Narrative:

While flying the [approach; the] aircraft descended to approximately 800 AGL during visual approach prior to the final segment. Following descent clearance and subsequent clearance to fly the [approach]; and on the offshore segment of the approach; tower instructed us to 'square off' the turn to final for traffic in the pattern. Additional traffic was called to our 3 o'clock position. At this time I confirmed the instructions to the ca (captain) (pilot flying) and immediately began a visual scan for the traffic. I glanced back to the pfd and called 'you're at 1;250 feet;' to call attention to the ca that we were getting low for our distance from the airport. I went back outside the aircraft momentarily to scan for the called traffic. Next time I looked inside we were at 800 feet AGL. I immediately called the deviation to the ca; saying; 'check altitude - 800 feet.' as the ca corrected immediately tower called; 'low altitude alert; 700 feet.' the ca regained altitude to approximately 1;200 AGL prior to commencing final descent to the airport. The flight continued without further incident. The ca had disconnected the ap during the initial descent phase of the visual approach. During the descent; the ca was sequencing waypoints manually on the FMS; including programming and cleaning up the approach. Throughout the flying day; the ca was very hands on and performing several pm (pilot monitoring) tasks while he was PF (pilot flying). I feel that should sops regarding PF/pm duties had been adhered to during the flight the likelihood of the incident occurring would have been significantly reduced. I also feel that disconnecting the autopilot and hand-flying the approach would not have been a bad thing in itself should PF/pm duties had been followed. The ca hand-flying a visual approach while being heads-down into the FMS contributed to the lack of attention to altitude. The adjustment of the approach per ATC instructions was a contributing factor. The additional traffic called by tower (but not depicted on TCAS) at our 3 o'clock (which was in the direction of our turn back to the airport) took my attention as pm from monitoring flight data to an outside visual scan for traffic.reinforcement of CRM during critical phases of flight. Reinforcement that hand-flying the aircraft requires complete attention to flight instruments by the PF.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ First Officer reported the Captain descended early on a visual approach and failed to follow SOP's on several occasions.

Narrative: While flying the [approach; the] aircraft descended to approximately 800 AGL during visual approach prior to the final segment. Following descent clearance and subsequent clearance to fly the [approach]; and on the offshore segment of the approach; tower instructed us to 'square off' the turn to final for traffic in the pattern. Additional traffic was called to our 3 o'clock position. At this time I confirmed the instructions to the CA (Captain) (Pilot Flying) and immediately began a visual scan for the traffic. I glanced back to the PFD and called 'You're at 1;250 feet;' to call attention to the CA that we were getting low for our distance from the airport. I went back outside the aircraft momentarily to scan for the called traffic. Next time I looked inside we were at 800 feet AGL. I immediately called the deviation to the CA; saying; 'check altitude - 800 feet.' As the CA corrected immediately tower called; 'Low altitude alert; 700 feet.' The CA regained altitude to approximately 1;200 AGL prior to commencing final descent to the airport. The flight continued without further incident. The CA had disconnected the AP during the initial descent phase of the visual approach. During the descent; the CA was sequencing waypoints manually on the FMS; including programming and cleaning up the approach. Throughout the flying day; the CA was very hands on and performing several PM (Pilot Monitoring) tasks while he was PF (Pilot Flying). I feel that should SOPs regarding PF/PM duties had been adhered to during the flight the likelihood of the incident occurring would have been significantly reduced. I also feel that disconnecting the autopilot and hand-flying the approach would not have been a bad thing in itself should PF/PM duties had been followed. The CA hand-flying a visual approach while being heads-down into the FMS contributed to the lack of attention to altitude. The adjustment of the approach per ATC instructions was a contributing factor. The additional traffic called by tower (but not depicted on TCAS) at our 3 o'clock (which was in the direction of our turn back to the airport) took my attention as PM from monitoring flight data to an outside visual scan for traffic.Reinforcement of CRM during critical phases of flight. Reinforcement that hand-flying the aircraft requires complete attention to flight instruments by the PF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.