Narrative:

Aircraft X was landing roll runway 28 left needing to go to the [parking] (right turn off). There was aircraft a staggered for runway 28 right. When aircraft X crossed the threshold runway 28 left; local control loaded aircraft Z for departure. Then local told aircraft X to turn right on east hold short of runway 28 right. As aircraft a was rolling out runway 28 right passing through taxiway north; local cleared aircraft Z for takeoff. I said immediately 'I would not do that; aircraft X is a B777-300' (by SOP we cannot hold them between on a perpendicular taxiway). I thought originally their plan was to cross aircraft X at east as aircraft a rolled through; then clear aircraft Z for takeoff. The local controller then cancelled aircraft Z's take off; and instead of crossing aircraft X at east since aircraft a was rolling through; and aircraft Y was about a two mile final; then re-clearing aircraft Z for takeoff; they sent aircraft Y around; crossed aircraft X; and then cleared aircraft Z for takeoff. Okay; so here is my dig. Yes; aircraft X was errant in being tagged a B773 (not B772 as the report states) which was probably from a beacon code generated by the nct controller working them back into sfo after their flying was completed. Either way there was a huge B777 rolling out runway 28 left that anyone could tell was a B77W or B777-300 or whatever you want to call it; and there was an flm working the local assist position who upon hearing the local controller cancel aircraft Z's take off clearance said they thought the B777 looked big. I am not sure where the focus was; but this was a very unsafe situation in broad daylight that speaks directly to the verbiage for additional airport surface safety measures that was added to the FAA re-authorization bill about close calls on the ground at our nation's airports.I cannot have a conversation with the local controller or the flm (flight line manager) on local assist because they are so defensive; and hard to work with in a team environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SFO Tower Controller reported a procedure error with holding a large aircraft between the runways.

Narrative: Aircraft X was landing roll Runway 28 Left needing to go to the [parking] (right turn off). There was Aircraft A staggered for Runway 28 Right. When Aircraft X crossed the threshold Runway 28 Left; Local Control loaded Aircraft Z for departure. Then Local told Aircraft X to turn right on E hold short of Runway 28 Right. As Aircraft A was rolling out Runway 28 Right passing through Taxiway N; Local cleared Aircraft Z for takeoff. I said immediately 'I would not do that; Aircraft X is a B777-300' (by SOP we cannot hold them between on a perpendicular taxiway). I thought originally their plan was to cross Aircraft X at E as Aircraft A rolled through; then clear Aircraft Z for takeoff. The Local Controller then cancelled Aircraft Z's take off; and instead of crossing Aircraft X at E since Aircraft A was rolling through; and Aircraft Y was about a two mile final; then re-clearing Aircraft Z for takeoff; they sent Aircraft Y around; crossed Aircraft X; and then cleared Aircraft Z for takeoff. Okay; so here is my dig. Yes; Aircraft X was errant in being tagged a B773 (not B772 as the report states) which was probably from a beacon code generated by the NCT controller working them back into SFO after their flying was completed. Either way there was a HUGE B777 rolling out Runway 28 Left that anyone could tell was a B77W or B777-300 or whatever you want to call it; and there was an FLM working the Local Assist position who upon hearing the Local Controller cancel Aircraft Z's take off clearance said they thought the B777 looked big. I am not sure where the focus was; but this was a very unsafe situation in broad daylight that speaks directly to the verbiage for additional airport surface safety measures that was added to the FAA Re-authorization bill about close calls on the ground at our nation's airports.I cannot have a conversation with the Local Controller or the FLM (Flight Line Manager) on Local Assist because they are so defensive; and hard to work with in a team environment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.