Narrative:

During this event; I was working sector 68/66 combined. The weather was IFR with reports of light ice in the area. I just accepted four radar handoffs from ict approach; 2 hys arrivals; a gbd arrival and a gck arrival. 2 aircraft at 060 and 2 at 080. I then accepted a mpr arrival from SEC06 inside of ict approach's airspace descending to FL240; which needs to descend to 060 by ict boundary per LOA. This was a complex scenario because all aircraft requested radar vectors for ILS approaches at their destinations and the close proximity of all the aircraft. I was also having to go offline to issue multiple IFR clearances through FSS. The mpr arrival was on a vector for traffic descending to 090 initially then issued a descent to 060; traffic was the gbd arrival that I had on vectors for the ILS RY35. Everything was working fine then I started losing aircraft on radar! I inquired to the supervisor if there was any reported issues with the hti radar. He then informed me it was [going to be out of service for 8 hours] . This was never briefed to the controllers working or written down on any status information areas in SEC68/66. Why would anyone release a radar when it is IFR knowing all arrivals will need instrument approaches! This is not the first time this has happened in the last few months! This is unacceptable! At no time should navaids or radar sites be released for maintenance during IFR conditions. All aircraft were radar separated until the radar went out and then I didn't have any aircraft at the same altitude non-radar procedurally separated. The OM (operations manager) and flm (front line manage)] released the radar knowing the weather conditions and that is unsafe. This was the worst position I've been put in by someone's negligence.in the last few years; we had a lot of new flm's and OM's with very little experience. Most supervisors are on the computer not engaged on what's going on in the area. I see multiple flm's on the internet looking at sport scores when they have red sectors. No cell phones in the areas but flm's on [the web]; no accountability. It was always common practice for management to ask the opinion of the controllers working the sector when it came to releasing navaids or radar. How about they come up with a checklist when releasing equipment. I.e.; look at the weather forecast; forecasting IFR conditions don't release it. If VFR tentatively release it but coordinate with sector effected. I feel that management is not held to the same level of responsibility; they released the radar putting me in a bad situation and nothing happens. If they are unsure what to do ask the sector for their opinion!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Kansas City Center Controller reported that a radar system was released to maintenance during IFR conditions with highly complex traffic.

Narrative: During this event; I was working Sector 68/66 combined. The weather was IFR with reports of light ice in the area. I just accepted four radar handoffs from ICT Approach; 2 HYS arrivals; a GBD arrival and a GCK arrival. 2 aircraft at 060 and 2 at 080. I then accepted a MPR arrival from SEC06 inside of ICT Approach's airspace descending to FL240; which needs to descend to 060 by ICT boundary per LOA. This was a complex scenario because all aircraft requested RADAR vectors for ILS approaches at their destinations and the close proximity of all the aircraft. I was also having to go offline to issue multiple IFR clearances through FSS. The MPR arrival was on a vector for traffic descending to 090 initially then issued a descent to 060; traffic was the GBD arrival that I had on vectors for the ILS RY35. Everything was working fine then I started losing aircraft on RADAR! I inquired to the Supervisor if there was any reported issues with the HTI radar. He then informed me it was [going to be out of service for 8 hours] . This was never briefed to the controllers working or written down on any status information areas in SEC68/66. Why would anyone release a RADAR when it is IFR knowing all arrivals will need instrument approaches! This is not the first time this has happened in the last few months! This is unacceptable! At no time should NAVAIDS or Radar sites be released for maintenance during IFR conditions. All aircraft were RADAR separated until the RADAR went out and then I didn't have any aircraft at the same altitude non-radar procedurally separated. The OM (Operations Manager) and FLM (Front Line Manage)] released the radar knowing the weather conditions and that is unsafe. This was the worst position I've been put in by someone's negligence.In the last few years; we had a lot of new FLM's and OM's with very little experience. Most supervisors are on the computer not engaged on what's going on in the area. I see multiple FLM's on the internet looking at sport scores when they have red sectors. No cell phones in the areas but FLM's on [the web]; no accountability. It was always common practice for Management to ask the opinion of the controllers working the sector when it came to releasing NAVAIDS or RADAR. How about they come up with a checklist when releasing equipment. i.e.; look at the weather forecast; forecasting IFR conditions don't release it. If VFR tentatively release it but coordinate with sector effected. I feel that Management is not held to the same level of responsibility; they released the RADAR putting me in a bad situation and nothing happens. If they are unsure what to do ask the sector for their opinion!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.