Narrative:

Prior to our takeoff; a B757; an A321 and a Q400 departed. We took off and immediately experienced wake turbulence associated with the previous departures. The RNAV SID calls for a nearly immediate and large course change to the east at 520 feet. At 500 feet I called for autopilot on to comply with best practices for RNAV sids. At acceleration altitude the pilot monitoring (pm) called acceleration altitude. Because the autopilot was on; we both reached for the FGC speed button. I said; since the autopilot is on; I command the FGC. I called for flaps up. The first officer (first officer) subsequently ran the after takeoff checklist. As the pilot flying (PF); I was saturated with flying the airplane as the departure has several short tight turning legs. Once we got up and out of the terminal airspace; I lowered the nose to accelerate the aircraft. At that time the aircraft wasn't accelerating normally. I scanned the cockpit and observed the flaps were still in the 9 position. I observed our speed at that time to be 261 KIAS. I immediately reduced thrust to below 250 KIAS and retracted the flaps. We continued the flight and landed without incident. Made an aml entry. Cause: high workload and task saturation. This was an error that was made during a high workload time period and the associated confusion of who manipulates the FGC during an autopilot on departure for RNAV SID compliance. As such; a thorough debrief and review of the after takeoff checklist and flow is my suggestion. Also; highlighting the PF/pm duties and how they change depending on whether the autopilot is turn on at 500 feet or just the yd is turned on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Embraer jet flight crew reported a wake turbulence encounter combined with a complex departure resulted in failure to retract flaps on schedule.

Narrative: Prior to our takeoff; a B757; an A321 and a Q400 departed. We took off and immediately experienced wake turbulence associated with the previous departures. The RNAV SID calls for a nearly immediate and large course change to the east at 520 feet. At 500 feet I called for autopilot on to comply with best practices for RNAV SIDs. At acceleration altitude the Pilot Monitoring (PM) called acceleration altitude. Because the autopilot was on; we both reached for the FGC SPD button. I said; since the autopilot is on; I command the FGC. I called for flaps up. The First Officer (FO) subsequently ran the After Takeoff checklist. As the Pilot Flying (PF); I was saturated with flying the airplane as the departure has several short tight turning legs. Once we got up and out of the terminal airspace; I lowered the nose to accelerate the aircraft. At that time the aircraft wasn't accelerating normally. I scanned the cockpit and observed the Flaps were still in the 9 position. I observed our speed at that time to be 261 KIAS. I immediately reduced thrust to below 250 KIAS and retracted the flaps. We continued the flight and landed without incident. Made an AML entry. Cause: high workload and task saturation. This was an error that was made during a high workload time period and the associated confusion of who manipulates the FGC during an autopilot on departure for RNAV SID compliance. As such; a thorough debrief and review of the after takeoff checklist and flow is my suggestion. Also; highlighting the PF/PM duties and how they change depending on whether the autopilot is turn on at 500 feet or just the YD is turned on.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.