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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1582639 |
Time | |
Date | 201810 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Person 1 | |
Function | Technician Inspector |
Qualification | Maintenance Airframe Maintenance Inspection Authority Maintenance Powerplant |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Aircraft overflew airworthiness directive. A report was completed; and overdue maintenance items were present in the report. Failure to detect ad event due to insufficient data generated from pre-flight report. I confirmed the reason for the lack of data from the report; the documentation from a recent C inspection performed and released on sent back to ZZZ records department did not contain all the data to indicate all the work in the package had been completed. This caused [pre-flight report] to show the items as overdue. A telephone call by the assistant director of maintenance to the company that performed the inspection was successful in having the missing documents sent via facsimile to records in ZZZ. [Employee name] was informed of the pending records transfer; and later confirmed to me that she had the documents and that the maintenance was in fact complete. I was unaware that a post check inspection had not been performed as required by company policy at the facility where the inspection was completed. The check package did not contain the form required which would have been a checklist of the steps needed to be completed during the inspection process; this may have been a causative factor in there not having been a check being completed prior to releasing the aircraft from the inspection and subsequent return to service. Replace the program with one that can update maintenance and critical time factors in a more timely manner with bar-code and internet capability across the company spectrum. Without accurate tracking capabilities events like this will occur again. Better training on interdepartmental communications at all levels of the maintenance chain would be a plus factor in reducing erroneous assumptions in aircraft status. The hiring of more inspectors full time; working the floor full time; would aid in reducing the work load. We have four inspectors now but at any given time two are deployed off site; or otherwise not able to be present on the maintenance floor during the busy work cycle. Inspectors are tasked with a multitude of duties that could otherwise be performed by other departments or individuals. Duties that take us away from our primary task; inspecting work being performed on the aircraft; and being available to mechanics working aircraft. There is a dire need for effective supervision on the maintenance floor; and for more mechanics to facilitate work with the current workload.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier Maintenance Technician reported misleading maintenance documentation made it difficult to positively identify the maintenance status related to an Airworthiness Directive.
Narrative: Aircraft overflew airworthiness directive. A report was completed; and overdue maintenance items were present in the report. Failure to detect AD event due to insufficient data generated from pre-flight report. I confirmed the reason for the lack of data from the report; the documentation from a recent C inspection performed and released on sent back to ZZZ records department did not contain all the data to indicate all the work in the package had been completed. This caused [pre-flight report] to show the items as overdue. A telephone call by the Assistant Director of Maintenance to the company that performed the inspection was successful in having the missing documents sent via FAX to records in ZZZ. [Employee name] was informed of the pending records transfer; and later confirmed to me that she had the documents and that the maintenance was in fact complete. I was unaware that a post check inspection had not been performed as required by company policy at the facility where the inspection was completed. The check package did not contain the form required which would have been a checklist of the steps needed to be completed during the inspection process; this may have been a causative factor in there not having been a check being completed prior to releasing the aircraft from the inspection and subsequent return to service. Replace the program with one that can update maintenance and critical time factors in a more timely manner with bar-code and internet capability across the company spectrum. Without accurate tracking capabilities events like this will occur again. Better training on interdepartmental communications at all levels of the maintenance chain would be a plus factor in reducing erroneous assumptions in aircraft status. The hiring of more inspectors full time; working the floor full time; would aid in reducing the work load. We have four inspectors now but at any given time two are deployed off site; or otherwise not able to be present on the maintenance floor during the busy work cycle. Inspectors are tasked with a multitude of duties that could otherwise be performed by other departments or individuals. Duties that take us away from our primary task; inspecting work being performed on the aircraft; and being available to mechanics working aircraft. There is a dire need for effective supervision on the maintenance floor; and for more mechanics to facilitate work with the current workload.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.