Narrative:

I was the sic (second in command) for our gear down special ferry flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was not made aware of the flight until the night before when we received our brief. Only after reading the logbook (on line) did I find out we had to do a gear down ferry flight. 10.5 hours notice for a ferry flight on day 7 should be unacceptable from a safety standpoint. I stretch it to call it a notice since I found it in the e-logbook. At a minimum we should receive an email or call from [a coordinator]. I called [dispatch] to find out if this was a [flight rules type Z or Y] since the nrfo (non-routine flight operations) manual isn't clear. [Dispatch] said it was a [type Z] and it had been approved by the union. He said that [company] was informed that it had been approved [for type Z] only if [company] provided the crew with gear down performance numbers for take off; enroute; and landing. If the crew was not provided these numbers he said it would then be a [type Y] flight. I told the [dispatch] that the forecast weather for the next morning was fog 200 overcast and asked if there were any weather minimums for the flight. He said there were not. After the call with [dispatch] I then emailed the [union] chairman to inform him of the flight and asked if there should be any weather minimums for the flight. He called me and told me there were no weather minimums for the flight. He said that when [company] informed him of the flight they told him the weather would be VFR. I informed him that I was not comfortable with visibility forecast and no obstacle climb numbers. He agreed that the visibility was too low. He said it was up to the flight crew to determine what they needed and were comfortable with. He also confirmed what [dispatch] had said about the performance numbers. He said if we did not get takeoff; enroute; and landing performance then we should not takeoff. He stated; like [dispatch]; that the flight would then become a [type Y] nrfo flight. The schedule for the brief the next day after rest on day 6 was [an early morning] show; ferry ZZZ-ZZZ1; arrive ZZZ1 [half an hour later] with [an hour before the] airline home. This is irresponsible scheduling! Only a one hour show go for a special ferry flight on a plane we hadn't even seen yet; followed by only a 1 hour opportunity to catch an airline home. At a minimum you should be given 1.5 hr show go and same for catching an airline. How is a crew supposed to properly post flight a plane under this type of scheduling? Scheduling this type of time compression in both the ferry flight preflight and trying to make an airline home is dangerous. On our way to the FBO the next morning the captain attempted to call the [coordinator an hour before show] to get the ball rolling on the flight and performance numbers. After being told that there was no [coordinator locally] he was transferred to [another coordinator's] cell phone and it went to voicemail and left a message. We arrived at the FBO and started the preflight when again the captain called and asked for the [coordinator] after not getting a call back. This time he was able to reach a [coordinator]. He asked for special ferry flight permit to be sent along with performance numbers. The [coordinator] said maintenance was responsible for providing that information. My captain then called maintenance for the ferry permit and performance numbers. He was told they were working on it and would send when it was ready. He received an email from [dispatch twenty minutes later] with the permit and four pages from embraer. After printing them out we saw that the only performance numbers were for specific range all engine. Nothing with takeoff; climb; or landing. We as a crew agreed that this wasn't enough. I called the [dispatcher] who agreed that that wasn't sufficient. The captain once again called [the coordinator] and asked for all performance numbers as was agreed to by the union and [company]. [The coordinator] said that if we lost an engine we could just raise the gear and meet any climb gradient. The captain informed him that the gear was placarded inop and handle taped in the down position along with a [notice] that said this had been done. With the weather at [low visibility] and low ceilings we needed to meet a 413 feet per NM to 1100 feet for [runway] xxl according to the chart. [The coordinator] then said it would take some time to get these numbers. It seemed [the coordinator] was trying to help; but isn't provided with the resources necessary to do that. [An hour later; now delayed departure; another dispatcher] sent my captain an email that claimed it had all the numbers we needed. After reading it; it did not. The email contained screenshots of them inputting information into [performance data calculators]. The performance information from this program only provided us with takeoff speeds; runway length needed; and power setting. Nothing for the climb gradient or obstacle clearance. Again we had no way of figuring out if we could meet the climb. I then called the [union] chairman and brought him up to speed. He agreed that this wasn't sufficient and told us to call [the dispatcher] directly and get what we needed. We called [the dispatcher] on speaker phone and the captain told her our issues. She admitted that [the performance data isn't airport specific and doesn't provide any climb gradient. That's when she told us that she had a version of pre departure clearance that did have gear down as an option. Why hadn't this been used the first time?! [Dispatch] said these numbers were approved and were to be released company-wide soon. We asked her to use that and send us the numbers. The document she sent had a one engine inop with a specific engine out procedure that we didn't know about. With these performance numbers