Narrative:

During flight planning; we learned that the assigned aircraft had an issue on the previous day involving an APU fuel leak where the fuel feed lines attach to the APU fuel control unit resulting in a flight cancellation. We spoke with the [departure airport's] maintenance supervisor regarding the repair. He indicated that new fuel lines and seals had been flown in from ZZZ; the leaking lines were replaced and the APU was leak checked and run tested per procedure.we pushed a few minutes late due to an ATC gate hold but still expected to be in ZZZ ahead of schedule. During start of the left engine; the APU quit resulting in electrical power loss for approximately 30 seconds until the engine generator reached proper speed. The APU failure resulted in several EICAS and status messages. I initiated a satellite call to maintenance control and after discussion maintenance control advised a return to blocks. After block arrival at a hard stand; maintenance arrived [and] cleared all maintenance messages and restarted the APU. The APU was operating normally so maintenance requested another engine start using APU power. Another satellite call was placed to maintenance control to run the appropriate checklists and to get approval for a flight crew performed maintenance engine run. When approval was granted and appropriate personnel were in place; normal cockpit flows resulted in the APU again failing even before engine starter engagement.at this point it was determined that the APU was non-serviceable and would need to be put on MEL. I coordinated a new flight plan with dispatch; performed an engine start using ground air at the hard stand; and then performed a cross bleed start after gate departure.once airborne; we planned for gate arrival in ZZZ approximately 1:40 late. During the entire event; myself and my flight crew were very diligent in keeping the passengers apprised of the situation. According to the purser; as well as other flight attendants; the announcements were pivotal in the customers being accepting of the situation. With only one exception; all passengers were not really upset with the delay. About an [hour] from arrival at ZZZ; I asked my [relief pilot] to send a message to ZZZ station in order to be sure that ramp personnel were aware that an engine would be running until external power was attached and that I wanted ground power as soon as possible. After landing; we were advised that the gate had been changed. I then asked my [relief pilot] to call ops to remind them that an engine would be running on gate arrival and that we would need ground power immediately upon arrival. When we entered the alleyway; we found that there were no personnel in position and we called ramp. Although we were advised of the gate change - apparently the parking crew was not. As an aside; this is not the first time that this communication failure has occurred during a gate change involving flights that I have flown. After an extended delay; the parking crew arrived and we were pulled up to the gate. Unfortunately; there was no jet way driver and we were advised on the headset that ground power on [the] gate was inop. This would involve getting a gpu from another location. While waiting for the gpu; we saw ground personnel coming close to the running engine although the beacon was on and we had warned the station by ACARS and radio making us wonder if ground personnel were even aware that the engine was running.while waiting for the gpu; we again called operations asking why the jet bridge was not being attached. After several calls with no answer; I asked the [relief pilot] to try calling ramp. After explaining the situation to ramp; they were unwilling to help; simply saying 'call operations.' during this extended delay; we continued to make PA announcements; telling the passengers that we were calling inside and trying to get the aircraft door open as soon as we could. We finally made contact with operations and were advised thatthe [the county] has control of the gates and there was nothing that they could do other than call the [the county] again. After about 20 minutes the gpu finally arrived and we were able to secure the running engine. Of course; with the AC packs off; after about 5 minutes the cabin began to get warm so we started to call about the jet bridge again and again we were told about having no control over B gates. At this point I asked why we were put in this situation with an inop APU - the operations controller said that station personnel had probably not been notified. I informed him that we had sent an ACARS message an hour before landing and had called on his frequency taxiing in him the same information. The jet bridge finally arrived and passengers were deplaned. When I exited the aircraft; I was met by a customer service person who wanted to know why I had 'thrown him under the bus' with the passengers. I asked him what he was talking about and he proceeded to tell me that the passengers were angry; so I must have incited them with PA announcements blaming him for the jet bridge taking so long to be attached. I asked him if he had been told of such an announcement or had heard such an announcement and he indicated that he had not. I told him that I and my crew had; in fact; operated with the highest degree of professionalism to keep the passengers informed at every stage of the operation starting many hours earlier. I have no issue with the agent wanting more information on what had occurred but to imply that I or my crew had 'thrown him under the bus' was unprofessional.this is not an isolated occurrence during gate change at ZZZ but was especially concerning with the added issue of a running engine at the gate for an extended period and the safety hazard associated with that. Frankly; this was a substandard operation and needs to be addressed by station management. My intent is not to place blame; however; I would like to be informed as to why this happened and what procedures will be put in place to prevent this from happening in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier Captain reported multiple procedural failures involving passenger service and ground personnel on arrival.

