisted. Prior to the manual shutdown of the right engine; ATC assigned us FL330. I advised them of the need to stop at FL270. The aircraft eventually ceased climbing around FL266. I requested lower altitudes; initially FL200 and subsequently lower verified by the ENG OUT prompt on the VNAV page which indicated FL185. After we completed the checklist; we advised ATC of our problem. We advised them that we would be returning to SFO. The CA spoke with Dispatch and Technical Support Maintenance Control about the issue and the fact that we would be diverting back to SFO. Afterwards; the CA advised the flight attendants of the issue and eventually the passengers as well. After we got vectored back in the direction of SFO; we were given CEDES for the DYAMD 3 RNAV arrival and the FMS Bridge Visual 28R. ATC asked us if we wanted emergency equipment and we elected for Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) only as a precaution. They also let us know that both runways were available; however; we stayed with Runway 28R. The CA also ran checklist Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance to determine the landing distance required. It was followed by a detailed approach briefing. Afterward; the Deferred Items descent checklist was performed and; after cleared for the approach the appropriate landing checklist was performed. We landed without incident.However; due to the higher V speeds; the right brake temperatures reached as high as 8 as we were taxiing to the gate. Taxiing in; we advised flight operations to let ramp know that we could not set the parking brake due to the high brake temperatures. As we parked; we could see ARFF trucks behind the aircraft. Flight Operations gave us frequency 128.65 to speak with ARFF. What was frustrating was the fact that it took several minutes before they responded to the CA. Also; the ramp personnel didn't connect a headset to the aircraft for approximately 4 to 5 minutes as the CA wanted to speak with them as well about the hot brake temps. We made the request with Flight Operations for the ground personnel to attach a headset to speak to us. Flight Ops also let us know that there was smoke emanating from the brakes. ARFF also advised us as well. As the temps were coming down (5-6 range); they indicated them temps were 250 degrees and decreasing. After a further decrease in temps; we let them know that no further assistance was needed. Soon; maintenance personnel came to the flight deck for a debrief on the issue and whether or not it was an overweight landing. We landed around 9;000 lbs overweight. Based upon the facts provided to the Maintenance Supervisor; he indicated that there was a bleed air duct leak.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.