Narrative:

I am a flight instructor. I was giving a flight review to a professional pilot in his personal A36 beech bonanza. The pilot IFR in high-performance aircraft; but seldom flies VFR or practices basic flight maneuvers; so I emphasized these operations during the flight phase of the review. My goal was to review slow flight and stalls; emergency procedures; ground reference maneuvers; takeoffs and landings. Both the pilot and myself have experience in beech bonanzas; although I had not flown that make and model in many years. Prior to entering the airplane; I instructed the pilot that we would be reviewing emergency procedures; but that I would only verbally tell him of an engine failure. I would expect him to reduce power himself to simulate an engine out (since he was flying his own airplane I would expect him to manage the power reduction in a manner that would not result in any damage to the engine.) the initial takeoff and subsequent slow flight and stalls were conducted at 3;000 AGL; progressed normally. We simulated an engine fire by my verbally telling him smoke was billowing from the cowling. The pilot properly took the corrective actions; including an emergency descent. I instructed him to not descend below 2;500 MSL; which was about 1;100 feet AGL. He correctly recovered and we discussed how he would have landed in the chosen field. We then progressed to ground reference maneuvers -- turns around a point and s-turns along a road. I then instructed the pilot to return to the airport. As we started the climb; I asked the pilot to simulate a low-altitude engine loss. The pilot retarded the throttle and correctly trimmed the airplane; selected a field; and performed an emergency checklist. I again instructed him to terminate the procedure at 2;400 MSL (1;000 AGL). We passed through 2;400 MSL; and I initially thought the pilot had missed the target altitude; however it soon became clear that the engine was not responding. I noted that this was a real engine failure and we continued our approach to the field. The engine coughed and sputtered several times; providing sporadic power. We lowered the landing gear and I noted that we were committed to landing at that point. We continued the approach and landed in a hay field on an upslope. Halfway up the slope there was a slight berm; perhaps an old road or hedgerow. We believe that is what caused the nose wheel to collapse. The aircraft came to a stop well short of the trees on the opposite end of the field; and neither of us were injured. We exited the airplane. I noticed that the rotating beacon was still on; and re-entered the airplane to turn off all switches. No damage was sustained to property other than the airplane itself; and no one was injured. I cannot find fault with either myself or the pilot. I had established an operational floor 1;000 AGL; which we did not violate until the engine failed. The pilot reacted correctly in so far as I could tell; although I could not visually verify all of the controls due to the position and size of the yoke.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE36 instructor reported an engine failure during a training exercise.

Narrative: I am a flight instructor. I was giving a flight review to a professional pilot in his personal A36 Beech Bonanza. The pilot IFR in high-performance aircraft; but seldom flies VFR or practices basic flight maneuvers; so I emphasized these operations during the flight phase of the review. My goal was to review slow flight and stalls; emergency procedures; ground reference maneuvers; takeoffs and landings. Both the pilot and myself have experience in Beech Bonanzas; although I had not flown that make and model in many years. Prior to entering the airplane; I instructed the pilot that we would be reviewing emergency procedures; but that I would only verbally tell him of an engine failure. I would expect him to reduce power himself to simulate an engine out (since he was flying his own airplane I would expect him to manage the power reduction in a manner that would not result in any damage to the engine.) The initial takeoff and subsequent slow flight and stalls were conducted at 3;000 AGL; progressed normally. We simulated an engine fire by my verbally telling him smoke was billowing from the cowling. The pilot properly took the corrective actions; including an emergency descent. I instructed him to not descend below 2;500 MSL; which was about 1;100 feet AGL. He correctly recovered and we discussed how he would have landed in the chosen field. We then progressed to ground reference maneuvers -- turns around a point and S-turns along a road. I then instructed the pilot to return to the airport. As we started the climb; I asked the pilot to simulate a low-altitude engine loss. The pilot retarded the throttle and correctly trimmed the airplane; selected a field; and performed an emergency checklist. I again instructed him to terminate the procedure at 2;400 MSL (1;000 AGL). We passed through 2;400 MSL; and I initially thought the pilot had missed the target altitude; however it soon became clear that the engine was not responding. I noted that this was a real engine failure and we continued our approach to the field. The engine coughed and sputtered several times; providing sporadic power. We lowered the landing gear and I noted that we were committed to landing at that point. We continued the approach and landed in a hay field on an upslope. Halfway up the slope there was a slight berm; perhaps an old road or hedgerow. We believe that is what caused the nose wheel to collapse. The aircraft came to a stop well short of the trees on the opposite end of the field; and neither of us were injured. We exited the airplane. I noticed that the rotating beacon was still on; and re-entered the airplane to turn off all switches. No damage was sustained to property other than the airplane itself; and no one was injured. I cannot find fault with either myself or the pilot. I had established an operational floor 1;000 AGL; which we did not violate until the engine failed. The pilot reacted correctly in so far as I could tell; although I could not visually verify all of the controls due to the position and size of the yoke.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.