Narrative:

Normal descent on the bluzz arrival to a visual approach to 36R. Little-to-no traffic - one aircraft on parallel approach to 36L. I configured in order (slats 15; flaps 15; flaps 20) to arrive at 500 feet on GS and stable. At just under 1;000 feet and approximately 50 knots above vapp; I called for flaps 40. At that time; first officer (first officer) reminded me I had not lowered the gear. I decided to continue the approach; and called for landing gear down - even beginning to reach for the gear handle myself; realizing I was likely not going to be stable. First officer lowered the gear; then flaps; making as much of an effort to get configured as possible. At 500 feet; I on glide path; but still 20 knots fast and checklist not fully complete. I told the first officer we would 'continue;' deciding in my mind to go-around if I felt like the landing would be unsafe. We were stable at approximately 200 feet; and landed normally.I was rushing the approach at the end of a long morning on our second revised/cancelled pairing (two long early am legs instead of one planned for the night before). I was trying too hard to manage my energy and stretch my speed as long as I could; and got distracted from the basic configuring of the aircraft. First officer noted afterwards that he 'should have said something' about the gear not being down so late in the approach; but I said that it was not really his duty as pm (pilot monitoring) to manage my approach; and that he did the right thing by alerting me to the gear being up when I called for flaps 40. We were both hesitant to call for the required unstable/go-around; probably for a variety of reasons - the most likely not to extend and complicate an already long day by cutting off an otherwise completely uncomplicated daylight approach and landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Widebody Transport Captain reported unstable approach to MEM airport due to speed and configuration mismanagement.

Narrative: Normal descent on the BLUZZ arrival to a visual approach to 36R. Little-to-no traffic - one aircraft on parallel approach to 36L. I configured in order (slats 15; flaps 15; flaps 20) to arrive at 500 feet on GS and stable. At just under 1;000 feet and approximately 50 knots above Vapp; I called for flaps 40. At that time; FO (First Officer) reminded me I had not lowered the gear. I decided to continue the approach; and called for landing gear down - even beginning to reach for the gear handle myself; realizing I was likely not going to be stable. FO lowered the gear; then flaps; making as much of an effort to get configured as possible. At 500 feet; I on glide path; but still 20 knots fast and checklist not fully complete. I told the FO we would 'continue;' deciding in my mind to go-around if I felt like the landing would be unsafe. We were stable at approximately 200 feet; and landed normally.I was rushing the approach at the end of a long morning on our second revised/cancelled pairing (two long early AM legs instead of one planned for the night before). I was trying too hard to manage my energy and stretch my speed as long as I could; and got distracted from the basic configuring of the aircraft. FO noted afterwards that he 'should have said something' about the gear not being down so late in the approach; but I said that it was not really his duty as PM (Pilot Monitoring) to manage my approach; and that he did the right thing by alerting me to the gear being up when I called for flaps 40. We were both hesitant to call for the required unstable/go-around; probably for a variety of reasons - the most likely not to extend and complicate an already long day by cutting off an otherwise completely uncomplicated daylight approach and landing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.