Narrative:

IMC to ZZZ. ZZZ reported wind slight from northeast; acceptable ceiling; requested from ZZZ approach VOR to circle to runway xx. Airport in site at VOR (7 miles). Set CTAF as backup on radios 1 and 2 and remained with approach on radio 1 until close to the field. Cancelled IFR; squawked 1200; switched radio 1 to CTAF and announced intent to cross midfield; enter downwind for runway xx and land. No response; no apparent activity at the airport; wind sock favorable; announced downwind; base and final. Normal visual landing. Partway through the rollout I heard a noise that sounded like an aluminum bang on the left side. I visually checked left wing and all looked ok. Flaps were down and fine. I taxied to the FBO and the line guy mentioned he noticed us close as that falcon took off. The sound I heard was apparently my left flap banging within its range of movement from the thrust of the jet crossing close above.in the FBO; they said they heard the falcon make his departure contact announcement to ATC but was still on the clearance frequency; and that he sounded 'as cool as a cucumber'.my primary error is clear: it turns out I had set radio 2 backup correctly but had set radio 1 backup to [incorrect frequency]. No one would have heard my intent and position announcements. This resulted in a jet believing he was free to take off on runway xy; and a near collision at the intersection. My error nearly led to the death of at least two of us. I also should not have cancelled IFR as I entered the pattern; since visibility down and horizontal were fine; I was not sufficiently below the broken layer above to qualify as VMC conditions.there are two potential contributing factors; although my error is the cause. 1: if the falcon was given his clearance to take off; wouldn't he have been advised that there was another aircraft inbound or in the vicinity? 2: if I had been on the correct CTAF frequency; would the falcon have heard my calls since neither of us were heard on the FBO's unicom radio; but he was heard on the clearance frequency that they apparently monitor?the lessons I take away from this incident are:1. Double check tuned frequencies.2. Make radio contact at the intended landing airport if there is no other activity on the frequency; even if just a radio check on unicom.3. If flying any approach other than in clear VFR conditions; do not cancel IFR until either on final or on the ground.these lessons are now seared into my memory. I also thankful for the rapid response of the falcon pilot; who I assume pulled up more quickly than normal; upon seeing me come in.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Cessna 182 pilot reported that while landing at a non-towered airport another aircraft was taking off on a crossing runway.

Narrative: IMC to ZZZ. ZZZ reported wind slight from NE; acceptable ceiling; requested from ZZZ Approach VOR to circle to RWY XX. Airport in site at VOR (7 miles). Set CTAF as backup on radios 1 and 2 and remained with Approach on Radio 1 until close to the field. Cancelled IFR; squawked 1200; switched radio 1 to CTAF and announced intent to cross midfield; enter downwind for RWY XX and land. No response; no apparent activity at the airport; wind sock favorable; announced downwind; base and final. Normal visual landing. Partway through the rollout I heard a noise that sounded like an aluminum bang on the left side. I visually checked left wing and all looked OK. Flaps were down and fine. I taxied to the FBO and the line guy mentioned he noticed us close as that Falcon took off. The sound I heard was apparently my left flap banging within its range of movement from the thrust of the jet crossing close above.In the FBO; they said they heard the Falcon make his departure contact announcement to ATC but was still on the clearance frequency; and that he sounded 'as cool as a cucumber'.My primary error is clear: It turns out I had set radio 2 backup correctly but had set radio 1 backup to [incorrect frequency]. No one would have heard my intent and position announcements. This resulted in a jet believing he was free to take off on RWY XY; and a near collision at the intersection. My error nearly led to the death of at least two of us. I also should not have cancelled IFR as I entered the pattern; since visibility down and horizontal were fine; I was not sufficiently below the broken layer above to qualify as VMC conditions.There are two potential contributing factors; although my error is the cause. 1: If the Falcon was given his clearance to take off; wouldn't he have been advised that there was another aircraft inbound or in the vicinity? 2: If I HAD been on the correct CTAF frequency; would the Falcon have heard my calls since neither of us were heard on the FBO's UNICOM radio; but he was heard on the clearance frequency that they apparently monitor?The lessons I take away from this incident are:1. Double check tuned frequencies.2. Make radio contact at the intended landing airport if there is no other activity on the frequency; even if just a radio check on UNICOM.3. If flying any approach other than in clear VFR conditions; DO NOT cancel IFR until either on final or on the ground.These lessons are now seared into my memory. I also thankful for the rapid response of the Falcon pilot; who I assume pulled up more quickly than normal; upon seeing me come in.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.