Narrative:

I was flying the leg as captain on flight from dtw to syr. We were filed at FL330, but the best we could get was FL290. There was WX beneath us which extended into the destination area. Center kept trying to descend us into it far in advance of our descent profile. After some negotiation we descended to FL240, accepted a clearance to cross 35 west of syr at 11000'. The first officer required watching. He has a habit of initiating nonpertinent discussions at less than ideal times, ie, when we need the ATIS (trw in the area) he's discussing catering requirements with the station and is 'out of the loop'. He was on and off ATC a couple times and conversing with F/a about a passenger, etc, all legitimate functions but taking too long to complete them, some people are slower than others. Meanwhile, I was deviating around storms. One seemed to be on the final to syr while first officer is talking to company center gave us a heading for the localizer and a frequency change to syr approach. I elected to tune the ILS to take advantage of the ILS/DME. Approach (and center) were busy with the controller handling multiple frequencys, we're seeing too much of this! Approach missed a couple of our calls as well as some from other traffic. As we intercepted the ILS, approach was giving us numerous traffic at 3 and 4 thousand while we were IMC at 8000' deviating around multiple contouring cells. I was concerned that I might have missed a clearance...'why are we being given traffic that was obviously not a factor?' I discussed that with the first officer who then queried approach. 'No not a problem, the important guy was working cle center at 12000'/.' in all the confusion I had made my crossing restriction on the ILS/DME instead of the VOR. No mention of conflict but I missed the restriction by 5 mi. The 'snowball effect' was there and fortunately I recognized it. Due in no small part to reading accident/NASA reports. I knew I was pretty much on my own. Fought off distrs from first officer mcfumble but still missed the crossing restriction. Subsequent legs introduced similar circumstances. Cockpit resources mgt notwithstanding, it is sometimes necessary to forcefully direct the first officer to 'do this, don't do that.' I might add 99 percent of the first officer's are excellent team players (this one tried, but...) why this doesn't happen every day going in/out of dtw can only be a credit to the crews. Far too much information on the ATIS. Even with ACARS we're still talking to company when both of us should be listening to ATC. But 2 pilot aircraft are less expensive as long as they don't crash!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG ALT UNDERSHOOT IN DESCENT INTO SYR.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING THE LEG AS CAPT ON FLT FROM DTW TO SYR. WE WERE FILED AT FL330, BUT THE BEST WE COULD GET WAS FL290. THERE WAS WX BENEATH US WHICH EXTENDED INTO THE DEST AREA. CTR KEPT TRYING TO DSND US INTO IT FAR IN ADVANCE OF OUR DSNT PROFILE. AFTER SOME NEGOTIATION WE DSNDED TO FL240, ACCEPTED A CLRNC TO CROSS 35 W OF SYR AT 11000'. THE F/O REQUIRED WATCHING. HE HAS A HABIT OF INITIATING NONPERTINENT DISCUSSIONS AT LESS THAN IDEAL TIMES, IE, WHEN WE NEED THE ATIS (TRW IN THE AREA) HE'S DISCUSSING CATERING REQUIREMENTS WITH THE STATION AND IS 'OUT OF THE LOOP'. HE WAS ON AND OFF ATC A COUPLE TIMES AND CONVERSING WITH F/A ABOUT A PAX, ETC, ALL LEGITIMATE FUNCTIONS BUT TAKING TOO LONG TO COMPLETE THEM, SOME PEOPLE ARE SLOWER THAN OTHERS. MEANWHILE, I WAS DEVIATING AROUND STORMS. ONE SEEMED TO BE ON THE FINAL TO SYR WHILE F/O IS TALKING TO COMPANY CTR GAVE US A HDG FOR THE LOC AND A FREQ CHANGE TO SYR APCH. I ELECTED TO TUNE THE ILS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ILS/DME. APCH (AND CTR) WERE BUSY WITH THE CTLR HANDLING MULTIPLE FREQS, WE'RE SEEING TOO MUCH OF THIS! APCH MISSED A COUPLE OF OUR CALLS AS WELL AS SOME FROM OTHER TFC. AS WE INTERCEPTED THE ILS, APCH WAS GIVING US NUMEROUS TFC AT 3 AND 4 THOUSAND WHILE WE WERE IMC AT 8000' DEVIATING AROUND MULTIPLE CONTOURING CELLS. I WAS CONCERNED THAT I MIGHT HAVE MISSED A CLRNC...'WHY ARE WE BEING GIVEN TFC THAT WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT A FACTOR?' I DISCUSSED THAT WITH THE F/O WHO THEN QUERIED APCH. 'NO NOT A PROB, THE IMPORTANT GUY WAS WORKING CLE CTR AT 12000'/.' IN ALL THE CONFUSION I HAD MADE MY XING RESTRICTION ON THE ILS/DME INSTEAD OF THE VOR. NO MENTION OF CONFLICT BUT I MISSED THE RESTRICTION BY 5 MI. THE 'SNOWBALL EFFECT' WAS THERE AND FORTUNATELY I RECOGNIZED IT. DUE IN NO SMALL PART TO READING ACCIDENT/NASA RPTS. I KNEW I WAS PRETTY MUCH ON MY OWN. FOUGHT OFF DISTRS FROM F/O MCFUMBLE BUT STILL MISSED THE XING RESTRICTION. SUBSEQUENT LEGS INTRODUCED SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. COCKPIT RESOURCES MGT NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO FORCEFULLY DIRECT THE F/O TO 'DO THIS, DON'T DO THAT.' I MIGHT ADD 99 PERCENT OF THE F/O'S ARE EXCELLENT TEAM PLAYERS (THIS ONE TRIED, BUT...) WHY THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN EVERY DAY GOING IN/OUT OF DTW CAN ONLY BE A CREDIT TO THE CREWS. FAR TOO MUCH INFO ON THE ATIS. EVEN WITH ACARS WE'RE STILL TALKING TO COMPANY WHEN BOTH OF US SHOULD BE LISTENING TO ATC. BUT 2 PLT ACFT ARE LESS EXPENSIVE AS LONG AS THEY DON'T CRASH!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.