Narrative:

ATC used radar vectors to place us inside the FAF on a modified left base to 28C. 28C is served by an RNAV approach that was loaded and active. After accepting the visual approach; I sequenced the approach in the FMS to provide a backup. When I looked up I noticed that the first officer (first officer) had set 1;600 (minimums for the approach) in the box. I asked him why he set it and he stated that that was the minimums. I announced 'you are getting low.' he did not change the descent path and when I looked down we were descending at 1;800 feet per minute. Just as I saw that the terrain warning went off. I instructed the first officer to climb. We did and resumed the visual approach manually. The first officer stated he believed captains did not want fos hand flying the aircraft on approach. I reminded him that visual approaches require us to hand fly below 1;500. Excessive descent rate as a result of over-reliance on automation and a lack of situational awareness combined with my inattentiveness while programming the FMS lead to a low altitude/terrain alert. If we had followed sops; I doubt this would have occurred. The first officer set a new altitude without announcing the change and used an excessive descent rate that wasn't needed. He may have been aided had our FMS had lpv capability. The gp would have signaled the excessive rate of descent and being below the 3 degree glide path.I would also suggest changing the responsibility of setting the altitude alerted to the pm (pilot monitoring). If the PF (pilot flying) has to request the change; 'secret' changes like this would be less common.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on approach to PIT.

Narrative: ATC used radar vectors to place us inside the FAF on a modified left base to 28C. 28C is served by an RNAV approach that was loaded and active. After accepting the visual approach; I sequenced the approach in the FMS to provide a backup. When I looked up I noticed that the FO (First Officer) had set 1;600 (minimums for the approach) in the box. I asked him why he set it and he stated that that was the minimums. I announced 'you are getting low.' He did not change the descent path and when I looked down we were descending at 1;800 feet per minute. Just as I saw that the terrain warning went off. I instructed the FO to climb. We did and resumed the visual approach manually. The FO stated he believed Captains did not want FOs hand flying the aircraft on approach. I reminded him that visual approaches require us to hand fly below 1;500. Excessive descent rate as a result of over-reliance on automation and a lack of situational awareness combined with my inattentiveness while programming the FMS lead to a low altitude/terrain alert. If we had followed SOPs; I doubt this would have occurred. The FO set a new altitude without announcing the change and used an excessive descent rate that wasn't needed. He may have been aided had our FMS had LPV capability. The GP would have signaled the excessive rate of descent and being below the 3 degree glide path.I would also suggest changing the responsibility of setting the altitude alerted to the PM (Pilot Monitoring). If the PF (Pilot Flying) has to request the change; 'secret' changes like this would be less common.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.