we finally left at [more than an hour after scheduled departure] and arrived [forty minutes later]. Weather by that time had come up to VFR. I missed my flight home and then wasn't able to get home within 14 hours resulting in an after midnight. What a mess this was. First; why were we not told of this special ferry flight before shutdown? Second; why do this to a crew on day 7 who wants to get home? Having only one hour to catch a flight home artificially adds time compression and a stress that would not be there for a crew with lots of rest in the middle or beginning of a tour. Third why are there no weather minimums? A basic set of minimums is needed for this and all nrfo flights; not just a thumbs up and 'good luck'. Finally why wasn't the special ferry flight permit already on board and correct performance ready for us at show time. The company knew about the flight and had been made aware by the union of what would be required to make this a [type Z] flight. Yet this was not done. We had to over and over ask for the correct information. The [coordinator] did his best but he wasn't aware what was needed or where to find it. Gone are the days when every fleet had [coordinators] who knew the plane and are proactive about these types of issues. It seems now that [coordinators] are short staffed and behind. A crew who had less of a professional pace might have just taken off with the specific range numbers or no numbers at all. They would have made the flight home and seen their family. If the company can't or won't become more organized on these type of operations then they should become [type Y] flights or not at all. ZZZ has a hangar where maintenance could have been done. If that wouldn't be possible then it isn't that far of a drive for ZZZ1 mechanics. These types of flights should also not be assigned to a crew on their last day. The desire to go home and see one's family is hard for normal flights on the last day let alone with flights like this one. It should be unacceptable from a professional and safety standpoint to run an operation this way. In the course of pushing the company to provide the correct performance numbers we forgot to complete the nrfo risk analysis. Maybe with a 1.5 hr show go and the correct paperwork being ready at show time this would have been completed. The show go time and time between aircraft block in and flight home should be a hard 1.5 hrs. Not pliable to whatever scheduling hopes can get done. How is one hour enough to post flight a plane; gather one's belongings; find transportation; get through security and make ones flight? I'm disappointed in the way this situation was handled; and would expect scheduling to learn from this mistake in the future. Safety needs to be a priority; and it was pushed aside to get a plane flown to a maintenance base.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Light Transport Captain reported that proper performance data was not provided for a gear-down ferry flight.

Narrative: I was the SIC (Second in Command) for our gear down special ferry flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was not made aware of the flight until the night before when we received our brief. Only after reading the logbook (on line) did I find out we had to do a gear down ferry flight. 10.5 hours notice for a ferry flight on day 7 should be unacceptable from a safety standpoint. I stretch it to call it a notice since I found it in the e-logbook. At a minimum we should receive an email or call from [a Coordinator]. I called [Dispatch] to find out if this was a [Flight Rules Type Z or Y] since the NRFO (Non-Routine Flight Operations) manual isn't clear. [Dispatch] said it was a [Type Z] and it had been approved by the Union. He said that [Company] was informed that it had been approved [for Type Z] only if [Company] provided the crew with gear down performance numbers for take off; enroute; and landing. If the crew was not provided these numbers he said it would then be a [Type Y] flight. I told the [Dispatch] that the forecast weather for the next morning was fog 200 overcast and asked if there were any weather minimums for the flight. He said there were not. After the call with [Dispatch] I then emailed the [Union] chairman to inform him of the flight and asked if there should be any weather minimums for the flight. He called me and told me there were no weather minimums for the flight. He said that when [Company] informed him of the flight they told him the weather would be VFR. I informed him that I was not comfortable with visibility forecast and no obstacle climb numbers. He agreed that the visibility was too low. He said it was up to the flight crew to determine what they needed and were comfortable with. He also confirmed what [Dispatch] had said about the performance numbers. He said if we did not get takeoff; enroute; and landing performance then we should not takeoff. He stated; like [Dispatch]; that the flight would then become a [Type Y] NRFO flight. The schedule for the brief the next day after rest on day 6 was [an early morning] show; ferry ZZZ-ZZZ1; arrive ZZZ1 [half an hour later] with [an hour before the] airline home. This is irresponsible scheduling! Only a one hour show go for a special ferry flight on a plane we hadn't even seen yet; followed by only a 1 hour opportunity to catch an airline home. At a minimum you should be given 1.5 hr show go and same for catching an airline. How is a crew supposed to properly post flight a plane under this type of scheduling? Scheduling this type of time compression in both the ferry flight preflight and trying to make an airline home is dangerous. On our way to the FBO the next morning the Captain attempted to call the [coordinator an hour before show] to get the ball rolling on the flight and performance numbers. After being told that