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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1572928 |
Time | |
Date | 201808 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | LXT.Airport |
State Reference | MO |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Person 1 | |
Function | Instructor Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42 Flight Crew Total 3480 Flight Crew Type 145 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict NMAC Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Miss Distance | Horizontal 500 Vertical 200 |
Narrative:
I was checking a [pilot] out in their cessna 182. We were doing pattern work at lxt; a non-towered airport. We called on the CTAF; giving our position consistently. We had been in the pattern about 20 minutes. We had just taken off after a touch and go on runway 36; which has a right pattern. We hadn't turned crosswind yet so we were still under 500 feet AGL. We were looking up and caught the glimpse of a cherokee out of the corner of our eyes just below us and to our left. I instructed my student to keep climbing. We then turned right crosswind. When we turned right downwind for 36; we were able to spot the cherokee. He was now on a low left downwind for runway 36. We called again on the CTAF that we were now 'right downwind for 36'. At that time he crossed midfield in front of us to enter right down wind also. He called entering right downwind. I responded that he cut in front of us and that we would now be number two for the runway. He responded that he had us in sight.my client decided to end the lesson. We landed and taxied to the hangar. The other plane is also based at lxt. There was an instructor and instrument student in the plane. They came up to our hangar to talk. The instructor reprimanded us for not having adsb as they didn't see us on their tablets. Our plane is equipped with adsb but we were so low they probably weren't receiving it. They were doing a practice VOR a circling approach which cuts across the airport at a low altitude from the northeast. I told them they needed to be looking out the window; especially doing an approach to a non-towered airport and that you can't count on adsb at very low altitudes. They said they made repeated calls and heard no one at lxt. They then admitted that they were still on the frequency of the last airport; until just after the near miss. They both apologized. We were scanning at pattern elevation for traffic as we heard no radio calls. They came in very low and at an angle to the runway for their approach. Not where we would have expected traffic.they weren't looking out the windows for traffic; trusting their equipment to keep them safe around a non-towered airport. They assumed erroneously that everyone has adsb and that it can be seen at low altitudes. Planes aren't required to have adsb until january of 2020. They needed to see and avoid especially as they were doing a non-standard pattern. They were calling on the wrong frequency. They seemed to feel that someone on that frequency should have told them they were on the wrong frequency. If the approach had been properly briefed; they would have put in the correct frequency.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C182 instructor pilot reported a NMAC in the pattern at LXT a non-towered airport.
Narrative: I was checking a [pilot] out in their Cessna 182. We were doing pattern work at LXT; a non-towered airport. We called on the CTAF; giving our position consistently. We had been in the pattern about 20 minutes. We had just taken off after a touch and go on Runway 36; which has a right pattern. We hadn't turned crosswind yet so we were still under 500 feet AGL. We were looking up and caught the glimpse of a Cherokee out of the corner of our eyes just below us and to our left. I instructed my student to keep climbing. We then turned right crosswind. When we turned right downwind for 36; we were able to spot the Cherokee. He was now on a low left downwind for runway 36. We called again on the CTAF that we were now 'right downwind for 36'. At that time he crossed midfield in front of us to enter right down wind also. He called entering right downwind. I responded that he cut in front of us and that we would now be number two for the runway. He responded that he had us in sight.My client decided to end the lesson. We landed and taxied to the hangar. The other plane is also based at LXT. There was an instructor and instrument student in the plane. They came up to our hangar to talk. The instructor reprimanded us for not having ADSB as they didn't see us on their tablets. Our plane is equipped with ADSB but we were so low they probably weren't receiving it. They were doing a practice VOR A circling approach which cuts across the airport at a low altitude from the northeast. I told them they needed to be looking out the window; especially doing an approach to a non-towered airport and that you can't count on ADSB at very low altitudes. They said they made repeated calls and heard no one at LXT. They then admitted that they were still on the frequency of the last airport; until just after the near miss. They both apologized. We were scanning at pattern elevation for traffic as we heard no radio calls. They came in very low and at an angle to the runway for their approach. Not where we would have expected traffic.They weren't looking out the windows for traffic; trusting their equipment to keep them safe around a non-towered airport. They assumed erroneously that everyone has ADSB and that it can be seen at low altitudes. Planes aren't required to have ADSB until January of 2020. They needed to see and avoid especially as they were doing a non-standard pattern. They were calling on the wrong frequency. They seemed to feel that someone on that frequency should have told them they were on the wrong frequency. If the approach had been properly briefed; they would have put in the correct frequency.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.