Narrative:

While at the gate all normal procedures and briefings occurred. It was my leg to fly. While I programming the FMS; the captain assisted in programming the mfd menu and the radio portion of the 'J' pattern. While doing this; he was in the radio portion of the programming and attempting to place Nav1 and Nav2 into 'auto' mode; however; he was unable to place my Nav2 into auto since my side was still in green needles from the previous crew. I took the nav source knob and turned it fully clockwise to the right to get back into FMS white needles. The captain then proceeded to place Nav1 and Nav2 into auto. The briefing occurred with details discussing the complex special engine out procedure; the heading bug was set to 332 degrees; a 2.5 fix ring around [a fix] was entered for a visual reminder of the engine out turn; the climbout discussed; a review of the two prohibited airspaces and the need to remain clear was also reviewed. I went through a full briefing.the taxi to the runway was uneventful and had no delays. The takeoff was a flaps 20; full thrust takeoff with V2+10 to 1000 feet. After rotation and calling for speed mode/navigation mode and at 400 feet the FD did not indicate a turn to 332 degrees. Within seconds and climbing through 600 feet; I called 'autopilot on' and the captain did so. It was engaged and navigation mode was active in the FMA. I recognized that with the ap engaged and navigation active in the FMA that the aircraft was still not turning and the FD also did not indicate a turn. At the same time I was recognizing this and quickly reassessing to ensure the ap and FMA was configured properly; which it was. The captain said that the turn was not occurring for some reason and to switch to heading mode; and turn left to 320 degrees. He referenced that the ap was not responding and to disregard the navigation mode issue for now and that we can figure that out later after we climb out. The captain spun the heading bug to about 320 and I hit the heading on the acp and heading became active in the FMA and was confirmed. The aircraft seemed like it did not initially respond to the turn and finally responded at a slow rate. This scenario with a westerly strong wind in the air resulted in encroaching upon [a restricted area]. After [resuming] on course; I continued to fly the SID with the ap engaged; in heading mode and by referencing the FMS map on the mfd until we could figure out the navigation/autopilot issue. Shortly later; the captain noticed the pfd showed no data in the FMS area and that the white needles had disappeared. I confirmed this fact and then I took the navigation source knob; clicked it one click counterclockwise; then one click clockwise to reset my FMS back to white needles. The flight then continued on course with no further FMS anomalies. The cause of this FMS/ap anomaly is unknown. This is no precursor; there is no warning; it simply occurred without reason. This is the second anomaly that I have experienced. The first anomaly was reported [a few months ago]. This was another automation anomaly in which climbing through FL250 at 290 knots with the ap engaged. Again for no reason and without any input; the bugged airspeed automatically changed from 290 knots to 140 knots. This was recognized by the PF and caught as the aircraft pitch rapidly increased and airspeed rapidly decreased. [Company] reported that they would pull all the data from the flight; however; after a week; they called to inform me that the data was lost from the aircraft as it was a newly acquired plane and the data was not pulled. The also acknowledged that they have heard of this anomaly three other times. I discussed this FMS/ap/white needle/loss of data with chief pilot. During this conversation; [the chief pilot] explained that he too had experienced this anomaly during a cruise portion of a flight in the past similar to what we experienced. There simply is no explanation of what; why or how these happen. They just do and we have to be vigilant to catch them when one occurs. It is easy to sit back in a chair after the [fact] and think about what we could have done or should have done. It is also easy for other pilots to suggest other actions. However; things are a bit different when in the cockpit. As we have many other complex departures in our system; we are conditioned to rely heavily on the RNAV procedure and the use automation for accuracy. When an issue arises when using automation; we can usually and quickly fix it - whether it is the heading button that wasn't pushed all the way; or ap wasn't actually engaged; or the FMS has to be executed; etc. If the autopilot is not reacting immediately; we typically will not quickly disengage the autopilot and hand fly on a complex departure. After all the hundreds of flights we do; and if the automation is not doing what we anticipate it should be doing; we will attempt to quickly assess the situation and attempt to correct the automation which is generally pilot error. In this case; it was not pilot error; but rather; another anomaly. In an attempt to correct what should have been a simple automation issue; it could not be quickly corrected as it was verified twice that the configuration of the ap and it active modes were what it should have been. During this attempt to solve this issue; the aircraft continued on its straight-ahead flight path and with a strong westerly wind aloft; pushed us east and closer to [the restricted area]. Once realized that an anomaly occurred; the navigation mode was deselected and heading made active. Three things have been learned. Firstly; future briefings will include the discussion that if something with the automation is not doing what we expect; we will disengage the ap and hand fly with a left turn to stay west of the prohibited areas and not to attempt to correct the ap/FMA/FMS. Secondly; a quick call to ATC to advise them that we are starting the turn could have prevented any security issue with encroaching [the restricted area] as they have acknowledgment from the crew. Lastly; the anomaly should have been written up. Both the captain and I discussed writing up the anomaly; especially since we likely encroached the [restricted area] airspace. However; after discussion of the fact that the remainder of the flight occurred without incident; that there were no indications of any further anomalies; that the flight did not have to be delayed with a write-up which likely could not be duplicated; to not delay the subsequent flight; and that it could be conducted safely as all systems were functioning normal; the anomaly was not written up. Returning [to base]; the anomaly occurred during the approach and it was written up. We waited until maintenance arrived to discuss and to look over the onboard data logs and as expected; because the system does not record these anomalies; it could not be duplicated and no fault found.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 flight crew reported a track deviation and a restricted airspace incursion resulted when the FMC malfunctioned.