Narrative: During flight planning; we learned that the assigned aircraft had an issue on the previous day involving an APU fuel leak where the fuel feed lines attach to the APU Fuel Control Unit resulting in a flight cancellation. We spoke with the [departure airport's] Maintenance Supervisor regarding the repair. He indicated that new fuel lines and seals had been flown in from ZZZ; the leaking lines were replaced and the APU was leak checked and run tested per procedure.We pushed a few minutes late due to an ATC gate hold but still expected to be in ZZZ ahead of schedule. During start of the left engine; the APU quit resulting in electrical power loss for approximately 30 seconds until the engine generator reached proper speed. The APU failure resulted in several EICAS and STATUS messages. I initiated a satellite call to Maintenance Control and after discussion Maintenance Control advised a return to blocks. After block arrival at a hard stand; Maintenance arrived [and] cleared all maintenance messages and restarted the APU. The APU was operating normally so Maintenance requested another engine start using APU power. Another satellite call was placed to Maintenance Control to run the appropriate checklists and to get approval for a flight crew performed maintenance engine run. When approval was granted and appropriate personnel were in place; normal cockpit flows resulted in the APU again failing even before engine starter engagement.At this point it was determined that the APU was non-serviceable and would need to be put on MEL. I coordinated a new flight plan with Dispatch; performed an engine start using ground air at the hard stand; and then performed a cross bleed start after gate departure.Once airborne; we planned for gate arrival in ZZZ approximately 1:40 late. During the entire event; myself and my flight crew were very diligent in keeping the passengers apprised of the situation. According to the Purser; as well as other flight attendants; the announcements were pivotal in the customers being accepting of the situation. With only one exception; all passengers were not really upset with the delay. About an [hour] from arrival at ZZZ; I asked my [Relief Pilot] to send a message to ZZZ Station in order to be sure that Ramp personnel were aware that an engine would be running until external power was attached and that I wanted ground power as soon as possible. After landing; we were advised that the gate had been changed. I then asked my [Relief Pilot] to call Ops to remind them that an engine would be running on gate arrival and that we would need ground power immediately upon arrival. When we entered the alleyway; we found that there were no personnel in position and we called Ramp. Although we were advised of the gate change - apparently the parking crew was not. As an aside; this is not the first time that this communication failure has occurred during a gate change involving flights that I have flown. After an extended delay; the parking crew arrived and we were pulled up to the gate. Unfortunately; there was no jet way driver and we were advised on the headset that ground power on [the] gate was inop. This would involve getting a GPU from another location. While waiting for the GPU; we saw ground personnel coming close to the running engine although the beacon was on and we had warned the station by ACARS and radio making us wonder if ground personnel were even aware that the engine was running.While waiting for the GPU; we again called OPS asking why the jet bridge was not being attached. After several calls with no answer; I asked the [Relief Pilot] to try calling Ramp. After explaining the situation to Ramp; they were unwilling to help; simply saying 'call OPS.' During this extended delay; we continued to make PA announcements; telling the passengers that we were calling inside and trying to get the aircraft door open as soon as we could. We finally made contact with OPS and were advised thatthe [the county] has control of the gates and there was nothing that they could do other than call the [the county] again. After about 20 minutes the GPU finally arrived and we were able to secure the running engine. Of course; with the AC packs off; after about 5 minutes the cabin began to get warm so we started to call about the jet bridge again and again we were told about having no control over B gates. At this point I asked why we were put in this situation with an inop APU - the OPS controller said that Station personnel had probably not been notified. I informed him that we had sent an ACARS message an hour before landing and had called on his frequency taxiing in him the same information. The jet bridge finally arrived and passengers were deplaned. When I exited the aircraft; I was met by a customer service person who wanted to know why I had 'thrown him under the bus' with the passengers. I asked him what he was talking about and he proceeded to tell me that the passengers were angry; so I must have incited them with PA announcements blaming him for the jet bridge taking so long to be attached. I asked him if he had been told of such an announcement or had heard such an announcement and he indicated that he had not. I told him that I and my crew had; in fact; operated with the highest degree of professionalism to keep the passengers informed at every stage of the operation starting many hours earlier. I have no issue with the agent wanting more information on what had occurred but to imply that I or my crew had 'thrown him under the bus' was unprofessional.This is not an isolated occurrence during gate change at ZZZ but was especially concerning with the added issue of a running engine at the gate for an extended period and the safety hazard associated with that. Frankly; this was a substandard operation and needs to be addressed by Station Management. My intent is not to place blame; however; I would like to be informed as to why this happened and what procedures will be put in place to prevent this from happening in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.