Narrative:

The aircraft had bleed #1 MEL'd. We had flown one leg in it; and the aircraft flew normally. We departed ZZZ normally. The first officer was pilot flying. Climbing through FL185; bleed 2 fail EICAS annunciated soon after the anti-ice turned on automatically due to the ice detector detecting ice. I told ATC we needed to descend to 10;000 ft due to a pressurization problem. They cleared us to 10;000 ft. During the descent; and before I ran the QRH; I noted that the pressurization was holding and the cabin was not climbing. The ecs sys on the mfd indicated a red X over the #2 bleed valve but a green line running to pack 2; which was normal for the MEL condition (with the anti-ice on); and pack 2 green as well. I ran the QRH at that time. Bleed 2 reset as a result of the QRH procedure and operated normally thereafter.I evaluated our fuel; the weather; and all other pertinent conditions and after discussing it with the first officer; we thought it safe and prudent to continue to [destination]. As a precaution; we avoided icing conditions as much as possible to reduce any extra stress on the bleed system. Via ACARS; I notified dispatch of the failure and reset and that we were continuing to destination at 10;000 ft. The dispatcher sent us new fuel numbers and asked if we had notified maintenance. I asked the dispatcher to notify maintenance for us since we were busy. I also spoke to the flight attendants to check on them; since I thought they might have noticed the pressurization bump and the descent at an unusual point in the flight. They had not noticed.we landed in destination normally.I was not surprised the #2 bleed failed; considering the history in the maintenance logbook. There was a long history of bleed problems on this aircraft - both #1 and #2 bleeds. Anecdotally; I've noticed an uptick in bleed problems on the 190 based on reviewing the maintenance logbook of each aircraft I fly. From what I see on the line; there seem to be more issues with bleed valves than I've seen before. This aircraft should have been repaired earlier; considering its history of bleed failures. While it might be useful to reference [logbook deferral sheet] numbers to highlight history to maintenance when a pilot writes something up; it does seem logical that history is a consideration when maintenance determines whether or not an MEL is wise in lieu of repairing the aircraft; especially when the history is only one; two; or three pages previous.maintenance should be considering history of past mechanical issues in their determination of whether to fix aircraft; instead of pushing the fix onto overnights when flights won't be disrupted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-190 Captain reported overcoming bleed system failure enabling to continue to destination. Captain stated higher incidents of bleed system malfunctions on this aircraft type.

Narrative: The aircraft had bleed #1 MEL'd. We had flown one leg in it; and the aircraft flew normally. We departed ZZZ normally. The First Officer was Pilot Flying. Climbing through FL185; BLEED 2 FAIL EICAS annunciated soon after the anti-ice turned on automatically due to the ice detector detecting ice. I told ATC we needed to descend to 10;000 ft due to a pressurization problem. They cleared us to 10;000 ft. During the descent; and before I ran the QRH; I noted that the pressurization was holding and the cabin was not climbing. The ECS Sys on the MFD indicated a red X over the #2 bleed valve but a green line running to Pack 2; which was normal for the MEL condition (with the anti-ice on); and Pack 2 green as well. I ran the QRH at that time. Bleed 2 reset as a result of the QRH procedure and operated normally thereafter.I evaluated our fuel; the weather; and all other pertinent conditions and after discussing it with the First Officer; we thought it safe and prudent to continue to [destination]. As a precaution; we avoided icing conditions as much as possible to reduce any extra stress on the bleed system. Via ACARS; I notified Dispatch of the failure and reset and that we were continuing to destination at 10;000 ft. The Dispatcher sent us new fuel numbers and asked if we had notified Maintenance. I asked the Dispatcher to notify Maintenance for us since we were busy. I also spoke to the flight attendants to check on them; since I thought they might have noticed the pressurization bump and the descent at an unusual point in the flight. They had not noticed.We landed in destination normally.I was not surprised the #2 bleed failed; considering the history in the maintenance logbook. There was a long history of bleed problems on this aircraft - both #1 and #2 bleeds. Anecdotally; I've noticed an uptick in bleed problems on the 190 based on reviewing the maintenance logbook of each aircraft I fly. From what I see on the line; there seem to be more issues with bleed valves than I've seen before. This aircraft should have been repaired earlier; considering its history of bleed failures. While it might be useful to reference [Logbook Deferral Sheet] numbers to highlight history to maintenance when a pilot writes something up; it does seem logical that history is a consideration when maintenance determines whether or not an MEL is wise in lieu of repairing the aircraft; especially when the history is only one; two; or three pages previous.Maintenance should be considering history of past mechanical issues in their determination of whether to fix aircraft; instead of pushing the fix onto overnights when flights won't be disrupted.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.