Narrative:

Takeoff with navigation position lights inoperative with lights are required by the MEL. This did not effect airworthiness and only marginally effected safety as we had anti-collision lights above and below the fuselage and strobes on each wing. After a 25 min wait while taxiing into position for takeoff an aircraft behind us remarked on frequency that our navigation wing tip lights appeared to be inoperative. My second officer made a strong statement that they were on during his preflight inspection. I recycled the switch lights a couple of times as the tower remarked that they could see our strobes and anti-collision lights and subsequently cleared us for takeoff. Drawing on my 32 yrs of airline experience, I elected to take off with a belief that certain combinations of navigation lights could be inoperative until reaching the next airport where repairs could be made. This may or may not have been true in the past, but it is certainly not true today, as we found after checking the MEL on climb out. We also discovered the circuit breaker's for the position lights were pulled (out). Contributing factors: failure of the second officer to ensure that all 4 position light circuit breaker's were in (checklist item). Failure of the second officer to detect on preflight that the lights were inoperative, and yet at takeoff be so certain he saw them on his walk-around. My feeling that if all lights were operative on walk-around that once in flight they could be regained by troubleshooting system. Time constraints: taking the time to troubleshoot or check the MEL after taxiing into position would delay takeoff for many aircraft behind us. A long taxi to clear the runway due to many aircraft on adjacent taxiway. The fact that the tower had no qualms about clearing us for takeoff with the lights we had. (No intention to blame here--they are not responsible for my MEL knowledge.) neither the first officer nor second officer questioned my decision to takeoff or suggested that we check the MEL. In my crew briefing I had stressed that I gladly accepted questions or suggestions they may have concerning any abnormal or emergency situations we might encounter. Conclusion: while I do not believe safety of flight was an issue here, company regulations and procedure were not completely adhered to. This was not a deliberate act, however. In the future if events of this nature occur, I am certain taking as much time as necessary to be 100% sure of my facts will be foremost on my mind before proceeding.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING TAXI THE ACFT BEHIND REPORTER ADVISED REPORTER ACFT HAD NO WING TIP NAVIGATION LIGHTS. STROBES ON EACH WING AND TOP AND BOTTOM POSITION LIGHTS WERE OPERATIVE. CAPT ELECTED TO TAKE OFF.

Narrative: TKOF WITH NAV POS LIGHTS INOP WITH LIGHTS ARE REQUIRED BY THE MEL. THIS DID NOT EFFECT AIRWORTHINESS AND ONLY MARGINALLY EFFECTED SAFETY AS WE HAD ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS ABOVE AND BELOW THE FUSELAGE AND STROBES ON EACH WING. AFTER A 25 MIN WAIT WHILE TAXIING INTO POS FOR TKOF AN ACFT BEHIND US REMARKED ON FREQ THAT OUR NAV WING TIP LIGHTS APPEARED TO BE INOP. MY S/O MADE A STRONG STATEMENT THAT THEY WERE ON DURING HIS PREFLT INSPECTION. I RECYCLED THE SWITCH LIGHTS A COUPLE OF TIMES AS THE TWR REMARKED THAT THEY COULD SEE OUR STROBES AND ANTI-COLLISION LIGHTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED US FOR TKOF. DRAWING ON MY 32 YRS OF AIRLINE EXPERIENCE, I ELECTED TO TAKE OFF WITH A BELIEF THAT CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF NAV LIGHTS COULD BE INOP UNTIL REACHING THE NEXT ARPT WHERE REPAIRS COULD BE MADE. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TRUE IN THE PAST, BUT IT IS CERTAINLY NOT TRUE TODAY, AS WE FOUND AFTER CHKING THE MEL ON CLBOUT. WE ALSO DISCOVERED THE CB'S FOR THE POS LIGHTS WERE PULLED (OUT). CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FAILURE OF THE S/O TO ENSURE THAT ALL 4 POS LIGHT CB'S WERE IN (CHKLIST ITEM). FAILURE OF THE S/O TO DETECT ON PREFLT THAT THE LIGHTS WERE INOP, AND YET AT TKOF BE SO CERTAIN HE SAW THEM ON HIS WALK-AROUND. MY FEELING THAT IF ALL LIGHTS WERE OPERATIVE ON WALK-AROUND THAT ONCE IN FLT THEY COULD BE REGAINED BY TROUBLESHOOTING SYS. TIME CONSTRAINTS: TAKING THE TIME TO TROUBLESHOOT OR CHK THE MEL AFTER TAXIING INTO POS WOULD DELAY TKOF FOR MANY ACFT BEHIND US. A LONG TAXI TO CLR THE RWY DUE TO MANY ACFT ON ADJACENT TXWY. THE FACT THAT THE TWR HAD NO QUALMS ABOUT CLRING US FOR TKOF WITH THE LIGHTS WE HAD. (NO INTENTION TO BLAME HERE--THEY ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR MY MEL KNOWLEDGE.) NEITHER THE F/O NOR S/O QUESTIONED MY DECISION TO TKOF OR SUGGESTED THAT WE CHK THE MEL. IN MY CREW BRIEFING I HAD STRESSED THAT I GLADLY ACCEPTED QUESTIONS OR SUGGESTIONS THEY MAY HAVE CONCERNING ANY ABNORMAL OR EMER SITUATIONS WE MIGHT ENCOUNTER. CONCLUSION: WHILE I DO NOT BELIEVE SAFETY OF FLT WAS AN ISSUE HERE, COMPANY REGS AND PROC WERE NOT COMPLETELY ADHERED TO. THIS WAS NOT A DELIBERATE ACT, HOWEVER. IN THE FUTURE IF EVENTS OF THIS NATURE OCCUR, I AM CERTAIN TAKING AS MUCH TIME AS NECESSARY TO BE 100% SURE OF MY FACTS WILL BE FOREMOST ON MY MIND BEFORE PROCEEDING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.