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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1597972 |
Time | |
Date | 201811 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZID.ARTCC |
State Reference | IN |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Developmental |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
We were cpdlc testing and had many people in our area from all over the country for the testing. I was working out highs as an right side for about an hour when I was told to close my sector and run the list. The highs were combined to one sector and weren't really busy at all. I ran the list and ended up getting out a controller on the D side to our ultra high; D97/lockborne. Her briefing just mentioned that cpdlc was on and nothing more on this subject. The right side working had been in for at or more than an hour. We had a full page on uret [user request evaluation tool] and were red. After about 1-2 minutes of sitting; really just getting signed in and my settings adjusted; I had a cpdlc subject matter expert (sme) plug in with me on the D. Two more sme's stood right behind my right side as one was helping him with an aircraft that had a red X. I never really got the picture of the scope when my sme told me that the aircraft we had near ape; aircraft X; was a ZID cpdlc test flight and since we were the last ZID sector that we need to send him as many commands as possible. I had to answer a line; got back to my sme; and he was telling me I needed to give the plane a command but he will not act on it. We were simply seeing if the messages were going through. I confirmed what he said and asked 'are you sure he won't change altitude or his route?' to which a man's voice behind or beside me (I cannot pinpoint who said it) said everyone knows he's a test flight it's in the remarks. To which I replied; ok! Being my right side had been there at least an hour this assured me he knew the aircraft was a test flight. He was spacing to multiple airports as well and was very busy so I didn't want to bother him with something he already knew. My sme and I agreed on an altitude change uplink so I told him to climb to FL410; out of FL390. After I sent it; my sme asked me to pull up my message output box for cpdlc. As he was telling me how to open it; I hear my right side say traffic alert. I turned to look; and it was the test aircraft in confliction with another aircraft at FL400; head on! I had to tell him; no! He's a test flight he's not climbing! To which the right side asked for everyone to leave or backup to give him space as he had at least 3-4 smes behind us. The right side did give an evasive turn to the aircraft as well. There were so many issues leading up to this that could've been prevented. One; we should have been briefed! I cannot believe this was not a briefing item for this reason alone! Two; he should've been descended into our much less busy high stratum and let them deal with him. Lastly; it should have never been assumed everyone knew he was a test flight and would not act on commands just because of the remarks section. At minimum; this needed to be on our restriction board for all affected areas.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Indianapolis Center Controller reported that a test CPDLC aircraft was sent a test message to climb; and climbed; causing an airborne conflict. Test aircraft was to receive messages; not act on them.
Narrative: We were CPDLC testing and had many people in our area from all over the country for the testing. I was working out highs as an R side for about an hour when I was told to close my sector and run the list. The highs were combined to one sector and weren't really busy at all. I ran the list and ended up getting out a controller on the D side to our ultra high; D97/Lockborne. Her briefing just mentioned that CPDLC was on and nothing more on this subject. The R side working had been in for at or more than an hour. We had a full page on URET [User Request Evaluation Tool] and were red. After about 1-2 minutes of sitting; really just getting signed in and my settings adjusted; I had a CPDLC Subject Matter Expert (SME) plug in with me on the D. Two more SME's stood right behind my R side as one was helping him with an aircraft that had a red X. I never really got the picture of the scope when my SME told me that the aircraft we had near APE; Aircraft X; was a ZID CPDLC test flight and since we were the last ZID sector that we need to send him as many commands as possible. I had to answer a line; got back to my SME; and he was telling me I needed to give the plane a command but he will not act on it. We were simply seeing if the messages were going through. I confirmed what he said and asked 'Are you sure he won't change altitude or his route?' To which a man's voice behind or beside me (I cannot pinpoint who said it) said everyone knows he's a test flight it's in the remarks. To which I replied; OK! Being my R side had been there at least an hour this assured me he knew the aircraft was a test flight. He was spacing to multiple airports as well and was very busy so I didn't want to bother him with something he already knew. My SME and I agreed on an altitude change uplink so I told him to climb to FL410; out of FL390. After I sent it; my SME asked me to pull up my message output box for CPDLC. As he was telling me how to open it; I hear my R side say Traffic Alert. I turned to look; and it was the test aircraft in confliction with another aircraft at FL400; head on! I had to tell him; no! He's a test flight he's not climbing! To which the R side asked for everyone to leave or backup to give him space as he had at least 3-4 SMEs behind us. The R side did give an evasive turn to the aircraft as well. There were so many issues leading up to this that could've been prevented. One; we should have been briefed! I cannot believe this was not a briefing item for this reason alone! Two; he should've been descended into our much less busy high stratum and let them deal with him. Lastly; it should have never been assumed everyone knew he was a test flight and would not act on commands just because of the remarks section. At minimum; this needed to be on our restriction board for all affected areas.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.