Narrative:

Upon receiving performance my first officer (first officer) mentioned that he has noticed that recently it says that we should be using a complex engine out procedure for both runways in mfr. Sure enough that is what was indicated on [flight data computer] and the paper [performance charts] yet we do not have a charted complex engine out for either runway. With that discrepancy I contacted dispatch and they were unaware of the issue so I asked for a duty officer to call me. I got a call back about 10 minutes later and the duty officer explained that there is now a complex engine out for [this airport]; but jeppesen has yet to chart it and publish to the pilots. The [dispatcher] indicated that the charted simple specials were still valid or we could go into the performance manual where a textual version of the complex procedures were listed. The [dispatcher] indicated that there should have been a dispatch release note listed; but there was not and having just looked up a couple releases the next day; there still is no release note listed.while this event alone is not a huge issue it is one item on a long list of botched policy and procedure changes. Those issues include but are not limited to (and in no particular order):1) policy change to prohibit backpacks on one page of the fom; but still allowed just a few pages later2) the maximum airspeed at FL250 in the [aircraft] being wildly inaccurate3) hgs aiii limitations saying we have to be configured by the FAF while the procedure changed to 5nm4) saying we need to write up every windshear encounter on approach. I confirmed with [dispatch]that it was poorly worded and only is when LLWS causes a missed approach below mins (which is redundant). This has yet to be clarified to the pilot group5) use of overtravel power guidance being that it really is never needed; thus second guessing the actions of pilots who were actually in command of the aircraft at the time. I feel this will cause pilots to not use it when they really do need it for fear of disciple and could ultimately lead to a CFIT accident6) after this tlr/complex engine out issue in [the airport] I found out that the company and aerodata has flipped the switch on condition specific engine out procedures; yet that has not been communicated to the pilot group7) pilot controlled lighting not working during the day. It took multiple requests for the company to actually communicate the issue to the pilots8) the [manual] eliminating the 90 degree turn onto the runway in obstacle and field limited situations in order to reduce tire wear; thus placing the company's bottom line over safety9) multiple check list change errors last year (i.e. The maintenance log....reviewed response in the old before start checklist supposed to be both pilots per the fsm but was actually printed out incorrected for the entire fleet to be only a captain response)10) the 'flash cooling' procedure not being communicated to the pilots until the end of the season when it is really not needed any more11) countless fcifs not actually incorporated into the next manual changes (i.e. We have been able to directly contact medlink via satcom yet the fom still reflects the primary method is via dispatch and was only recently clarified via fcif that will undoubtedly not be actually reflected in our manuals)12) ipad training for new hires and upgrades being extremely inaccurate yet taking months to correct (not to mention the company not providing the time off during aircraft transitions to study the new aircraft and instead forcing a pilot to learn a new aircraft while still flying their old aircraft)13) the release of pilots early from their ground school to get them on an earlier DH to sim to prevent the company from having to pay pilots extra. Also; the scheduling of sim support pilots for a 15 minute debrief to prevent pay for working into a day off or affecting the pilots next day reserve; likely violating our manual or at the very leastcompletely contrary to the purpose of CRM and crew debriefslike I said this is only a limited list but it still paints a stark picture of our procedures for making policy and procedure changes that seems to place 'getting the job done' over safety and compliance. I am beginning to feel that every time I sit down in the cockpit I am playing 'bet my ticket.' I have zero issue stopping the operation to ensure safety; and will continue to do so; but with all the low time captains here and the pressure placed on them for on-time performance I know things are being overlooked or ignored in interest of making that flow time to [other airports] or not 'rocking the boat.' we have a culture that calls people out and places blame on them for delays instead of actually fixing the issue that caused it. We have a 'pathways' career path program that allows the release of safety reports which undoubtedly causes pilots to second guess every action they do that could be considered 'not being a team player' out of fear for their ability to move on to [another carrier]. This is not rhetoric; I believe this all to be fact. Furthermore; I have concern of the oversight of [company] by the FAA. Most; if not all; of the manual changes need to be approved by the [dispatcher] yet so many errors get past them. Also; we had a woefully inadequate training program just a year ago that was blessed by the FAA. I don't know why; but it seems that some personal in the FAA seem to rubber stamp these changes without knowledge of our operation just to get it done and move onto the next thing.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier Captain reported the company is not following its publication regarding policy and procedures.

