Narrative:

A line of weather was moving from west to east. All military restricted and warning areas airspace was active and a ship was offshore; which means that the restricted airspace control facility is often unable to take point outs or (perhaps even worse) will take a point out and then revoke it at a later time due to 'ship's traffic' - perhaps a separate issue; but I will include details on that problem below the description of this specific event.as is often the case; weather was spread throughout the center's airspace; and in the interest of not 'sinking' the other areas and not slowing down traffic through the facility; we were vectoring aircraft in the narrow corridor between the weather and the airspace. The weather moved steadily east and it was apparent to the experienced controllers in the room that it would not be dying out on the coast like it sometimes does. Approximately 30 minutes prior to the event; our supervisor went to tmu (traffic management unit) to advise them that the warning areas had already denied two aircraft deviations due to warning airspace and we needed to shift aircraft west. The supervisor informed us that it was tmu's position to continue running down the coast until aircraft actually encroached on the warning areas.I was handed an aircraft X's landing and advised pilot of the weather and warning area situation. Upon learning that east deviations were not available; the pilot advised he'd like to take up a 270 heading and stay north of the line. After the west turn; they needed another 30 degrees right to remain clear of the heavy to extreme precipitation. I informed the supervisor that we now had an aircraft inbound flying northwest; bound for weather; and it was time to stop traffic on the coast. The supervisor informed the warning areas then went to tmu to tell them.around this time; three departures came off and due to the line of weather; immediately started an east deviation towards my sector. I took radar on the three departures and issued deviations as far east as possible without entering the warning areas. The supervisor returned to inform me that the plan from tmu was now that we're not working arrivals; we can work departures since they would not be head on with landers anymore. I explained that 'heads up' traffic wasn't the issue; but rather the fact that the departures were now pointed at the same closed hole that the arrivals used to be.I took a handoff on aircraft Y's southbound landing. Being sure to take extra time with the general aviation pilot and aircraft; I laid out a very clear picture of what was ahead with regards to the weather and warning areas. I allowed the pilot to get as close to the warning area as possible then advised I had to turn them away. Concerned the general aviation pilot may be more concerned about my authority than their own safety; I did explain something along the lines of 'I have to turn you 30 degrees for the warning area now. I am aware there is a thunderstorm to your west; if you are unable to take that turn; let me know and we'll do what we need to do to keep you safe'. The pilot advised he'd take the turn and have a look. Shortly after that; he said he could not take the heading and continued into the warning area.similarly; my northbound aircraft were now telling me that they needed further east than the 010 heading I had assigned. I explained I had to turn them clear of the airspace. The first departure did take a turn and remained barely clear; but aircraft Z and aircraft a both continued into the warning area airspace. I advised these aircraft and aircraft Y that I understood they were exercising their urgent authority while my d-side coordinated with their facility. They did take point outs on all three aircraft ultimately; however; they may have entered the airspace on their urgent authority before this point.first; I'd like to address the point out issue. Often; we continue moving aircraft very near or inside the warning area's airspace because they are taking point outs. Unfortunately; I believe their controllers are unfamiliar with what exactly a point out is and what they have authorized when they take one. It is a somewhat common occurrence that after accepting a point out; they will call back at a later time and tell us we need to turn an aircraft to miss something they have going on in their airspace. I have personally witnessed at least 2 of these occurrences in the past month. The first time; they took a point out on an aircraft northwest bound at 37;000 feet. The aircraft was well into the warning airspace when conflict alert went off with that aircraft and multiple targets southbound at 37;000 feet in the airspace. The sector [was called] on the landline and told them to get the aircraft out of the airspace immediately. The second incident happened this week. The altrv (altitude reservation) was hot 19;000 to 22;000 feet; but nobody was in it. They told the sector controller they could use the airspace for the next hour because nothing was scheduled (but they did not officially call it down - something of a 'blanket point out' thing they do sometimes). Approximately 30 minutes later; the controller had to stop a departure at 18;000 feet because he observed limited data tags transitioning the altrv. About a minute later; they called to tell him his traffic had to stay clear of the altrv. Discussion with other controllers in the area leads me to believe that almost all of us have had a similar experience at some point in our careers.I bring up this issue to explain my feeling regarding running aircraft too near the warning areas because 'they're taking point outs.' I hate to say it; but I do not treat a point out to them the same way I treat a point out to another FAA controller. I know what I'm getting when I make a point out to any other surrounding facility; but with the warning area facility; I always need to have a 'plan B' for when they change their mind or I observe traffic in the vicinity of my aircraft. With this in mind; it is my personal policy that I will always vector to remain clear of the airspace until such time as it is absolutely necessary to make a point out. At that point I will do whatever I need to do to ensure that additional aircraft are not placed in a similar situation. I feel that if tmu were more responsive early to the requests of competent; experienced controllers and supervisors; aircraft can be moved in a timely and strategic manner instead of last minute 'panic' vectors. I understand they want to even out the traffic load; but ultimately the aircraft they try to keep out of the other sectors wind up there anyway; just they arrive in a random and chaotic manner instead of organized and spaced had they been moved prior to the weather.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZJX Center Controller reported the facility controlling Restricted/Warning Areas approved point outs for weather deviations than called back to tell them to exit the areas for traffic.

