Narrative:

Upon arrival at [the] gate almost two hours late; brakes set; APU on; I directed the first officer (first officer) to shut down the engines. Left engine shutdown was normal. I was watching the marshaller outside as he was giving me the 'chocks in place' signal. First officer stated that the right engine wasn't shutting down. He apparently; without my direction; thought toggling the fuel cutoff switch from off to on several times was appropriate; but it had no effect. I don't recall seeing any EICAS messages or the valve lights on by the switch as I was kind of stunned by his action. I told him to put the switch in off and then pull the fire shutoff handle per the B757 FM normals. Having been on this jet for half my career here; a few things stick over time; that being one of them. The first officer fumbled with how to pull the switch. I told him he had to push the release button; then pull the handle up. As he was pulling the switch up; I noticed his hand starting to bias toward a handle rotation. Just as the words 'dont rotate it' started to come out of my mouth; I think I at least got 'dont ro....' out; he inadvertently rotated the handle towards him and the #2 bottle discharged into the engine. We watched the engine very slowly shutdown; much more slowly than normal. If I had to estimate how long this took from initial shutdown to pulling the handle I would guess a little over a minute. Time seems to move differently in stressful situations. Engine finally stopped rotating; operations was called; maintenance met aircraft; elb (electronic logbook) entry was made. First officer speaks fluent spanish; so he started speaking with the mechanic right away as soon as he came to the cockpit. I have no idea exactly what was said; so I have no idea if the correct info was passed to him. I had to borrow the csr phone to call [maintenance control] to ensure they had receipt of the write up. Played phone tag with the [chief pilot] while in van to hotel; but I kept losing signal on my cell phone; so had to wait until I got to hotel to contact him. While speaking with [chief pilot]; he and I both agreed that muscle memory and a bias toward rotation from events involving fire probably contributed to this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Flight Crew reported one engine did not shut down at the gate with the fuel master switch.

Narrative: Upon arrival at [the] gate almost two hours late; brakes set; APU on; I directed the F/O (First Officer) to shut down the engines. Left engine shutdown was normal. I was watching the marshaller outside as he was giving me the 'Chocks In Place' signal. F/O stated that the right engine wasn't shutting down. He apparently; without my direction; thought toggling the fuel cutoff switch from OFF to ON several times was appropriate; but it had no effect. I don't recall seeing any EICAS messages or the valve lights ON by the switch as I was kind of stunned by his action. I told him to put the switch in OFF and then pull the Fire Shutoff Handle per the B757 FM Normals. Having been on this jet for half my career here; a few things stick over time; that being one of them. The F/O fumbled with how to pull the switch. I told him he had to push the release button; then pull the handle up. As he was pulling the switch up; I noticed his hand starting to bias toward a handle rotation. Just as the words 'DONT ROTATE IT' started to come out of my mouth; I think I at least got 'DONT RO....' out; he inadvertently rotated the handle towards him and the #2 bottle discharged into the engine. We watched the engine very slowly shutdown; much more slowly than normal. If I had to estimate how long this took from initial shutdown to pulling the handle I would guess a little over a minute. Time seems to move differently in stressful situations. Engine finally stopped rotating; Operations was called; Maintenance met aircraft; ELB (Electronic Logbook) entry was made. F/O speaks fluent Spanish; so he started speaking with the mechanic right away as soon as he came to the cockpit. I have no idea exactly what was said; so I have no idea if the correct info was passed to him. I had to borrow the CSR phone to call [Maintenance Control] to ensure they had receipt of the write up. Played phone tag with the [Chief Pilot] while in van to hotel; but I kept losing signal on my cell phone; so had to wait until I got to hotel to contact him. While speaking with [Chief Pilot]; he and I both agreed that muscle memory and a bias toward rotation from events involving fire probably contributed to this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.