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Dispatcher reported that airbus A320 neo aircraft are getting a large number of ACARS MEL's and the dispatchers are not included in the loop and thus flight crews are not receiving dispatch's ACARS messages.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1588863 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201810 |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | A320 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Cruise |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Communication Systems |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Dispatcher |
| Qualification | Dispatch Dispatcher |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe |
Narrative:
The neo aircraft are continuing to get a large number of ACARS mels wrote up by pilots due to the static on the radios caused by ACARS messaging bleeding thru on the VH1 radio. I heard the pilots have a memo saying that they are getting a lot of feedback over the VH1 radio whenever the aircraft is reporting positions and other info thru ACARS VH3 radio. Dispatch seems to be the last to know on pilot memos. We used to be able to review pilot memos thru the company site; but this is no longer available for dispatchers. The main problem is when they put the ACARS inoperative on these aircraft it is causing an even more safety risk; not only for the dispatchers when they have to use arinc but also ATC trying to communicate. There have been a few cases where we are not able to communicate with the aircraft. A recent issue involved an ATC center missing a transfer of their frequency to a flight. ATC center calls dispatch and requests the dispatcher pass on the frequency to the aircraft. The dispatcher taking the call from ATC might not be the dispatcher that has operational control and sends the ACARS of the frequency not knowing ACARS is inoperative. ATC calls again asking the dispatcher to give a frequency to the aircraft again; this time the dispatcher that has the flight notices the other dispatchers were sending frequencies via ACARS to an aircraft that cannot receive ACARS. The dispatcher with operational control calls arinc and they cannot get ahold of the flight either [due] to too many squawk s on the radio. The crew finally takes their own initiative and calls an airport and [they] get ahold of ATC. By this time a violation is issued to the pilot for non-communicating with ATC. [Suggestions include] pilot memos need to be distributed to dispatch and let the dispatchers decide which ones that don't pertain to dispatch on a need to know bases. Instead of the dispatchers being blindsided. Dispatch resource management (drm) on operational control of another dispatcher needs some work. No dispatcher should be making decisions for the other dispatcher when they are in the room and available. Airbus needs to be if they have not been already and fix these new aircraft from getting frequency feedback thru ACARS reporting. Flight ops memos that might involve dispatch need to be forwarded to dispatch.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Dispatcher reported that Airbus A320 NEO aircraft are getting a large number of ACARS MEL's and the dispatchers are not included in the loop and thus flight crews are not receiving Dispatch's ACARS messages.
Narrative: The NEO aircraft are continuing to get a large number of ACARS MELs wrote up by pilots due to the static on the radios caused by ACARS messaging bleeding thru on the VH1 radio. I heard the pilots have a memo saying that they are getting a lot of feedback over the VH1 radio whenever the aircraft is reporting positions and other info thru ACARS VH3 radio. Dispatch seems to be the last to know on pilot memos. We used to be able to review pilot memos thru the company site; but this is no longer available for dispatchers. The main problem is when they put the ACARS inoperative on these aircraft it is causing an even more safety risk; not only for the dispatchers when they have to use ARINC but also ATC trying to communicate. There have been a few cases where we are not able to communicate with the aircraft. A recent issue involved an ATC Center missing a transfer of their frequency to a flight. ATC Center calls Dispatch and requests the dispatcher pass on the frequency to the aircraft. The dispatcher taking the call from ATC might not be the dispatcher that has operational control and sends the ACARS of the frequency not knowing ACARS is inoperative. ATC calls again asking the dispatcher to give a frequency to the aircraft again; this time the dispatcher that has the flight notices the other dispatchers were sending frequencies via ACARS to an aircraft that cannot receive ACARS. The dispatcher with operational control calls ARINC and they cannot get ahold of the flight either [due] to too many squawk s on the radio. The crew finally takes their own initiative and calls an airport and [they] get ahold of ATC. By this time a violation is issued to the pilot for non-communicating with ATC. [Suggestions include] pilot memos need to be distributed to dispatch and let the dispatchers decide which ones that don't pertain to dispatch on a need to know bases. Instead of the dispatchers being blindsided. Dispatch Resource Management (DRM) on operational control of another dispatcher needs some work. No dispatcher should be making decisions for the other dispatcher when they are in the room and available. Airbus needs to be if they have not been already and fix these new aircraft from getting frequency feedback thru ACARS reporting. Flight Ops memos that might involve dispatch need to be forwarded to dispatch.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.