Narrative:

3 runway operation at pit, land 10L, takeoff 10C, land and some takeoffs 10R. Due to weight my flight required longer runway 10R. There was a lot of chatter (radio) as all runways were being heavily utilized. Runways 10C and 10R were handed by 1 controller. Runway 10L was handed by another controller. We were lined up perpendicularly to runway 10R on a taxiway in #1 position for the runway. A flight of 3 MTR landed out of a 360 degree overhead pattern on runway 10R. With the MTR rolling out on the runway, the tower made a call. I missed the first part and it ended, '...runway 10R.' my first officer called to the tower, 'roger, air carrier X position and hold runway 10R.' there was no reply from the tower. I checked final approach--no aircraft. The first officer also checked. As we inched toward the runway I checked final again--no aircraft. In position and holding on runway 10R the tower called called and asked if we had taken the runway. The first officer replied 'roger...position and holding 10R.' tower then sidestepped a light trying to land 10C. The twin had apparently been cleared to land 10R originally. It also had apparently been cleared on a left base to land, which is why it was not visible from the cockpit. I then asked the tower if he had received our initial reply of 'roger...air carrier X position and hold runway 10R.' he replied that he had not since he was also talking to someone immediately after on runway 10C. There are many factors that led to this incident. Primarily was my not checking with the tower on the call that they first officer had misinterpreted and that I had not heard clearly. Checking the final approach is necessary and should always be done. It will prevent this happening 999 out of 1000 times. However in this instance, it failed to prevent the problem. How to prevent someone from taking a call to another aircraft and then misinterpreting it can only be done by the other crew member confirming the call initially, or if the call is missed, reconfirming the call with the tower. Especially with multiple operations when the controller does not acknowledged or correct a call he was not expecting.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF MLG HOLDING AT RWY 10R AT PIT UNDERSTOOD CLEARED INTO POSITION AND HOLD. FO ACKNOWLEDGED WITH CALL SIGN BUT TWR CTLR SOON QUESTIONED WHY THEY TAXIED ONTO RWY. HAD NOT CLEARED THE FLT AND HAD NOT HEARD THE CLRNC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

Narrative: 3 RWY OPERATION AT PIT, LAND 10L, TKOF 10C, LAND AND SOME TKOFS 10R. DUE TO WT MY FLT REQUIRED LONGER RWY 10R. THERE WAS A LOT OF CHATTER (RADIO) AS ALL RWYS WERE BEING HEAVILY UTILIZED. RWYS 10C AND 10R WERE HANDED BY 1 CTLR. RWY 10L WAS HANDED BY ANOTHER CTLR. WE WERE LINED UP PERPENDICULARLY TO RWY 10R ON A TXWY IN #1 POS FOR THE RWY. A FLT OF 3 MTR LANDED OUT OF A 360 DEG OVERHEAD PATTERN ON RWY 10R. WITH THE MTR ROLLING OUT ON THE RWY, THE TWR MADE A CALL. I MISSED THE FIRST PART AND IT ENDED, '...RWY 10R.' MY F/O CALLED TO THE TWR, 'ROGER, ACR X POS AND HOLD RWY 10R.' THERE WAS NO REPLY FROM THE TWR. I CHKED FINAL APCH--NO ACFT. THE F/O ALSO CHKED. AS WE INCHED TOWARD THE RWY I CHKED FINAL AGAIN--NO ACFT. IN POS AND HOLDING ON RWY 10R THE TWR CALLED CALLED AND ASKED IF WE HAD TAKEN THE RWY. THE F/O REPLIED 'ROGER...POS AND HOLDING 10R.' TWR THEN SIDESTEPPED A LIGHT TRYING TO LAND 10C. THE TWIN HAD APPARENTLY BEEN CLRED TO LAND 10R ORIGINALLY. IT ALSO HAD APPARENTLY BEEN CLRED ON A LEFT BASE TO LAND, WHICH IS WHY IT WAS NOT VISIBLE FROM THE COCKPIT. I THEN ASKED THE TWR IF HE HAD RECEIVED OUR INITIAL REPLY OF 'ROGER...ACR X POS AND HOLD RWY 10R.' HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT SINCE HE WAS ALSO TALKING TO SOMEONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER ON RWY 10C. THERE ARE MANY FACTORS THAT LED TO THIS INCIDENT. PRIMARILY WAS MY NOT CHKING WITH THE TWR ON THE CALL THAT THEY F/O HAD MISINTERPRETED AND THAT I HAD NOT HEARD CLEARLY. CHKING THE FINAL APCH IS NECESSARY AND SHOULD ALWAYS BE DONE. IT WILL PREVENT THIS HAPPENING 999 OUT OF 1000 TIMES. HOWEVER IN THIS INSTANCE, IT FAILED TO PREVENT THE PROB. HOW TO PREVENT SOMEONE FROM TAKING A CALL TO ANOTHER ACFT AND THEN MISINTERPRETING IT CAN ONLY BE DONE BY THE OTHER CREW MEMBER CONFIRMING THE CALL INITIALLY, OR IF THE CALL IS MISSED, RECONFIRMING THE CALL WITH THE TWR. ESPECIALLY WITH MULTIPLE OPS WHEN THE CTLR DOES NOT ACKNOWLEDGED OR CORRECT A CALL HE WAS NOT EXPECTING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.