Narrative:

We had just departed ZZZZ. Our clearance was to make a right turn off departure and contact departure frequency. Just before reaching fra (flap retraction altitude) in IMC the PF (pilot flying) called for heading mode. Once reaching fra the pilot flying called for flight level change (a mode that selects a speed hold of 240 kts) I reminded the PF that we were in [foreign] airspace and the max speed was 200 kts. The PF corrected and called for 'speed hold 200; flaps 0; set climb power; after takeoff checks' all whilst beginning the turn to the right. I as pm (pilot monitoring) did as commanded and whilst completing the after takeoff check flow the stall shaker went off. My eyes immediately went to the airspeed tape showing around 150 kts. The PF promptly lowered the pitch attitude of the aircraft with no power adjustment. The shaker was active for a few seconds. The airspeed began to climb and we were out of harm's way. I continued the checklist once the airspeed was in safe numbers (climbing above 165 kts). No altitude was lost in this event. It is possible we hit a bit of wind shear on our initial climb out thus causing such a loss in airspeed even though no wind shear warning was activated. Possible wind shear plus configuration change and the bank angle for the turn (about 20 degrees) could have caused this undesired state.the threats can come down to the high wind condition we had once departing runway xx; in a critical phase of flight. Low airspeed; high pitch attitude with a bank angle of about 20 degrees. As pilot monitoring I should have been more tentative to the aircraft state while doing as the PF commanded. The high workload on both pilots was also a threat in this situation.I've learned in such conditions it's important for both pilots to be attentive to the state of the aircraft even if busy doing other duties such as configuration changes and checklists. Even though the checklists were done at their appropriate time it is important to be mindful of the situation and priorities the aircraft over all else.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 crew reported stick shaker activation during turn on climb out.

Narrative: We had just departed ZZZZ. Our clearance was to make a right turn off departure and contact departure frequency. Just before reaching FRA (Flap Retraction Altitude) in IMC the PF (Pilot Flying) called for Heading mode. Once reaching FRA the Pilot Flying called for Flight Level Change (a mode that selects a speed hold of 240 kts) I reminded the PF that we were in [foreign] airspace and the max speed was 200 kts. The PF corrected and called for 'speed hold 200; Flaps 0; set climb power; after takeoff checks' all whilst beginning the turn to the right. I as PM (Pilot Monitoring) did as commanded and whilst completing the after takeoff check flow the stall shaker went off. My eyes immediately went to the airspeed tape showing around 150 kts. The PF promptly lowered the pitch attitude of the aircraft with no power adjustment. The shaker was active for a few seconds. The airspeed began to climb and we were out of harm's way. I continued the checklist once the airspeed was in safe numbers (climbing above 165 kts). No altitude was lost in this event. It is possible we hit a bit of wind shear on our initial climb out thus causing such a loss in airspeed even though no wind shear warning was activated. Possible wind shear plus configuration change and the bank angle for the turn (about 20 degrees) could have caused this undesired state.The threats can come down to the high wind condition we had once departing runway XX; in a critical phase of flight. Low airspeed; high pitch attitude with a bank angle of about 20 degrees. As pilot monitoring I should have been more tentative to the aircraft state while doing as the PF commanded. The high workload on both pilots was also a threat in this situation.I've learned in such conditions it's important for both pilots to be attentive to the state of the aircraft even if busy doing other duties such as configuration changes and checklists. Even though the checklists were done at their appropriate time it is important to be mindful of the situation and priorities the aircraft over all else.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.