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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1557727 |
Time | |
Date | 201807 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | HPN.Airport |
State Reference | NY |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Citation Excel (C560XL) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Incursion Runway |
Narrative:
Given clearance for the visual approach to runway 16 at hpn. Good VFR and no mention of any lahso operation. Upon landing rollout the controller told us to hold short of runway 11/29 about 3 seconds prior to crossing the hold short line. At this point I estimate we were at 40+ knots and less than 100 yards from the intersection and already max reverse was in use. I broke as hard as I could and stopped about 10-20 feet past the hold short line onto runway 11/29. The controller then cleared an airplane to takeoff or land; can't remember which. I got on the radio and told [the controller] the clearance was wholly unacceptable at which time the supervisor came on frequency and stated that if it was unacceptable we should have declined it. We didn't have time to decline anything. If we would have known they expected lahso we would have declined the clearance on approach. I remember another aircraft lining up on runway 16 and I was getting nervous. We sat on runway 16 with half our aircraft sitting on runway 11/29 with silence on the radio. I called and told him to get us off the runway. He said he'll get us off the runway when he can. I would have fired him that day for his incompetence. My passengers were shaken by this event and probably seriously question our ability to safely operate our aircraft. The controller and the supervisor working the tower this day allowed an unsafe condition to develop and did not put a stop to it. The supervisor is ultimately responsible. [The supervisor] jeopardized the safety of my passengers; the safety of the aircraft; and safety of the crew. As is typical when I questioned him he got an attitude about it all. To top [the supervisor's] incompetence [the controller] allowed another aircraft takeoff/land while I was intruding on 11/29. The runway was not clear. [The controller] was overloaded with an incompetent supervisor. I don't fault [the controller] as [they] may have been in training. I recommend pulling the ATC tapes and reviewing this issue. The sooner the supervisor is fired and somebody competent fills the position the safer hpn will be.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Citation CE560XL crew reported Tower issuing an untimely hold short on landing roll out that the pilot could not comply with.
Narrative: Given clearance for the visual approach to Runway 16 at HPN. Good VFR and no mention of any LAHSO operation. Upon landing rollout the controller told us to hold short of Runway 11/29 about 3 seconds prior to crossing the hold short line. At this point I estimate we were at 40+ knots and less than 100 yards from the intersection and already max reverse was in use. I broke as hard as I could and stopped about 10-20 feet past the hold short line onto Runway 11/29. The controller then cleared an airplane to takeoff OR land; can't remember which. I got on the radio and told [the controller] the clearance was wholly unacceptable at which time the supervisor came on frequency and stated that if it was unacceptable we should have declined it. We didn't have time to decline anything. If we would have known they expected LAHSO we would have declined the clearance on approach. I remember another aircraft lining up on Runway 16 and I was getting nervous. We sat on Runway 16 with half our aircraft sitting on Runway 11/29 with silence on the radio. I called and told him to get us off the runway. He said he'll get us off the runway when he can. I would have fired him that day for his incompetence. My passengers were shaken by this event and probably seriously question our ability to safely operate our aircraft. The controller and the supervisor working the Tower this day allowed an unsafe condition to develop and did not put a stop to it. The supervisor is ultimately responsible. [The supervisor] jeopardized the safety of my passengers; the safety of the aircraft; and safety of the crew. As is typical when I questioned him he got an attitude about it all. To top [the supervisor's] incompetence [the controller] allowed another aircraft takeoff/land while I was intruding on 11/29. The runway was not clear. [The controller] was overloaded with an incompetent supervisor. I don't fault [the controller] as [they] may have been in training. I recommend pulling the ATC tapes and reviewing this issue. The sooner the supervisor is fired and somebody competent fills the position the safer HPN will be.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.