Narrative:

The subject aircraft departed runway 6 at lambert field and overflew men and equipment working on runway 12R at the intersection of runway 6. I was working the midnight shift at lambert field on 9/90. At approximately xa pm local time, city veh contacted ground control to request permission to begin precoordinated rubber removal operations on runway 12R. I was the only controller in the tower, which is the usual procedure, and after some delay due to airport operations, approved the operation and officially closed runway 12R. There was no mention or coordination involving runway 6 with city veh. The lights were turned off on runway 12R as requested by city veh and notation made on facility log that runway 12R was closed. At approximately xc:45, an small transport departed runway 6. A scan of the runway prior to takeoff clearance showed equipment in close proximity to runway 6 on runway 12R, yet the equipment appeared to be off on the runway edge. As no permission was ever granted for operations on runway 6 and city vehs were requesting permission to cross the runway throughout the evening, equipment near the runway was expected, however, equipment on the runway was not anticipated. The aircraft departed, no evasive action was required and the aircraft reported nothing unusual about the departure. Almost immediately after the aircraft departed, the city communications center called the tower to question why an aircraft had departed a closed runway and report that the aircraft 'flew over the head' of some worker. The conversation terminated with the expression that it was 'no big deal' so I assumed that the first comment was not a literal description of what actually happened and that the aircraft had only been judged to have been close to the men on the runway. However, the contractors involved contacted the facility the next day to inquire about the incident and an investigation into the incident began. Stl is in the process of the investigation and final results are still pending. The city maintains that, because the runway 6 was notamed closed on the summary sheet delivered to the tower prior to the shift beginning, the runway was in fact closed. However, no coordination was accomplished with the tower on the radio or by phone to verify closure. This is contrary to normal and accepted procedures. Very often the NOTAM summary sheet is delivered to the tower listing runway closures that never actually take place. Furthermore, city vehs would not consider beginning operations on a previously active runway only because such activity is detailed on a summary sheet. It is my contention that runway 6 was open and an active runway because actual coordination had not taken place. This is one problem area that led to the incident. It has also been brought to my attention that runways that intersect a closed runway cannot be used for arriving or departing aircraft because that portion of the runway that intersects the closed runway is also closed and that vehs can cross any runway which intersects a closed runway west/O coordination with ATC. This is a dangerous situation that is contrary to positive control by ATC of the airport proper.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MISUNDERSTANDING OCCURRED BETWEEN GND EQUIPMENT AND CTLR ON RWY CLOSURE. CTLR RELEASED AN ACFT ON INTERSECTING RWY WITH MEN AND EQUIPMENT WORKING AT INTERSECTION.

Narrative: THE SUBJECT ACFT DEPARTED RWY 6 AT LAMBERT FIELD AND OVERFLEW MEN AND EQUIP WORKING ON RWY 12R AT THE INTXN OF RWY 6. I WAS WORKING THE MIDNIGHT SHIFT AT LAMBERT FIELD ON 9/90. AT APPROX XA PM LCL TIME, CITY VEH CONTACTED GND CTL TO REQUEST PERMISSION TO BEGIN PRECOORDINATED RUBBER REMOVAL OPS ON RWY 12R. I WAS THE ONLY CTLR IN THE TWR, WHICH IS THE USUAL PROC, AND AFTER SOME DELAY DUE TO ARPT OPS, APPROVED THE OPERATION AND OFFICIALLY CLOSED RWY 12R. THERE WAS NO MENTION OR COORD INVOLVING RWY 6 WITH CITY VEH. THE LIGHTS WERE TURNED OFF ON RWY 12R AS REQUESTED BY CITY VEH AND NOTATION MADE ON FAC LOG THAT RWY 12R WAS CLOSED. AT APPROX XC:45, AN SMT DEPARTED RWY 6. A SCAN OF THE RWY PRIOR TO TKOF CLRNC SHOWED EQUIP IN CLOSE PROX TO RWY 6 ON RWY 12R, YET THE EQUIP APPEARED TO BE OFF ON THE RWY EDGE. AS NO PERMISSION WAS EVER GRANTED FOR OPS ON RWY 6 AND CITY VEHS WERE REQUESTING PERMISSION TO CROSS THE RWY THROUGHOUT THE EVENING, EQUIP NEAR THE RWY WAS EXPECTED, HOWEVER, EQUIP ON THE RWY WAS NOT ANTICIPATED. THE ACFT DEPARTED, NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS REQUIRED AND THE ACFT RPTED NOTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT THE DEP. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ACFT DEPARTED, THE CITY COMS CTR CALLED THE TWR TO QUESTION WHY AN ACFT HAD DEPARTED A CLOSED RWY AND RPT THAT THE ACFT 'FLEW OVER THE HEAD' OF SOME WORKER. THE CONVERSATION TERMINATED WITH THE EXPRESSION THAT IT WAS 'NO BIG DEAL' SO I ASSUMED THAT THE FIRST COMMENT WAS NOT A LITERAL DESCRIPTION OF WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AND THAT THE ACFT HAD ONLY BEEN JUDGED TO HAVE BEEN CLOSE TO THE MEN ON THE RWY. HOWEVER, THE CONTRACTORS INVOLVED CONTACTED THE FAC THE NEXT DAY TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE INCIDENT AND AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT BEGAN. STL IS IN THE PROCESS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND FINAL RESULTS ARE STILL PENDING. THE CITY MAINTAINS THAT, BECAUSE THE RWY 6 WAS NOTAMED CLOSED ON THE SUMMARY SHEET DELIVERED TO THE TWR PRIOR TO THE SHIFT BEGINNING, THE RWY WAS IN FACT CLOSED. HOWEVER, NO COORD WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE TWR ON THE RADIO OR BY PHONE TO VERIFY CLOSURE. THIS IS CONTRARY TO NORMAL AND ACCEPTED PROCS. VERY OFTEN THE NOTAM SUMMARY SHEET IS DELIVERED TO THE TWR LISTING RWY CLOSURES THAT NEVER ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE. FURTHERMORE, CITY VEHS WOULD NOT CONSIDER BEGINNING OPS ON A PREVIOUSLY ACTIVE RWY ONLY BECAUSE SUCH ACTIVITY IS DETAILED ON A SUMMARY SHEET. IT IS MY CONTENTION THAT RWY 6 WAS OPEN AND AN ACTIVE RWY BECAUSE ACTUAL COORD HAD NOT TAKEN PLACE. THIS IS ONE PROB AREA THAT LED TO THE INCIDENT. IT HAS ALSO BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTN THAT RWYS THAT INTERSECT A CLOSED RWY CANNOT BE USED FOR ARRIVING OR DEPARTING ACFT BECAUSE THAT PORTION OF THE RWY THAT INTERSECTS THE CLOSED RWY IS ALSO CLOSED AND THAT VEHS CAN CROSS ANY RWY WHICH INTERSECTS A CLOSED RWY W/O COORD WITH ATC. THIS IS A DANGEROUS SITUATION THAT IS CONTRARY TO POSITIVE CTL BY ATC OF THE ARPT PROPER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.