Narrative:

Upon a normal takeoff rwy 18R and initial climb; ATC directed a right turn to 220; around 6;000 feet; we experienced around four or five compressor stalls within five seconds on the right engine. We retarded the right engine to idle; and the stalls stopped. We waited for awhile; then slowly advanced the right engine to normal climb and all engine indications were normal. There was no frost or contamination on the aircraft during preflight; it was chilly. Since the air was moist and cool; I thought there might have been a possibility of icing forming [in] the engine fan blades; but then dissipated after initial climb. We talked about whether to continuing the flight and inform the company.the pm immediately recognized what had happened and informed me he mistakenly pushed the right engine fire switch in the dark just above the event switch.I looked at the flight time clock and we were 4 minutes into the flight. I said lets push the event button to record the engine event. The pm pushed the event button. But then; the right engine rolled back. I flew the plane and the pm recognized that in a very dark cockpit; he pushed the button just above the illuminated engine event sign.I said; 'let's run the QRH engine shutdown and restart checklists.' the pm accomplished the engine shutdown; then engine airstart procedure; and the engine restarted. All engine indications were normal. We informed company and were directed to continue to destination. While arriving for approach into destination; ATC informed us that company wanted us to divert to ZZZ1. We diverted to ZZZ1 and accomplished a normal approach and landing. The right engine performed normally throughout the flight after the engine restart.once all QRH and company matters were addressed; we discussed what we could have done better; and we concluded; when accomplishing abnormal or emergency procedures at night time in a very dark cockpit; it is especially important to slow down and illuminate the cockpit as necessary to clearly identify and confirm the appropriate controls and switches before activation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL30 Captain reported experiencing 4 to 5 compressor stalls on departure. The First Officer then mistakenly pushed the right engine fire switch causing a roll back of the right engine.

Narrative: Upon a normal takeoff rwy 18R and initial climb; ATC directed a right turn to 220; around 6;000 feet; we experienced around four or five compressor stalls within five seconds on the right engine. We retarded the right engine to idle; and the stalls stopped. We waited for awhile; then slowly advanced the right engine to normal climb and all engine indications were normal. There was no frost or contamination on the aircraft during preflight; it was chilly. Since the air was moist and cool; I thought there might have been a possibility of icing forming [in] the engine fan blades; but then dissipated after initial climb. We talked about whether to continuing the flight and inform the company.The PM immediately recognized what had happened and informed me he mistakenly pushed the right engine fire switch in the dark just above the event switch.I looked at the flight time clock and we were 4 minutes into the flight. I said lets push the event button to record the engine event. The PM pushed the event button. But then; the right engine rolled back. I flew the plane and the PM recognized that in a very dark cockpit; he pushed the button just above the illuminated engine event sign.I said; 'let's run the QRH Engine Shutdown and Restart checklists.' The PM accomplished the Engine Shutdown; then Engine Airstart procedure; and the engine restarted. All engine indications were normal. We informed company and were directed to continue to destination. While arriving for approach into destination; ATC informed us that company wanted us to divert to ZZZ1. We diverted to ZZZ1 and accomplished a normal approach and landing. The right engine performed normally throughout the flight after the engine restart.Once all QRH and company matters were addressed; we discussed what we could have done better; and we concluded; when accomplishing abnormal or emergency procedures at night time in a very dark cockpit; it is especially important to slow down and illuminate the cockpit as necessary to clearly identify and confirm the appropriate controls and switches before activation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.