Narrative:

Upon reaching ZZZ we were given the ILS to [runway] xxl; and the clouds were reported at few at 300 feet. But was actually more a solid layer than few. I was flying the aircraft; and the captain was the pilot monitoring. We started the approach no issues. We started entering the clouds around 600-700 feet on the approach. The captain made the 500 foot call out and shortly after called lights in sight. I looked up; seen the approach lights; then disconnected the autopilot to prepare for landing. I should have left it engaged. While trying to divide my attention between the inside and outside of the aircraft; we became unstable and made the decision to go-around. I shoved in full thrust; hit the go around buttons; and the captain called go-around to the tower. I called for flaps 8 and we started to climb out and speed up; and was told to turn out to the left; on a heading; we continued to climb out at 200 knots until 3000 AGL; and then sped up to 250 knots. The captain told me to bring the power back some. We got our flaps up; and after takeoff checklist; and continued to fly the aircraft. We both heard a loud noise but could not figure out where it was coming from. The captain then realized as we were on downwind that the gear was still down. I had never called for gear up; and now we have over sped the gear limitation off 220 knots. We set up for another approach; this time we performed a catii approach to the same runway; and the captain landed the aircraft with no issues. Once arriving at the gate; the captain notified maintenance of the situation.I should not have disengaged the autopilot when I did; I drastically increased my workload at the wrong time by trying to manually fly while making sure I have runway environment in sight. [I] need to keep go around procedure fresh in mind at all times. This event showed me even if you know the procedure and call outs; it is imperative to stay calm to properly execute what needs to be done.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reported that the autopilot was disconnected early causing an unstabilized approach and a go-around.

Narrative: Upon reaching ZZZ we were given the ILS to [Runway] XXL; and the clouds were reported at few at 300 feet. But was actually more a solid layer than few. I was flying the aircraft; and the Captain was the pilot monitoring. We started the approach no issues. We started entering the clouds around 600-700 feet on the approach. The Captain made the 500 foot call out and shortly after called lights in sight. I looked up; seen the approach lights; then disconnected the autopilot to prepare for landing. I should have left it engaged. While trying to divide my attention between the inside and outside of the aircraft; we became unstable and made the decision to go-around. I shoved in full thrust; hit the go around buttons; and the Captain called go-around to the Tower. I called for flaps 8 and we started to climb out and speed up; and was told to turn out to the left; on a heading; we continued to climb out at 200 knots until 3000 AGL; and then sped up to 250 knots. The Captain told me to bring the power back some. We got our flaps up; and After Takeoff Checklist; and continued to fly the aircraft. We both heard a loud noise but could not figure out where it was coming from. The Captain then realized as we were on downwind that the gear was still down. I had never called for gear up; and now we have over sped the gear limitation off 220 knots. We set up for another approach; this time we performed a CATII approach to the same runway; and the Captain landed the aircraft with no issues. Once arriving at the gate; the Captain notified Maintenance of the situation.I should not have disengaged the autopilot when I did; I drastically increased my workload at the wrong time by trying to manually fly while making sure I have runway environment in sight. [I] need to keep go around procedure fresh in mind at all times. This event showed me even if you know the procedure and call outs; it is imperative to stay calm to properly execute what needs to be done.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.