Narrative:

As pilot flying (PF) I was to fly the departure. Performance [program] had generated flaps 25; engine bleeds off; takeoff for us. We had briefed in detail both the departure procedure; which as published showed 'assigned headings 360 degrees clockwise through 080 degrees climbing right turn to 2400 feet; heading 100 degrees before proceeding on course;' the call outs we were going to expect; and paid particular attention to how challenging the multiple heading; altitude; and configuration changes were going to be given our heavily loaded -800 aircraft and the short runway. We both missed the fact that our takeoff was supposed to be an 'engine bleeds off' takeoff until we were taxiing to the runway and called tower to let them know we would need a moment at the end of the taxiway to configure and call them when we were ready for departure. I mentioned to the captain that other than in the simulator I had never done an engine bleeds off takeoff. The captain configured the bleed panel for departure and said; 'don't worry about the bleeds; just fly the aircraft and I'll reconfigure them once we are cleaned up.' at that point in the event I was solidly 'in the yellow' and probably getting 'into the red' on our CRM model.we reconfirmed the configuration of the bleeds panel; completed our departure plan and before takeoff checklist then called for takeoff. Tower cleared us for takeoff; 'on departure turn left heading 250; cleared for takeoff.' the captain transferred the controls to me and we both acknowledged that it was going to be even more complicated by an initial right turn to 100 degrees and at 2400 feet; a climbing left turn to heading 250 while leveling at 3000 feet and cleaning up the flaps. I advanced the throttles and set takeoff thrust. The takeoff roll and call outs were normal and we got airborne. At 400 feet I called for heading select and started my right turn. As we approached the minimum cleanup altitude; the captain said 'watch your speed' and I assumed he was afraid that I would overspeed the flaps so instead of calling 'set speed' in the ensuing confusion I called 'flaps 15' and began a gentle nose over to catch the expected climb profile. Because the speed bug had not been moved to the 'up' position; the autothrottles pulled back to mid-range thrust as designed to maintain the initial speed setting. We were just under 2000 feet MSL and we started our left-hand turn to the assigned heading of 250 with the aircraft at flaps 15. I was aware that something was wrong and focused on the flight director and attempting to fly the aircraft when I noticed the red light indicating the autothrottles were off. The captain said something to the effect of 'there's something wrong with the autothrottles' and then said he was re-engaging them. I found out later that he had disengaged them; pushed them forward to get more speed; and then re-engaged them thinking that he had corrected the problem. We were turning north at under 2000 feet MSL in a left hand turn at about 160 knots. The handling of the aircraft seemed very sluggish and the captain and I were very confused as evidenced by our lack of communication. What little we did say was focused on getting airspeed. Finally; when we got the gear warning horn; 'don't sink'; and 'pull up'; I disengaged the autothrottles and moved them forward; rolled partially wings level and got the nose above the horizon on a climbing profile and cleaned up the flaps. It was at that point that we realized our error in failing to set the speed bug appropriately.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 flight crew reported that autoflight mismanagement led to a 'Don't sink. Pull up' warning on departure.

Narrative: As Pilot Flying (PF) I was to fly the Departure. Performance [program] had generated flaps 25; engine bleeds off; takeoff for us. We had briefed in detail both the departure procedure; which as published showed 'Assigned headings 360 degrees clockwise through 080 degrees climbing right turn to 2400 feet; heading 100 degrees before proceeding on course;' the call outs we were going to expect; and paid particular attention to how challenging the multiple heading; altitude; and configuration changes were going to be given our heavily loaded -800 aircraft and the short runway. We both missed the fact that our takeoff was supposed to be an 'Engine Bleeds Off' takeoff until we were taxiing to the runway and called Tower to let them know we would need a moment at the end of the taxiway to configure and call them when we were ready for departure. I mentioned to the Captain that other than in the simulator I had never done an engine bleeds off takeoff. The Captain configured the bleed panel for departure and said; 'Don't worry about the bleeds; just fly the aircraft and I'll reconfigure them once we are cleaned up.' At that point in the event I was solidly 'in the Yellow' and probably getting 'into the Red' on our CRM model.We reconfirmed the configuration of the bleeds panel; completed our departure plan and Before Takeoff Checklist then called for takeoff. Tower cleared us for takeoff; 'on departure turn left heading 250; cleared for takeoff.' The Captain transferred the controls to me and we both acknowledged that it was going to be even more complicated by an initial right turn to 100 degrees and at 2400 feet; a climbing left turn to heading 250 while leveling at 3000 feet and cleaning up the flaps. I advanced the throttles and set takeoff thrust. The takeoff roll and call outs were normal and we got airborne. At 400 feet I called for Heading Select and started my right turn. As we approached the minimum cleanup altitude; the Captain said 'watch your speed' and I assumed he was afraid that I would overspeed the flaps so instead of calling 'Set Speed' in the ensuing confusion I called 'Flaps 15' and began a gentle nose over to catch the expected climb profile. Because the Speed bug had not been moved to the 'UP' position; the autothrottles pulled back to mid-range thrust as designed to maintain the initial speed setting. We were just under 2000 feet MSL and we started our left-hand turn to the assigned heading of 250 with the aircraft at flaps 15. I was aware that something was wrong and focused on the flight director and attempting to fly the aircraft when I noticed the red light indicating the autothrottles were off. The Captain said something to the effect of 'there's something wrong with the autothrottles' and then said he was re-engaging them. I found out later that he had disengaged them; pushed them forward to get more speed; and then re-engaged them thinking that he had corrected the problem. We were turning north at under 2000 feet MSL in a left hand turn at about 160 knots. The handling of the aircraft seemed very sluggish and the Captain and I were very confused as evidenced by our lack of communication. What little we did say was focused on getting airspeed. Finally; when we got the Gear warning horn; 'Don't Sink'; and 'Pull Up'; I disengaged the autothrottles and moved them forward; rolled partially wings level and got the nose above the horizon on a climbing profile and cleaned up the flaps. It was at that point that we realized our error in failing to set the Speed bug appropriately.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.