Narrative: A line of weather was moving from west to east. All military Restricted and Warning Areas airspace was active and a ship was offshore; which means that the restricted airspace control facility is often unable to take point outs or (perhaps even worse) will take a point out and then revoke it at a later time due to 'ship's traffic' - perhaps a separate issue; but I will include details on that problem below the description of this specific event.As is often the case; weather was spread throughout the Center's airspace; and in the interest of not 'sinking' the other areas and not slowing down traffic through the facility; we were vectoring aircraft in the narrow corridor between the weather and the airspace. The weather moved steadily east and it was apparent to the experienced controllers in the room that it would not be dying out on the coast like it sometimes does. Approximately 30 minutes prior to the event; our supervisor went to TMU (Traffic Management Unit) to advise them that the Warning Areas had already denied two aircraft deviations due to warning airspace and we needed to shift aircraft west. The Supervisor informed us that it was TMU's position to continue running down the coast until aircraft actually encroached on the Warning Areas.I was handed an Aircraft X's landing and advised pilot of the weather and Warning Area situation. Upon learning that east deviations were not available; the pilot advised he'd like to take up a 270 heading and stay north of the line. After the west turn; they needed another 30 degrees right to remain clear of the heavy to extreme precipitation. I informed the Supervisor that we now had an aircraft inbound flying northwest; bound for weather; and it was time to stop traffic on the coast. The Supervisor informed the Warning Areas then went to TMU to tell them.Around this time; three departures came off and due to the line of weather; immediately started an east deviation towards my sector. I took radar on the three departures and issued deviations as far east as possible without entering the Warning Areas. The Supervisor returned to inform me that the plan from TMU was now that we're not working arrivals; we can work departures since they would not be head on with landers anymore. I explained that 'heads up' traffic wasn't the issue; but rather the fact that the departures were now pointed at the same closed hole that the arrivals used to be.I took a handoff on Aircraft Y's southbound landing. Being sure to take extra time with the general aviation pilot and aircraft; I laid out a very clear picture of what was ahead with regards to the weather and warning areas. I allowed the pilot to get as close to the Warning Area as possible then advised I had to turn them away. Concerned the general aviation pilot may be more concerned about my authority than their own safety; I did explain something along the lines of 'I have to turn you 30 degrees for the warning area now. I am aware there is a thunderstorm to your west; if you are unable to take that turn; let me know and we'll do what we need to do to keep you safe'. The pilot advised he'd take the turn and have a look. Shortly after that; he said he could not take the heading and continued into the Warning Area.Similarly; my northbound aircraft were now telling me that they needed further east than the 010 heading I had assigned. I explained I had to turn them clear of the airspace. The first departure did take a turn and remained barely clear; but Aircraft Z and Aircraft A both continued into the Warning Area airspace. I advised these aircraft and Aircraft Y that I understood they were exercising their urgent authority while my D-side coordinated with their facility. They did take point outs on all three aircraft ultimately; however; they may have entered the airspace on their urgent authority before this point.First; I'd like to address the point out issue. Often; we continue moving aircraft very near or inside the Warning Area's airspace because they are taking point outs. Unfortunately; I believe their controllers are unfamiliar with what exactly a point out is and what they have authorized when they take one. It is a somewhat common occurrence that after accepting a point out; they will call back at a later time and tell us we need to turn an aircraft to miss something they have going on in their airspace. I have personally witnessed at least 2 of these occurrences in the past month. The first time; they took a point out on an aircraft northwest bound at 37;000 feet. The aircraft was well into the Warning airspace when conflict alert went off with that aircraft and multiple targets southbound at 37;000 feet in the airspace. The sector [was called] on the landline and told them to get the aircraft out of the airspace immediately. The second incident happened this week. The ALTRV (Altitude Reservation) was hot 19;000 to 22;000 feet; but nobody was in it. They told the Sector Controller they could use the airspace for the next hour because nothing was scheduled (but they did not officially call it down - something of a 'blanket point out' thing they do sometimes). Approximately 30 minutes later; the controller had to stop a departure at 18;000 feet because he observed limited data tags transitioning the ALTRV. About a minute later; they called to tell him his traffic had to stay clear of the ALTRV. Discussion with other controllers in the area leads me to believe that almost all of us have had a similar experience at some point in our careers.I bring up this issue to explain my feeling regarding running aircraft too near the Warning Areas because 'they're taking point outs.' I hate to say it; but I do not treat a point out to them the same way I treat a point out to another FAA controller. I know what I'm getting when I make a point out to any other surrounding facility; but with the Warning Area facility; I always need to have a 'Plan B' for when they change their mind or I observe traffic in the vicinity of my aircraft. With this in mind; it is my personal policy that I will ALWAYS vector to remain clear of the airspace until such time as it is absolutely necessary to make a point out. At that point I will do whatever I need to do to ensure that additional aircraft are not placed in a similar situation. I feel that if TMU were more responsive early to the requests of competent; experienced controllers and supervisors; aircraft can be moved in a timely and strategic manner instead of last minute 'panic' vectors. I understand they want to even out the traffic load; but ultimately the aircraft they try to keep out of the other sectors wind up there anyway; just they arrive in a random and chaotic manner instead of organized and spaced had they been moved prior to the weather.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.