there was no [Coordinator locally] he was transferred to [another Coordinator's] cell phone and it went to voicemail and left a message. We arrived at the FBO and started the preflight when again the Captain called and asked for the [Coordinator] after not getting a call back. This time he was able to reach a [Coordinator]. He asked for special ferry flight permit to be sent along with performance numbers. The [Coordinator] said maintenance was responsible for providing that information. My Captain then called maintenance for the ferry permit and performance numbers. He was told they were working on it and would send when it was ready. He received an email from [Dispatch twenty minutes later] with the permit and four pages from Embraer. After printing them out we saw that the only performance numbers were for Specific Range All Engine. Nothing with takeoff; climb; or landing. We as a crew agreed that this wasn't enough. I called the [Dispatcher] who agreed that that wasn't sufficient. The Captain once again called [the Coordinator] and asked for all performance numbers as was agreed to by the Union and [Company]. [The Coordinator] said that if we lost an engine we could just raise the gear and meet any climb gradient. The Captain informed him that the gear was placarded inop and handle taped in the down position along with a [notice] that said this had been done. With the weather at [low visibility] and low ceilings we needed to meet a 413 feet per NM to 1100 feet for [runway] XXL according to the chart. [The Coordinator] then said it would take some time to get these numbers. It seemed [the Coordinator] was trying to help; but isn't provided with the resources necessary to do that. [An hour later; now delayed departure; another Dispatcher] sent my Captain an email that claimed it had all the numbers we needed. After reading it; it did not. The email contained screenshots of them inputting information into [performance data calculators]. The performance information from this program only provided us with takeoff speeds; runway length needed; and power setting. Nothing for the climb gradient or obstacle clearance. Again we had no way of figuring out if we could meet the climb. I then called the [Union] chairman and brought him up to speed. He agreed that this wasn't sufficient and told us to call [the dispatcher] directly and get what we needed. We called [the Dispatcher] on speaker phone and the Captain told her our issues. She admitted that [the performance data isn't airport specific and doesn't provide any climb gradient. That's when she told us that she had a version of PDC that did have gear down as an option. Why hadn't this been used the first time?! [Dispatch] said these numbers were approved and were to be released company-wide soon. We asked her to use that and send us the numbers. The document she sent had a one engine inop with a specific engine out procedure that we didn't know about. With these performance numbers we finally left at [more than an hour after scheduled departure] and arrived [forty minutes later]. Weather by that time had come up to VFR. I missed my flight home and then wasn't able to get home within 14 hours resulting in an after midnight. What a mess this was. First; why were we not told of this special ferry flight before shutdown? Second; why do this to a crew on day 7 who wants to get home? Having only one hour to catch a flight home artificially adds time compression and a stress that would not be there for a crew with lots of rest in the middle or beginning of a tour. Third why are there no weather minimums? A basic set of minimums is needed for this and all NRFO flights; not just a thumbs up and 'Good Luck'. Finally why wasn't the special ferry flight permit already on board and correct performance ready for us at show time. The company knew about the flight and had been made aware by the Union of what would be required to make this a [Type Z] flight. Yet this was not done. We had to over and over ask for the correct information. The [Coordinator] did his best but he wasn't aware what was needed or where to find it. Gone are the days when every fleet had [coordinators] who knew the plane and are proactive about these types of issues. It seems now that [coordinators] are short staffed and behind. A crew who had less of a professional pace might have just taken off with the specific range numbers or no numbers at all. They would have made the flight home and seen their family. If the company can't or won't become more organized on these type of operations then they should become [Type Y] flights or not at all. ZZZ has a hangar where maintenance could have been done. If that wouldn't be possible then it isn't that far of a drive for ZZZ1 mechanics. These types of flights should also not be assigned to a crew on their last day. The desire to go home and see one's family is hard for normal flights on the last day let alone with flights like this one. It should be unacceptable from a professional and safety standpoint to run an operation this way. In the course of pushing the company to provide the correct performance numbers we forgot to complete the NRFO risk analysis. Maybe with a 1.5 hr show go and the correct paperwork being ready at show time this would have been completed. The show go time and time between aircraft block in and flight home should be a hard 1.5 hrs. Not pliable to whatever scheduling hopes can get done. How is one hour enough to post flight a plane; gather one's belongings; find transportation; get through security and make ones flight? I'm disappointed in the way this situation was handled; and would expect scheduling to learn from this mistake in the future. Safety needs to be a priority; and it was pushed aside to get a plane flown to a maintenance base.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.