Narrative:

Day 4 early morning leg. During short vectors to visual approach ATC cleared us to maintain 4000 until established and cleared us for a visual approach. The first officer (first officer); pilot flying (PF); maintained 4000 instead of descending to 3000 feet which would have been the FAF altitude and appropriate altitude in order to properly intercept the GS or visual flight path. After established on the localizer course and seeing that the GS was below us by over a dot and a half; I instructed her that she needed to descend to 3000 prior to the FAF to capture the GS. She selected vs down .9 which made us high at the FAF and still not on GS. Autopilot was on at the time and she deselected autopilot (ap) and took manual control of the aircraft at approximately 3500 feet inside the FAF. I asked her once we were back on GS from her manual correction if she wanted ap reengaged. We attempted to reengage but got localizer/pitch due to incorrect mode selected prior to ap. Our configuration at this time was gear down and flaps 30. We made the 1000 foot call out but she stated stable in error. I made the 500 call out and in error stated stable. At that time we got the audible warning of terrain/flaps and I instructed a go around and when I went to raise flaps to 8 I knew then what we had messed up. We performed the go around; I notified the flight attendant (flight attendant) and the passengers that we went around and would be on the ground shortly; re-entered the traffic pattern and landed uneventfully. Cause was being tired from a 0330 wake-up for the van time didn't help; but the root cause was failing to adhere to the checklists and normal flows. There were opportunities as a crew to catch our mistake prior to the warning but we failed; either out of bad habits or being tired...or both. Executing the go around immediately when something wasn't right was the appropriate action. There was no hesitation or either of us trying to troubleshoot or 'solve' the problem there. It was go around; re-setup; and try again. Personally; this was a wake up; no matter the crew experience (the first officer was senior to me); being tired means check and double check myself and the crew actions because the simplest of things can be missed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 flight crew reported executing a go-around after receiving an GPWS flap configuration warning.

Narrative: Day 4 early morning leg. During short vectors to visual approach ATC cleared us to maintain 4000 until established and cleared us for a visual approach. The First Officer (FO); Pilot Flying (PF); maintained 4000 instead of descending to 3000 feet which would have been the FAF altitude and appropriate altitude in order to properly intercept the GS or visual flight path. After established on the localizer course and seeing that the GS was below us by over a dot and a half; I instructed her that she needed to descend to 3000 prior to the FAF to capture the GS. She selected VS down .9 which made us high at the FAF and still not on GS. Autopilot was on at the time and she deselected autopilot (AP) and took manual control of the aircraft at approximately 3500 feet inside the FAF. I asked her once we were back on GS from her manual correction if she wanted AP reengaged. We attempted to reengage but got LOC/PITCH due to incorrect mode selected prior to AP. Our configuration at this time was gear down and flaps 30. We made the 1000 foot call out but she stated stable in error. I made the 500 call out and in error stated stable. At that time we got the audible warning of terrain/flaps and I instructed a go around and when I went to raise flaps to 8 I knew then what we had messed up. We performed the go around; I notified the Flight Attendant (FA) and the passengers that we went around and would be on the ground shortly; re-entered the traffic pattern and landed uneventfully. Cause was being tired from a 0330 wake-up for the van time didn't help; but the root cause was failing to adhere to the checklists and normal flows. There were opportunities as a crew to catch our mistake prior to the warning but we failed; either out of bad habits or being tired...or both. Executing the go around immediately when something wasn't right was the appropriate action. There was no hesitation or either of us trying to troubleshoot or 'solve' the problem there. It was go around; re-setup; and try again. Personally; this was a wake up; no matter the crew experience (the FO was senior to me); being tired means check and double check myself and the crew actions because the simplest of things can be missed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.