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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1551821 |
Time | |
Date | 201806 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | DAB.TRACON |
State Reference | FL |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Cessna 152 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Departure |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Aircraft X departed dab and I instructed him to identify per our local radar identification method. Needing to move on to other areas of my sector that needed attention; I missed aircraft X identify and had to have him identify again. I didn't get him radar identified until several miles from the airport.during a recent external compliance verification (ecv); dab was found non-compliant with respect to radar identification methods; specifically dab departures. The vast majority of our traffic remains in our local practice areas or with our satellite towers; all of which are assigned beacon codes from our local subset that do not generate flight data input/output flight progress strips (fps).our current procedure requires our local controllers to ensure departure aircraft have the correct auto-acquired data block information associated with the radar target prior to switching communications to departure. Although this is 100% safe and there is no question about radar identification; our procedure was ruled out of compliance with jo 7110.65 paragraph 5-3-2(a). The following addition to paragraph 5-3-2 would resolve the problem.'3. Tower controllers with ctrds ensure that auto-acquired data block information corresponds with the radar target of the departure aircraft. Procedures for this method must be outlined in a local facility directive or LOA.'with the above addition; local control knows which radar target is which departure aircraft and if the correct data block information is displayed; there can be no confusion on the part of the departure controller as to which aircraft is which. Since dab has decommissioned our manual drop tubes; we have run 3.5M operations without ever having our procedures questioned. The method is sound and our track record demonstrates such.the mitigation contained in a notice as a result of our noncompliance introduces unnecessary risk into our airspace without a change to the 7110. Identification remains in the data block for 20 seconds; which is not site adaptable. If the departure corridor is shared between two controllers and two aircraft identify simultaneously; radar identification is questionable given our current procedures because we have to play ignorant; disregarding the correct data block information attached to the correct radar target. This forces the departure controller(s) to stare at departure data blocks for idents; taking focus away from the rest of the airspace. Even with a standalone departure controller; identify drastically slows down the ability to identification aircraft and reduces the efficiency of the system.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: DAB Departure Controller reported concerns with the new RADAR Identification procedures.
Narrative: Aircraft X departed DAB and I instructed him to IDENT per our local radar identification method. Needing to move on to other areas of my sector that needed attention; I missed Aircraft X IDENT and had to have him IDENT again. I didn't get him radar identified until several miles from the airport.During a recent External Compliance Verification (ECV); DAB was found non-compliant with respect to radar identification methods; specifically DAB departures. The vast majority of our traffic remains in our local practice areas or with our satellite towers; all of which are assigned beacon codes from our local subset that do not generate flight data input/output Flight Progress Strips (FPS).Our current procedure requires our Local controllers to ensure departure aircraft have the correct auto-acquired data block information associated with the radar target prior to switching communications to departure. Although this is 100% safe and there is no question about radar identification; our procedure was ruled out of compliance with JO 7110.65 paragraph 5-3-2(a). The following addition to paragraph 5-3-2 would resolve the problem.'3. Tower controllers with CTRDs ensure that auto-acquired data block information corresponds with the radar target of the departure aircraft. Procedures for this method must be outlined in a local facility directive or LOA.'With the above addition; Local Control knows which radar target is which departure aircraft and if the correct data block information is displayed; there can be no confusion on the part of the departure controller as to which aircraft is which. Since DAB has decommissioned our manual drop tubes; we have run 3.5M operations without ever having our procedures questioned. The method is sound and our track record demonstrates such.The mitigation contained in a notice as a result of our noncompliance introduces unnecessary risk into our airspace without a change to the 7110. ID remains in the data block for 20 seconds; which is not site adaptable. If the departure corridor is shared between two controllers and two aircraft IDENT simultaneously; radar identification is questionable given our current procedures because we have to play ignorant; disregarding the correct data block information attached to the correct radar target. This forces the departure controller(s) to stare at departure data blocks for IDENTs; taking focus away from the rest of the airspace. Even with a standalone departure controller; IDENT drastically slows down the ability to ID aircraft and reduces the efficiency of the system.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.