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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1562315 |
Time | |
Date | 201807 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | PMP.Airport |
State Reference | FL |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Route In Use | Other VFR flight following |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Person 1 | |
Function | Single Pilot |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33 Flight Crew Total 2000 Flight Crew Type 1800 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Clearance Ground Excursion Runway |
Narrative:
After start-up; we listened to ATIS; then called for a clearance to taxi. There were least 2 others on the ground frequency; and the ground controller consistently corrected minor errors in their read-backs; and kept having them repeat his instructions until they got it word perfect. I called for my clearance; and was corrected 3 times on my read-back; I stated the destination runway instead of the run-up area; or my read back was not in the exact order which he had said it. I had tried very hard to go slowly; refer to my notes and repeat back the instructions exactly as he said them; but I obviously fell short. The next 2 people to call after me--one a student and the other an older pilot in a twin--were also corrected on their read-backs even when there was no error; only different wording. It's obvious that communicating was difficult and taking up more time than it should.here is an approximate example of an exchange:controller: 'aircraft Y; proceed to the runway 28 run-up area via taxiways mike and lima; and hold short of runway 33.' this was spoken rapidly--no chance to write it verbatim. Most pilots might write 'M left 28 hold short 33' on their kneeboard.read back 1: 'mike then lima to the run-up area; hold short of 33. Aircraft Y.' controller: ''aircraft Y; that is 'proceed via taxiway microphone and taxiway lima to the runway two-eight run-up area; and hold short of runway three-three.'' seven corrections in one sentence.read back 2: 'ah...aircraft Y proceeding on mike; then lima; to the run-up ... An... To the runway 28 and 33 run-up area; and holding short of ... An...runway 33.' controller: 'aircraft Y; I said proceed to the runway 28 run-up area...'note: the run-up area--it is the only run-up area serving runways 28 and 33--is clearly marked 'runway 28 & 33 run-up area.' the controller was demanding a verbatim repetition of his words; not a confirmation that the pilot knew what was required of him; which was clear from both his read backs. By the time the student got to his third read back; he was obviously getting rattled; completely unsure what was expected of him; and was thoroughly distracted from the task of taxiing his airplane on mike; then lima; to the common run-up area; and holding short of runway 33. When the twin arrived at the hold-short line adjacent to the runway 28-33 run-up area; he stopped for a moment; then proceeded across the hold-short line into the departure end of runway 33. I don't remember just what the controller said; but the pilot turned back across the hold-short line; heading directly at me at a high rate of speed. There was little room between me and the hold short line for him to turn. The controller said something like 'aircraft Z; you see what you did there...'; then (directed to me) said 'aircraft X; give way to the twin; when able; proceed across 33 to taxiway east; hold short of 28'. Aircraft Z was headed right for me and I said 'standby'. The response from the controller was another rapid fire order; repeating what he had just said; clearly not happy that I said 'standby'. I was waiting to either be hit by the twin or better yet; see if he would stop in time to turn and go back to where he ran through the hold-short line. Eventually; everyone departed on 28. Several minutes after departure; when I was switched to palm beach approach; I heard the twin; who had departed after us; had engine trouble and asked to return to pompano. Could this have been related to his rushed and flustered departure? Was he rattled because of how the controller was treating him and everyone he heard on the frequency? Was he rattled because something was not right in his airplane and he had that on his mind? Did he make some unnecessary engine-related mistake because of his state of mind?our airport has a high volume of training activity; so it's important that proper phraseology be used and be emphasized; but repeated unnecessary corrections is counterproductive. I was embarrassed that I had to repeat his instructions 3 times - I'm a 2000+ hour pilot - but this interchange had everyone on edge; and prone to mistakes. Even my non-pilot passenger commented that everyone seemed hesitant to repeat anything back for fear of saying it wrong. If control during any of this span of 10 minutes with these 5 people had the controller said 'everyone stop; let's just take it slow and I'll call you in sequence' or some other blanket statement to calm everyone down (including himself); it would have promoted safety. We were all at a critical phase of flight - preparing our airplanes and ourselves to fly; and everyone's emotions were ratcheted up for no good reason; by a controller who would not tolerate the tiniest read back deviation from his rapid-fire and overly complex instructions repeated complaints about this controller's behavior by pilots; instructors; and others have been countered with 'he's unionized. We can't do anything about him.'I remain convinced the runway incursion by the twin pilot was caused; at least in part; by the ground controller's actions.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: GA pilot reported the Ground Controller at PMP created distracting conditions by making all pilots read back exact responses to the instructions.
