Narrative:

I was the captain and pilot flying to 25PD. On descent for approach and landing into 25PD; unexpected weather that was not forecast for the time of our arrival had created traffic delays that were increasing in length. The delays were exacerbated by three runway changes within approximately an hour of our arrival. Thunderstorms moving through the area; rain; and reduced visibility in the arrival corridors precipitated the changing runways even though conditions at the airport were mostly VMC with few clouds. ATC seemed to be overwhelmed by the changing conditions and having to reorient arriving traffic as the runways changed. Preflight forecast weather was for temporary tsra (thunderstorms and rain) in the vicinity; but with clearing weather and low clouds three hours prior to our ETA. Shanghai control gave us our first vector off course prior to airway fix dumet headed south and clear of weather. Continuing on vectors while descending we were given two successive orbits to the right; followed by a left orbit. There was some initial confusion by the pm (pilot monitoring) and [the relief pilots] whether or not instructions to orbit from ATC were for a single turn or continuous multiple turns in orbit. I; as the PF (pilot flying); interpreted the ATC instructions as given; 'fly an orbit to the right/left' as meaning a single complete turn to the right or left. Inquiry with ATC confirmed this understanding; and was supported by the [relief pilots] search of area information found in the [international operations manual]. Meanwhile; all four pilots; using our best CRM/tem (crew resource management/threat and error management) skills; vocalized our rising concern for the ever deteriorating remf (remaining fuel on board) state; making contingency plans; and running 'what if' scenarios out loud amongst us. No efc (expected further clearance) or expected time of delay was ever issued. The length of the vectors caused added concern that we might have been forgotten in the melee of aircraft. We inquired a couple of times as to the length of our delay. At one point we were told five minutes; and at another that we were headed for landing. We had clearly become part of an insidious creeping approach delay. Minimum fuel and emergency fuel contingencies were discussed. Zsss/sha diversion was considered. We pressed on; analyzing the traffic display ahead of us on TCAS; and choosing to continue to 25PD as our best and safest alternative. With 10.6K lbs. Of fuel remaining; I decided to declare minimum fuel. Approach control acknowledge our declaration and advised us of a 60 km run until landing. I had the pm advise approach control that we were unable to run 60 km; unable to accept further delays. We did not ask for priority handling; but were given an immediate right turn to base leg and an intercept to final; runway 17R. Another flight was heard being given orbit instructions soon afterward; presumably in deference to our handling priority. Approach and landing were normal; but for the preceding landing aircraft that delayed landing clearance until about 650 feet AGL. Landing fuel; 9;300 lbs.; was noted clear of the runway. Block fuel was 6;800 lbs.an item of note is that civil aviation administration china (caac) requested and was provided with a statement from the captain describing the fuel state onboard and the decision to declare minimum fuel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported declaring minimum fuel with ATC after incurring delay vectors due to unanticipated weather conditions at the destination.

Narrative: I was the Captain and pilot flying to 25PD. On descent for approach and landing into 25PD; unexpected weather that was not forecast for the time of our arrival had created traffic delays that were increasing in length. The delays were exacerbated by three runway changes within approximately an hour of our arrival. Thunderstorms moving through the area; rain; and reduced visibility in the arrival corridors precipitated the changing runways even though conditions at the airport were mostly VMC with few clouds. ATC seemed to be overwhelmed by the changing conditions and having to reorient arriving traffic as the runways changed. Preflight forecast weather was for temporary TSRA (Thunderstorms and Rain) in the vicinity; but with clearing weather and low clouds three hours prior to our ETA. Shanghai Control gave us our first vector off course prior to airway fix DUMET headed south and clear of weather. Continuing on vectors while descending we were given two successive orbits to the right; followed by a left orbit. There was some initial confusion by the PM (Pilot Monitoring) and [the Relief Pilots] whether or not instructions to orbit from ATC were for a single turn or continuous multiple turns in orbit. I; as the PF (Pilot Flying); interpreted the ATC instructions as given; 'Fly an orbit to the right/left' as meaning a single complete turn to the right or left. Inquiry with ATC confirmed this understanding; and was supported by the [Relief Pilots] search of area information found in the [International Operations Manual]. Meanwhile; all four pilots; using our best CRM/TEM (Crew Resource Management/Threat and Error Management) skills; vocalized our rising concern for the ever deteriorating REMF (Remaining Fuel on Board) state; making contingency plans; and running 'what if' scenarios out loud amongst us. No EFC (Expected Further Clearance) or expected time of delay was ever issued. The length of the vectors caused added concern that we might have been forgotten in the melee of aircraft. We inquired a couple of times as to the length of our delay. At one point we were told five minutes; and at another that we were headed for landing. We had clearly become part of an insidious creeping approach delay. Minimum Fuel and Emergency Fuel contingencies were discussed. ZSSS/SHA diversion was considered. We pressed on; analyzing the traffic display ahead of us on TCAS; and choosing to continue to 25PD as our best and safest alternative. With 10.6K lbs. of fuel remaining; I decided to declare Minimum Fuel. Approach Control acknowledge our declaration and advised us of a 60 km run until landing. I had the PM advise Approach Control that we were unable to run 60 km; unable to accept further delays. We did not ask for priority handling; but were given an immediate right turn to base leg and an intercept to final; Runway 17R. Another flight was heard being given orbit instructions soon afterward; presumably in deference to our handling priority. Approach and landing were normal; but for the preceding landing aircraft that delayed landing clearance until about 650 feet AGL. Landing fuel; 9;300 lbs.; was noted clear of the runway. Block fuel was 6;800 lbs.An item of note is that Civil Aviation Administration China (CAAC) requested and was provided with a statement from the Captain describing the fuel state onboard and the decision to declare Minimum Fuel.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.