Narrative: Upon receiving performance my First Officer (FO) mentioned that he has noticed that recently it says that we should be using a complex engine out procedure for both runways in MFR. Sure enough that is what was indicated on [Flight Data Computer] and the paper [Performance charts] yet we do not have a charted complex engine out for either runway. With that discrepancy I contacted dispatch and they were unaware of the issue so I asked for a duty officer to call me. I got a call back about 10 minutes later and the duty officer explained that there is now a complex engine out for [this airport]; but Jeppesen has yet to chart it and publish to the pilots. The [Dispatcher] indicated that the charted simple specials were still valid or we could go into the performance manual where a textual version of the complex procedures were listed. The [Dispatcher] indicated that there should have been a dispatch release note listed; but there was not and having just looked up a couple releases the next day; there still is no release note listed.While this event alone is not a huge issue it is one item on a LONG list of botched policy and procedure changes. Those issues include but are not limited to (and in no particular order):1) Policy change to prohibit backpacks on one page of the FOM; but still allowed just a few pages later2) The maximum airspeed at FL250 in the [aircraft] being wildly inaccurate3) HGS AIII limitations saying we have to be configured by the FAF while the procedure changed to 5NM4) Saying we need to write up every windshear encounter on approach. I confirmed with [dispatch]that it was poorly worded and only is when LLWS causes a missed approach below mins (which is redundant). This has yet to be clarified to the pilot group5) Use of overtravel power guidance being that it really is never needed; thus second guessing the actions of pilots who were actually in command of the aircraft at the time. I feel this will cause pilots to not use it when they really do need it for fear of disciple and could ultimately lead to a CFIT accident6) After this TLR/complex engine out issue in [the airport] I found out that the company and aerodata has flipped the switch on condition specific engine out procedures; yet that has not been communicated to the pilot group7) Pilot controlled lighting not working during the day. It took multiple requests for the company to actually communicate the issue to the pilots8) The [manual] eliminating the 90 degree turn onto the runway in obstacle and field limited situations in order to reduce tire wear; thus placing the company's bottom line over safety9) Multiple check list change errors last year (i.e. the Maintenance Log....reviewed response in the old before start checklist supposed to be both pilots per the FSM but was actually printed out incorrected for the entire fleet to be only a captain response)10) The 'flash cooling' procedure not being communicated to the pilots until the end of the season when it is really not needed any more11) Countless FCIFs not actually incorporated into the next manual changes (i.e. we have been able to directly contact MedLink via SATCOM yet the FOM still reflects the primary method is via dispatch and was only recently clarified via FCIF that will undoubtedly not be actually reflected in our manuals)12) iPad training for new hires and upgrades being extremely inaccurate yet taking months to correct (not to mention the company not providing the time off during aircraft transitions to study the new aircraft and instead forcing a pilot to learn a new aircraft while still flying their old aircraft)13) The release of pilots early from their ground school to get them on an earlier DH to sim to prevent the company from having to pay pilots extra. Also; the scheduling of sim support pilots for a 15 minute debrief to prevent pay for working into a day off or affecting the pilots next day reserve; likely violating our manual or at the very leastcompletely contrary to the purpose of CRM and Crew DebriefsLike I said this is only a limited list but it still paints a stark picture of our procedures for making policy and procedure changes that seems to place 'getting the job done' over safety and compliance. I am beginning to feel that every time I sit down in the cockpit I am playing 'bet my ticket.' I have zero issue stopping the operation to ensure safety; and will continue to do so; but with all the low time captains here and the pressure placed on them for on-time performance I know things are being overlooked or ignored in interest of making that flow time to [other airports] or not 'rocking the boat.' We have a culture that calls people out and places blame on them for delays instead of actually fixing the issue that caused it. We have a 'pathways' career path program that allows the release of safety reports which undoubtedly causes pilots to second guess every action they do that could be considered 'not being a team player' out of fear for their ability to move on to [another carrier]. This is not rhetoric; I believe this all to be fact. Furthermore; I have concern of the oversight of [Company] by the FAA. Most; if not all; of the manual changes need to be approved by the [Dispatcher] yet so many errors get past them. Also; we had a woefully inadequate training program just a year ago that was blessed by the FAA. I don't know why; but it seems that some personal in the FAA seem to rubber stamp these changes without knowledge of our operation just to get it done and move onto the next thing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.