Narrative: After start-up; we listened to ATIS; then called for a clearance to taxi. There were least 2 others on the ground frequency; and the Ground Controller consistently corrected minor errors in their read-backs; and kept having them repeat his instructions until they got it word perfect. I called for my clearance; and was corrected 3 times on my read-back; I stated the destination runway instead of the run-up area; or my read back was not in the exact order which he had said it. I had tried very hard to go slowly; refer to my notes and repeat back the instructions exactly as he said them; but I obviously fell short. The next 2 people to call after me--one a student and the other an older pilot in a twin--were also corrected on their read-backs even when there was no error; only different wording. It's obvious that communicating was difficult and taking up more time than it should.Here is an approximate example of an exchange:Controller: 'Aircraft Y; proceed to the Runway 28 run-up area via taxiways Mike and Lima; and hold short of Runway 33.' This was spoken rapidly--no chance to write it verbatim. Most pilots might write 'M L 28 hold short 33' on their kneeboard.Read back 1: 'Mike then Lima to the run-up area; hold short of 33. Aircraft Y.' Controller: ''Aircraft Y; that is 'proceed via TAXIWAY MIKE AND TAXIWAY LIMA to the RUNWAY TWO-EIGHT run-up area; and hold short of RUNWAY THREE-THREE.'' Seven corrections in one sentence.Read back 2: 'Ah...Aircraft Y proceeding on Mike; then Lima; to the Run-up ... an... to the Runway 28 and 33 run-up area; and holding short of ... an...Runway 33.' Controller: 'Aircraft Y; I SAID proceed to the RUNWAY 28 run-up area...'NOTE: The run-up area--it is the only run-up area serving runways 28 and 33--is clearly marked 'Runway 28 & 33 Run-up Area.' The controller was demanding a verbatim repetition of his words; not a confirmation that the pilot knew what was required of him; which was clear from both his read backs. By the time the student got to his third read back; he was obviously getting rattled; completely unsure what was expected of him; and was thoroughly distracted from the task of taxiing his airplane on Mike; then Lima; to the common run-up area; and holding short of Runway 33. When the twin arrived at the hold-short line adjacent to the Runway 28-33 run-up area; he stopped for a moment; then proceeded across the hold-short line into the departure end of Runway 33. I don't remember just what the controller said; but the pilot turned back across the hold-short line; heading directly at me at a high rate of speed. There was little room between me and the hold short line for him to turn. The controller said something like 'Aircraft Z; you see what you did there...'; then (directed to me) said 'Aircraft X; give way to the twin; when able; proceed across 33 to taxiway E; hold short of 28'. Aircraft Z was headed right for me and I said 'standby'. The response from the controller was another rapid fire order; repeating what he had just said; clearly not happy that I said 'standby'. I was waiting to either be hit by the twin or better yet; see if he would stop in time to turn and go back to where he ran through the hold-short line. Eventually; everyone departed on 28. Several minutes after departure; when I was switched to Palm Beach Approach; I heard the twin; who had departed after us; had engine trouble and asked to return to Pompano. Could this have been related to his rushed and flustered departure? Was he rattled because of how the controller was treating him and everyone he heard on the frequency? Was he rattled because something was not right in his airplane and he had that on his mind? Did he make some unnecessary engine-related mistake because of his state of mind?Our airport has a high volume of training activity; so it's important that proper phraseology be used and be emphasized; but repeated unnecessary corrections is counterproductive. I was embarrassed that I had to repeat his instructions 3 times - I'm a 2000+ hour pilot - but this interchange had everyone on edge; and prone to mistakes. Even my non-pilot passenger commented that everyone seemed hesitant to repeat anything back for fear of saying it wrong. If control during any of this span of 10 minutes with these 5 people had the controller said 'everyone stop; let's just take it slow and I'll call you in sequence' or some other blanket statement to calm everyone down (including himself); it would have promoted safety. We were all at a critical phase of flight - preparing our airplanes and ourselves to fly; and everyone's emotions were ratcheted up for no good reason; by a controller who would not tolerate the tiniest read back deviation from his rapid-fire and overly complex instructions Repeated complaints about this controller's behavior by pilots; instructors; and others have been countered with 'He's unionized. We can't do anything about him.'I remain convinced the runway incursion by the twin pilot was caused; at least in part; by the Ground Controller's actions.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.