Narrative: While at the gate all normal procedures and briefings occurred. It was my leg to fly. While I programming the FMS; the Captain assisted in programming the MFD Menu and the Radio portion of the 'J' pattern. While doing this; he was in the Radio portion of the programming and attempting to place Nav1 and Nav2 into 'Auto' mode; however; he was unable to place my Nav2 into Auto since my side was still in green needles from the previous crew. I took the Nav Source knob and turned it fully clockwise to the right to get back into FMS white needles. The Captain then proceeded to place Nav1 and Nav2 into Auto. The briefing occurred with details discussing the complex special engine out procedure; the heading bug was set to 332 degrees; a 2.5 fix ring around [a fix] was entered for a visual reminder of the engine out turn; the climbout discussed; a review of the two Prohibited airspaces and the need to remain clear was also reviewed. I went through a full briefing.The taxi to the runway was uneventful and had no delays. The takeoff was a flaps 20; full thrust takeoff with V2+10 to 1000 feet. After rotation and calling for speed mode/NAV mode and at 400 feet the FD did not indicate a turn to 332 degrees. Within seconds and climbing through 600 feet; I called 'Autopilot On' and the Captain did so. It was engaged and NAV mode was active in the FMA. I recognized that with the AP engaged and NAV active in the FMA that the aircraft was still not turning and the FD also did not indicate a turn. At the same time I was recognizing this and quickly reassessing to ensure the AP and FMA was configured properly; which it was. The Captain said that the turn was not occurring for some reason and to switch to HDG mode; and turn left to 320 degrees. He referenced that the AP was not responding and to disregard the NAV mode issue for now and that we can figure that out later after we climb out. The Captain spun the HDG bug to about 320 and I hit the HDG on the ACP and HDG became active in the FMA and was confirmed. The aircraft seemed like it did not initially respond to the turn and finally responded at a slow rate. This scenario with a westerly strong wind in the air resulted in encroaching upon [a restricted area]. After [resuming] on course; I continued to fly the SID with the AP engaged; in HDG mode and by referencing the FMS map on the MFD until we could figure out the navigation/autopilot issue. Shortly later; the Captain noticed the PFD showed no data in the FMS area and that the white needles had disappeared. I confirmed this fact and then I took the NAV Source knob; clicked it one click counterclockwise; then one click clockwise to reset my FMS back to white needles. The flight then continued on course with no further FMS anomalies. The cause of this FMS/AP anomaly is unknown. This is no precursor; there is no warning; it simply occurred without reason. This is the second anomaly that I have experienced. The first anomaly was reported [a few months ago]. This was another automation anomaly in which climbing through FL250 at 290 knots with the AP engaged. Again for no reason and without any input; the bugged airspeed automatically changed from 290 knots to 140 knots. This was recognized by the PF and caught as the aircraft pitch rapidly increased and airspeed rapidly decreased. [Company] reported that they would pull all the data from the flight; however; after a week; they called to inform me that the data was lost from the aircraft as it was a newly acquired plane and the data was not pulled. The also acknowledged that they have heard of this anomaly three other times. I discussed this FMS/AP/white needle/loss of data with Chief Pilot. During this conversation; [the Chief Pilot] explained that he too had experienced this anomaly during a cruise portion of a flight in the past similar to what we experienced. There simply is no explanation of what; why or how these happen. They just do and we have to be vigilant to catch them when one occurs. It is easy to sit back in a chair after the [fact] and think about what we could have done or should have done. It is also easy for other pilots to suggest other actions. However; things are a bit different when in the cockpit. As we have many other complex departures in our system; we are conditioned to rely heavily on the RNAV procedure and the use automation for accuracy. When an issue arises when using automation; we can usually and quickly fix it - whether it is the HDG button that wasn't pushed all the way; or AP wasn't actually engaged; or the FMS has to be executed; etc. If the autopilot is not reacting immediately; we typically will not quickly disengage the autopilot and hand fly on a complex departure. After all the hundreds of flights we do; and if the automation is not doing what we anticipate it should be doing; we will attempt to quickly assess the situation and attempt to correct the automation which is generally pilot error. In this case; it was not pilot error; but rather; another anomaly. In an attempt to correct what should have been a simple automation issue; it could not be quickly corrected as it was verified twice that the configuration of the AP and it active modes were what it should have been. During this attempt to solve this issue; the aircraft continued on its straight-ahead flight path and with a strong westerly wind aloft; pushed us east and closer to [the restricted area]. Once realized that an anomaly occurred; the NAV mode was deselected and HDG made active. Three things have been learned. Firstly; future briefings will include the discussion that if something with the automation is not doing what we expect; we will disengage the AP and hand fly with a left turn to stay west of the Prohibited areas and not to attempt to correct the AP/FMA/FMS. Secondly; a quick call to ATC to advise them that we are starting the turn could have prevented any security issue with encroaching [the restricted area] as they have acknowledgment from the crew. Lastly; the anomaly should have been written up. Both the Captain and I discussed writing up the anomaly; especially since we likely encroached the [restricted area] airspace. However; after discussion of the fact that the remainder of the flight occurred without incident; that there were no indications of any further anomalies; that the flight did not have to be delayed with a write-up which likely could not be duplicated; to not delay the subsequent flight; and that it could be conducted safely as all systems were functioning normal; the anomaly was not written up. Returning [to base]; the anomaly occurred during the approach and it was written up. We waited until Maintenance arrived to discuss and to look over the onboard data logs and as expected; because the system does not record these anomalies; it could not be duplicated and no fault found.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.